Chairperson, Conn. Med. Examining Bd. v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n

• Decision Date: 15 October 2013
• Docket Number: No. 19055.,19055.
• Citation: 77 A.3d 121,310 Conn. 276
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CHAIRPERSON, CONNECTICUT MEDICAL EXAMINING BOARD, et al., v. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

310 Conn. 276

77 A.3d 121

CHAIRPERSON, CONNECTICUT MEDICAL EXAMINING BOARD, et al.,

v.FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION et al.

No. 19055.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 15, 2013.

Decided Oct. 15, 2013.

Kerry Anne Colson, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was George Jepsen, attorney general, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Victor Perpetua, principal attorney, with whom, on the brief, was Tracie C. Brown, principal attorney, for the appellee (named defendant).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH and McDONALD, Js.

ZARELLA, J.

This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, the Connecticut Medical Examining Board (board) and its chairperson, from the judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal from a final decision of the named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), in favor of the complainants, Attorney Michael K. Courtney and the Office of the Chief Public Defender.¹ The trial court concluded that the commission properly had found that an executive session convened by the board on February 17, 2009, was not permissible under the Freedom of Information Act (act), General Statutes § 1–200 et seq. The board convened the executive session to obtain legal advice about issues raised in a letter from the complainants dated February 13, 2009 (letter), regarding their request for a declaratory ruling. The plaintiffs claim that the board was permitted to convene in executive session under the act because the letter demanded legal relief and, therefore, constituted notice of a pending claim as defined by § 1–200(8). In addition, the plaintiffs claim that the executive session was permitted under the act because it involved discussions of strategy and negotiations as defined by § 1–200(6)(B). The commission responds that the letter did not constitute notice of a pending claim but, rather, that the complainants merely noted a potential conflict of interest and suggested a course of action. We agree with the commission and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The commission found the following facts in its final decision dated December 16, 2009. On January 8, 2009, the complainants submitted a “Request for a Declaratory Ruling” to the board asking: “Is physician participation in the execution of condemned Connecticut inmates using lethal injection permitted?” On February [310 Conn. 279]13, 2009, the complainants sent a letter to Assistant Attorney General Thomas J. Ring noting a potential conflict of interest in his possible representation of the board and Robert Galvin, the Commissioner of Public Health.² The complainants also sent the board a copy of this letter.

At its February 17, 2009 meeting, the board convened in executive session for approximately five minutes to discuss what it deemed to be the “pending claim” contained in the letter to Ring. The next day, the complainants filed a complaint with the commission, alleging that the plaintiffs had “violated the ... [a]ct by convening in executive session during the ... [meeting] for purposes not permitted under the [a]ct.” ³ The complainantsthus requested, inter alia, that the commission order the board to disclose the content of the discussions held during the executive session.

After a hearing on the matter, the commission concluded that the letter “merely point[ed] out what [the complainants] considered to be a ‘potential’ conflict and only suggested that the ... board be provided with outside legal counsel before issuing a decision related to the request for a declaratory ruling.” (Emphasis in original.) The commission determined that the letter thus did not constitute a pending claim, which may be discussed in executive session under § 1–200(8), because the complainants had deliberately phrased the letter in a way that avoided any implication that they were demanding relief or that they intended to institute an action regarding the potential conflict of interest. In addition, the commission concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the board discussed “strategy” and “negotiations,” for which executive sessions are permitted under § 1–200(6)(B). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) As a result, the commission determined that the executive session was impermissible under the act and ordered that the plaintiffs “strictly comply” with the provisions of General Statutes § 1–225(a) in the future.

The plaintiffs appealed from the commission's final decision to the trial court, which upheld the commission's decision on June 28, 2011. The trial court agreed that the letter did not constitute notice of a pending claim under § 1–200(8) because the letter itself was “ample evidence that the complainants were not demanding legal relief or asserting a legal right.” In fact, the trial court characterized the plaintiffs' position as “unreasonable....” The trial court therefore dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal. This appeal followed.⁴

On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the letter constitutes notice of a pending claim because the letter threatens a claim of conflict of interest or bias, demands legal relief in connection with the request for the declaratory ruling, and challenges the board's right to counsel through the Office of the Attorney General. The commission counters that the letter does not constitute notice of a pending claim because it does not threaten a conflict of interest or bias claim and only suggests that the board retain outside counsel before issuing the declaratory ruling. In addition, the commission contends that the complainants did not have the right to challenge the board's right to counsel through the Office of the Attorney General under General Statutes § 3–125.

This court reviews the trial court's judgment pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4–166 et seq. Under the UAPA, “it is [not] the function ... of this court to retry the case or to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 298 Conn. 703, 716, 6 A.3d 763 (2010). Even for conclusions of law, “[t]he court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse if its discretion.... [Thus] [c]onclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts.... [Similarly], this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statute's purposes.... Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ... involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.... Furthermore, when a state agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny ... the agency is not entitled to special deference.... We have determined, therefore, that the traditional deference accorded to an agency's interpretation of a statutory term is unwarranted when the construction of a statute ... has not previously been subjected to judicial scrutiny [or to] ... a governmental agency's time-tested interpretation....” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 716–17, 6 A.3d 763. In the present case, the issue before this court requires us to construe § 1–200(6)(B) and (8) to determine whether the letter constitutes notice of a pending claim.⁵ Consequently, because the commission's interpretation has not been “subjected to judicial scrutiny or consistently applied by the agency over a long period of time,” our review is de novo. Id., at 717, 6 A.3d 763.

“When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 301 Conn. 323, 338, 21 A.3d 737 (2011). In the present case, the parties contest the meaning of two terms contained within the definition of “pending claim” in § 1–200(8): “demand for legal relief” and “intention to institute an action in an appropriate forum if such relief or right is not granted.” We therefore examine the relevant statutes to determine whether the letter qualifies as a pending claim under § 1–200(8).

The act requires that “[t]he meetings of all public agencies, except executive sessions, as defined in subdivision (6) of section 1–200, shall be open to the public.” General Statutes § 1–225(a). Section 1–200(6) defines an executive session as “a meeting of a public agency at which the public is excluded” for one of five specified purposes.⁶ This court has narrowly construed these purposes because “the general rule under the ... [a]ct is disclosure....” New Haven v. Freedom of...