Matthews v. State
| Decision Date | 11 June 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. PD–1341–13.,PD–1341–13. |
| Citation | 431 S.W.3d 596 |
| Parties | Cornelious L. MATTHEWS, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Wes Ball, Arlington, TX, for Appellant.
Danielle A. Kennedy, Assistant District Attorney, Fort Worth, TX, Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, TX, for The State.
Appellant was charged with possession with intent to deliver cocaine. He filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the crack cocaine that officers found during a warrantless search of a van that appellant had borrowed. After hearing the evidence, the trial judge ruled that appellant's original detention was reasonable and that he lacked standing to challenge the search of the van. A jury then found appellant guilty and sentenced him to twenty-two years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing that appellant lacked standing to challenge the van's search and upholding appellant's detention, even though it was based largely on information from an anonymous tip.1
We granted review to determine (1) whether a person who legitimately borrows a vehicle has standing to challenge its search, and (2) if appellant's initial and continued detention was supported by reasonable suspicion.2 We conclude that, although appellant originally had standing to challenge the search of the borrowed van, he abandoned any expectation of privacy (and hence his standing) when he fled from the officers and the van. Second, the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain appellant that was not based solely on the anonymous tip, and appellant's act of fleeing increased their suspicion and further justified his continued detention to await the arrival of a drug dog.
On July 23, 2009, at 11:11 p.m., Officer Zimpelman was dispatched to a food store on Hattie Street in Fort Worth to respond to an “anonymous” 911 call. Although the tipster did not leave her name, Officer Zimpelman's “call screen” displayed the tipster's phone number and address. According to the caller, a black male named Neil Matthews, wearing a white muscle shirt and dark pants, was selling “crack” out of a white van parked in front of the store. This was a high-crime area, known for drug and weapons arrests.
When Officer Zimpelman pulled up to the food store, he saw a white van in front of it. He stopped behind the van, got out of his patrol car, and walked up to the passenger side window of the van, while his partner, Officer Smith, approached the driver's side. Appellant was in the driver's seat of the van, wearing a white muscle shirt and dark pants. He was just sitting there with the keys in the ignition and the engine off.
When Officer Zimpelman looked in the passenger window, he could see appellant's right hand, but appellant's left hand was hidden from view. Concerned that appellant was hiding a weapon “because that area is known for pretty much a high crime rate area,” Officer Zimpelman told appellant to show his other hand, but appellant ignored him.3 When Officer Zimpelman repeated his request, appellant said that he was showing his hands, even though his left hand remained hidden by the driver's side door. Because it was close to midnight, difficult to see, and a high crime area, Officer Smith told appellant to get out of the van after he had repeatedly refused to show both his hands. Officer Smith led appellant to the back of the van and frisked him. Appellant was unarmed. When Officer Zimpelman asked appellant for his name, he said, “Cornelious Matthews.”
Based on the details from the anonymous tip, the fact that appellant's name was very similar to “Neil Matthews” (the name provided by the tipster), and appellant's gestures, Officer Zimpelman asked for consent to search the van. Appellant refused, stating that the van was not his, so he could not allow the search.4 Officer Zimpelman explained to appellant that “he was sitting in the driver's seat, so therefore he's in the care, custody, and control of the vehicle, that he can provide ... permission.” Appellant responded “I don't even have the keys.” Officer Zimpelman reminded him that the keys were in the ignition, but appellant still did not consent to the search.
Officer Zimpelman called dispatch and requested a K–9 unit. When appellant heard that request, and his breathing became “more rapid, kind of the fight or flight response.” Officer Zimpelman told a third officer to put appellant in the back of the squad car for further investigation. But as the officers walked to the squad car, appellant took off running. Officer Zimpelman pursued appellant on foot for several blocks, finally caught him, and brought him back to the squad car. When they returned, the anonymous tipster was at the scene and identified herself as the caller. When officers discovered that she had outstanding warrants, they arrested her as well.
K–9 Officer Macy arrived with his dog, Hutch, and conducted an “open-air sniff” around the van. Hutch alerted, so the officers searched the van and found a package of marijuana in the driver's-side door pocket and crack cocaine in a small compartment behind the driver's seat.5 The officers arrested appellant on drug charges.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress, but after hearing the testimony of Officer Zimpelman, Officer Macy, and appellant, the trial judge denied the motion. The judge stated that appellant did not own or have any possessory interest in the van, and thus he did not have standing to challenge the search. 6 A year later, right before the trial began, appellant filed another motion to suppress that challenged his original detention while also rearguing the standing issue. After hearing testimony from the same witnesses, the trial judge ruled that appellant had standing to challenge the detention and search of his person, but that the detention and search were reasonable under the circumstances.7 He again concluded that appellant lacked standing to challenge the search of the van.
The court of appeals agreed that appellant did not have standing to challenge the search of the van.8 Because appellant did not have complete dominion and control over the van and because the “owner's grant of permission to Appellant to be in the vehicle does not rise to a claim of privacy consistent with historical notions of privacy[,]” he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the van.9
The court of appeals also held that appellant's detention was supported by reasonable suspicion.10 When the officers arrived at the food store, they were able to corroborate some of the tipster's story—a man wearing the described clothing was sitting in the described vehicle.11 In addition, the officers knew that the location was a “high-crime, high-drug area.” 12 After they approached the windows of the van, appellant refused to comply with instructions to show both of his hands.13 Although a Terry frisk did not uncover any drugs or weapons, “the other facts known to the officers by personal observation increased the indicia of reliability of the anonymous tip.” 14 The court of appeals held that the entire investigative detention was lawful.15 We granted review of both of those holdings.
In his second ground for review, appellant argues that his continued detention after the Terry frisk was unlawful because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion; it was supported only by the 911 call of an anonymous tipster. Appellant now purports to concede that the officers' original approach, request for him to get out of the van, and the pat-down search were permissible. He argues that “the Constitutional line was crossed” when officers wanted him to sit in the patrol car and wait for approximately fifteen to twenty-five minutes for a drug dog to arrive, rather than release him when they did not find anything illegal during the Terry frisk or initial investigation.16 Appellant nevertheless continues, within his brief, to challenge the propriety of the initial detention. We therefore address the constitutionality of the detention from its inception.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a brief investigatory detention must be justifiedby reasonable suspicion.17 “A police officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” 18 In determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to detain, we look at the totality of the circumstances through an objective lens, disregarding the officer's subjective intent.19 Although some circumstances may seem innocent in isolation, they will support an investigatory detention if their combination leads to a reasonable conclusion that criminal activity is afoot.20
An anonymous tip alone is seldom sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.21 Reasonable suspicion is dependant not only on the content of the information possessed by law enforcement, but also on its reliability.22 To support reasonable suspicion, an anonymous tip requires some indicia that the caller is credible or that his information is reliable.23
Reasonable suspicion is not a carte blanche for a prolonged detention and investigation. The investigatory detention must be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” 24 An officer must act to confirm or dispel his suspicions quickly.25 But the temporary detention may continue for a reasonable period of time until the officers have confirmed or dispelled their original suspicion of criminal activity.26 One reasonable method of confirming or dispelling the reasonable suspicion that a vehicle contains drugs...
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