Mauldin v. Dyna-Color/Jack Rabbit

• Decision Date: 22 October 1991
• Docket Number: DYNA-COLOR,No. 23637,23637
• Citation: 308 S.C. 18,416 S.E.2d 639
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Virginia Gaynell MAULDIN, Petitioner, v./JACK RABBIT and Northwestern National Insurance Company, Respondents. . Heard

Page 639

416 S.E.2d 639

308 S.C. 18

Virginia Gaynell MAULDIN, Petitioner, v. DYNA-COLOR/JACK RABBIT and Northwestern National Insurance

Company, Respondents.

No. 23637.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard Oct. 22, 1991.

Decided April 13, 1992.

Rehearing Denied May 6, 1992.

Larry C. Brandt of Brandt, Fedder, Graham & Cain, Walhalla, for petitioner.

James J. Reid, Greenville, for respondents.

FINNEY, Justice:

This Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision in this Workers' Compensation case. Mauldin v. Dyna-Color, 303 S.C. 326, 400 S.E.2d 494 (Ct.App.1990). The South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) found that Petitioner Virginia Gaynell Mauldin was entitled to all medical care and compensation as provided by the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act (Act) for an injury sustained on January 2, 1985, but for which a claim was filed after the two-year statutory period for filing had expired.

The circuit court affirmed the Commission's finding, based upon its conclusion that the case was appropriate for application of the discovery rule. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court, finding that petitioner's claim was barred by S.C.Code Ann. § 42-15-40 (1976). After review of the record and consideration of the applicable law, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to the Commission for a determination of the amount of benefits to which the petitioner is entitled.

While at work on January 2, 1985, petitioner injured her left knee. She immediately reported the accident to her supervisor and, after finishing the work day, received treatment in the Oconee Memorial Hospital Emergency Room. The emergency room physician diagnosed the injury as a "medical collateral sprain," advised the petitioner to use crutches for at least four days, and see her family physician periodically. She lost no time from work as a result of her injury. Respondents Dyna-Color/Jack Rabbit, petitioner's employer, and Northwestern National Insurance Company, its insurance carrier, paid petitioner's medical expenses. The case was processed as "medical only," minor injury, and closed.

During the two-year period following the injury, petitioner experienced intermittent swelling and pain in the knee. Her family physician diagnosed the condition as arthritis. Dyna-Color was kept aware of petitioner's continuing problems with her knee. In October of 1987, petitioner had an episode of swelling and soreness which did not dissipate. As a result petitioner was seen by an orthopedic surgeon, and she discovered on November 1, 1987, that she had suffered a "torn medial meniscus." The knee did not respond to conservative treatment, and surgery was required.

As a result of the January 2, 1985, injury petitioner filed a claim on December 30, 1987, for compensation under the Act.

The issue on appeal is whether the two-year limitation period provided in Section 42-15-40 runs from the date of the accident or the date petitioner discovered the compensable injury. The Court of Appeals held that the date of petitioner's accident and the date of discovery were the same. Section 42-15-40 states in pertinent part:

The right to compensation under this title shall be forever barred unless a claim is filed with the Commission within two years after an accident....

Under the discovery rule, the statute would begin to run from the date petitioner either knew or should have known of her compensable injury.

In Santee Portland Cement v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 299 S.C. 269, 271, 384 S.E.2d 693, 694 (1989), this Court addressed the discovery rule, as it relates to statutes of limitations, in the following manner:

One policy behind the statute of limitations is the protection of a defendant from false or fraudulent claims that might be difficult to disprove if not brought until after relevant evidence has been lost or destroyed and witnesses have become unavailable ... It affords defendants an opportunity to gather evidence while facts are still fresh ... This concern must be balanced against a plaintiff's interest in prosecuting an action and pursuing his rights. Plaintiffs should not suffer where circumstances prevent them from knowing they have been harmed ... "[S]tatutes of limitation which are susceptible to judicial construction should not be applied mechanically but rather construed in the manner most consistent with both their underlying purposes and the requirements of substantial justice for all parties involved." [Quoting Gattis v. Chavez, 413 F.Supp. 33, 39 (D.S.C.1976).]

Citing Krell v. South Carolina Hwy. Dep't, 237 S.C. 584, 589, 118 S.E.2nd 322, 325 (1961), this Court held in Brayboy v. Clark Heating Co., --- S.C. ----, 409 S.E.2d 767 (1991), that a claim of change of condition within...