Mauldin v. Dyna-Color/Jack Rabbit
| Decision Date | 13 November 1990 |
| Docket Number | DYNA-COLOR,No. 1578,1578 |
| Citation | 303 S.C. 326,400 S.E.2d 494 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Virginia Gaynell MAULDIN, Claimant, Respondent, v./JACK RABBIT and Northwestern National Insurance Company, Appellants. . Heard |
James J. Reid, Greenville, for appellants.
Larry C. Brandt, Brandt & Fedder, Walhalla, for respondent.
This is a workers' compensation case. Virginia Gaynell Mauldin filed a claim with the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission for a job-related injury to her knee. Her employer, Dyna Color/Jack Rabbit, contested the claim on the ground that it was barred by the two-year statute of limitations, Section 42-15-40, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976. The single commissioner and a panel of the full commission found the claim was timely. Jack Rabbit sought judicial review in the circuit court, which affirmed the Commission's order. Jack Rabbit appeals. We reverse.
On January 2, 1985, Mauldin tripped on an uneven edge of the doorway of the film collection booth where she worked, injuring her knee. She immediately reported the accident to her supervisor, who instructed her to seek medical attention. She went to the Oconee Memorial Hospital where she was treated in the emergency room by Dr. Stan Rampey. Dr. Rampey diagnosed her injury as "medial collateral strain" with some bruising. He directed her to use crutches for at least four days and to follow up with her regular physician, Dr. Pate. She continued to work without any lost time or wages. Jack Rabbit paid her medical bills.
The knee got better within a short time and Mauldin resumed her normal activities. During the next two years the knee would periodically get sore, swell, and hurt, but then get better. She reported her knee problem to Dr. Pate on several occasions, but the doctor gave her no treatment for the problem. She also told her supervisor at work that the knee was still giving her problems. In October 1987, the knee swelled and would not go down. The pain became so severe that Mauldin could not tolerate it. On November 1, 1987, Mauldin consulted Dr. Bruce, an orthopedic surgeon, who diagnosed her condition as a "torn medial miniscus." On December 3, 1987, Bruce performed surgery on the knee. Mauldin returned to work on December 10, 1987. She filed this claim for compensation with the Commission on December 30, 1987, over two years and eleven months after the accident.
Jack Rabbit admits that Mauldin injured her knee by accident arising out of and in the course of her employment. It also admits she timely notified her employer of the accident.
Mauldin stipulates that neither the employer nor the insurance carrier by word or by deed led her to delay the filing of her claim. She also agrees the facts of her case do not support a theory that Jack Rabbit either waived or is estopped to assert the statute of limitations.
The sole issue before us is whether the two year limitation period of Section 42-15-40 runs from the date of the accident or the date the employee discovers the injury. This is a question of first impression in the courts of South Carolina.
Section 42-15-40 provides:
The right to compensation under this title shall be forever barred unless a claim is filed with the Commission within two years after an accident, or if death resulted from accident, within two years of the date of death; provided, however, that in the case of occupational disease claims such two-year period shall not begin to run until the employee concerned has been definitively diagnosed as having an occupational disease and has been notified of such diagnosis. * * * *
In interpreting the statute, we follow the guidance of the Supreme Court. The Court stated in Ashe v. Rock Hill Hardware Co., 219 S.C. 159, 64 S.E.2d 396 (1951), that although this section should be given liberal construction the courts are not justified in construing it so as to do violence to its specific requirements. See also Fox v. Union-Buffalo Mills, 226 S.C. 561, 86 S.E.2d 253 (1955) (). The statute applies with full force to the most meritorious claims. Likewise, the Court held in Kirby v. Holliday Laundry & Dry Cleaners, 230 S.C. 412, 96 S.E.2d 61 (1957), that the language of this section is plain. Thus, the courts are not at liberty by judicial construction to add to or amend its provisions so as to excuse a claimant from complying with its mandatory requirements.
The compensation afforded by the Workers' Compensation Law is purely statutory, and the right of any claimant thereto is dependent on the terms and conditions of the statute. Cook v. Mack's Transfer and Storage, 291 S.C. 84, 352 S.E.2d 296 (Ct.App.1986), cert. denied, 292 S.C. 230, 355 S.E.2d 861 (1987). Section 42-15-40 states that the right to compensation "shall be forever barred unless a claim is filed with the Commission within two years after an accident."...
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