Ashe v. Rock Hill Hardware Co., 16486

Decision Date02 April 1951
Docket NumberNo. 16486,16486
Citation219 S.C. 159,64 S.E.2d 396
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesASHE v. ROCK HILL HARDWARE CO. et al.

Hayes & Hayes, Rock Hill, Wise, Whaley & McCutchen, Columbia, for appellants.

Finley & Turner, York, for respondent.

HENDERSON, Acting Associate Justice.

This appeal is concerned with the section of the Workmen's Compensation Act which provides that the right to compensation shall be forever barred unless a claim is filed with the Industrial Commission within one year after the accident. Code, § 7035-27.

On June 13, 1946, the respondent, Jim N. Ashe, an employee of the Rock Hill Hardware Company, was accidently injured while loading sheets of roofing tin on a truck. He reported the incident to R. E. Barron, the president of the company, and was sent by him to Dr. Strait for treatment. The physician was not in his office that afternoon, and the respondent returned to work the following day. The second day after the injury he was examined by Dr. Strait and remained away from his work for two days. Dr. Strait diagnosed the injury as a sprained back. He strapped up the respondent's back and saw him three times, the last being on June 22, 1946.

On June 17, 1946, Dr. Strait made out the Industrial Commission form known as the surgeon's report, showing a non-permanent injury and ability to return to work in several days. On July 8, 1946, Dr. Strait completed commission form No. 14, showing termination of respondent's disability, and that as of June 22nd he was able to return to work without permanent injury. In the meantime, on June 19, 1946, as required by section 7035-69 of the Code, Mr. Barron had completed and forwarded to the Commission the form known as the first report of injury, showing that the respondent returned to work on June 18th.

After being discharged by Dr. Strait, the respondent continued to work for the hardware company and received his full wages. On July 31, 1946, the appellants filed with the Commission the form designated as the closing report, showing an accident in which no time was lost, with $9.00 medical bill paid, and stating that the report closed the case.

Although the respondent's back continued to trouble him, it was not until January, 1948, a year and a half after the accident, that he again consulted Dr. Strait. He was advised to have certain teeth pulled, and went to bed for six weeks in April and May, 1948, but continued to draw his full wages. About this time he consulted a chiropractor, and worked on until August, 1948, when he was referred by Dr. Strait to Dr. Love, who sent him to a hospital in Charlotte. It was there found that he had a fractured disc, and on September 10, 1948, he was operated upon at the Johns Hopkins hospital.

He received no wages from September 1, 1948, until January 1, 1949, the time he was at Johns Hopkins and immediately thereafter. On January 1, 1949, he returned to work at the hardware company, and is employed there now.

No formal written claim was filed by the respondent with the Industrial Commission until March 29, 1949, which was almost three years after the accident.

The first step he took with reference to asserting a claim for compensation was after his return from Baltimore, at which time the insurance carrier was notified about his operation, and he received a letter from the insurance company on September 29, 1948, denying liability for the reason that no claim had been filed within a year.

The Industrial Commission found as a fact that while the respondent did not formally notify the Commission in writing of his accident within one year, the reason for such failure was that he was led to believe by his employer that it was being filed for him, that the defendants by their conduct waived any formal notice by the employee to the Industrial Commission, and that they are estopped to set up or claim the bar of the statute of limitations.

On appeal to the Circuit Court the award of the Commission was affirmed.

In certain instances an employer and its insurance carrier may waive a failure of an employee to file his claim in due time with the Commission or they may become estopped by their conduct. Gold v. Moragne, 202 S.C. 281, 24 S.E.2d 491; Lowther v. Standard Oil Company, 206 S.C. 286, 33 S.E.2d 889; Young v. Sonoco Products Company, 210 S.C. 146, 41 S.E.2d 860; Duncan v. Gaffney Manufacturing Company, 214 S.C. 502, 53 S.E.2d 396.

In the present case the Commission strongly relied upon the following testimony of the respondent:

'Q. Mr. Ashe, at the time of the injury, who did you report it to? A. Mr. Barron.

'Q. Did you give written notice of your injury to the South Carolina Industrial Commission? A. No, sir.

'Q. Why did you not do so? A. I reported it to Mr. Barron. I did not know I was supposed to.

'Q. What did he say he would do? A. He said he would take care of it.

'Q. Mr. Barron said he would take care of it. Who did he send you to, Dr. Strait? A. Yes, sir.

'Q. Did you go to Dr. Strait? A. Yes, sir.

'Q. State whether or not you relied upon Mr. Barron's statement that he would report it to the South Carolina Industrial Commission? A. Yes, sir.

'Q. Did he report it to the South Carolina Industrial Commission? I will show you the report of injury form dated June 19, 1946. A. I guess he did.

'Q. (Indicating) Is that his signature? A. Yes, sir.

'Q. Did you later go to Mr. Barron and inquire as to whether or not he had reported it? A. When I came from Charlotte, from the hospital at Charlotte, I asked him had he reported it, and he said he did.'

It seems perfectly clear that all of this conversation related to the notice of the injury rather than to the filing of a claim for compensation. Sections 7035-25 and 7035-26 provide for the initial report of an injury to the employer. Their purpose is to enable the employer to investigate the claim and to give prompt medical attention if necessary. The filing with the Commission of a claim for compensation is an altogether different requirement, its object being to protect employers and their insurance carriers against long delayed demands. Wallace v. Campbell Limestone Company, 198 S.C. 196, 17 S.E.2d 309.

It was said in the case of Burnhart v. Dunean Mills, 214 S.C. 113, 51 S.E.2d 377, 380, that 'It is true that the employer had knowledge of the injury but the Act not only requires that the employee give notice to the employer of the accident, 7035-25 and 7035-26 of the 1942 Code, but also that any claim for compensation be made within one year thereafter. The reports heretofore mentioned which were filed with the Industrial Commission by appellants within one year of the accident do not constitute the filing of a claim as required by Statute. The employer is required to make these reports even though no claim for benefits has been made. If such reports were always sufficient to constitute the filing of a claim, it would never be necessary for the employee to comply with the statutory requirement as to filing claims within one year after the accident.'

And in Young v. Sonoco Products Co., above, the Court stated that 'The fact that claimant may have been unaware of the requirement as to filing a claim within one year furnishes no legal excuse for not filing her claim.' [...

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4 cases
  • Altman v. Williams Furniture Co.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 10 August 1967
    ...377; Duncan v. Gaffney Mfg. Co., 214 S.C. 502, 53 S.E.2d 396; Samuel v. Appleton Co., 214 S.C. 157, 51 S.E.2d 508; Ashe v. Rock Hill Hardware Co., 219 S.C. 159, 64 S.E.2d 396; Fox v. Union Buffalo Mills, 226 S.C. 561, 86 S.E.2d 253; Kirby v. Holiday Laundry & Dry Cleaners, 230 S.C. 412, 96 ......
  • Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. South Carolina Second Injury Fund, 21703
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 6 May 1982
    ...rule does not apply to all claims of which one has no knowledge before the limitations period has run. See Ashe v. Rock Hill Hardware Co., 219 S.C. 159, 64 S.E.2d 396 (1951). There must be some finality with a limitations period, and unless the legislature extends the period by including th......
  • Kirby v. Holliday Laundry & Dry Cleaners
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 2 January 1957
    ...v. Gaffney Mfg. Co., supra, 214 S.C. 502, 53 S.E.2d 396; Samuel v. Appleton Co., 214 S.C. 157, 51 S.E.2d 508; Ashe v. Rock Hill Hardware Co., 219 S.C. 159, 64 S.E.2d 396; and Fox v. Union Buffalo Mills, 226 S.C. 561, 86 S.E.2d In the following decisions it was held that the employer or the ......
  • Mauldin v. Dyna-Color/Jack Rabbit
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 13 November 1990
    ...* * * * In interpreting the statute, we follow the guidance of the Supreme Court. The Court stated in Ashe v. Rock Hill Hardware Co., 219 S.C. 159, 64 S.E.2d 396 (1951), that although this section should be given liberal construction the courts are not justified in construing it so as to do......

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