Mauler v. Titus

• Decision Date: 20 March 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-91,84-91
• Citation: 697 P.2d 303
• Parties: Joseph P. MAULER, Plaintiff, v. Keith TITUS, Bill Nation, and Mike Gregorio, Defendants.
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 303

697 P.2d 303

Joseph P. MAULER, Plaintiff, v. Keith TITUS, Bill Nation, and Mike Gregorio, Defendants.

No. 84-91.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 20, 1985.

Harold Frederick Buck of Kline & Buck, Cheyenne, for plaintiff.

William D. Bagley and Mary L. Scheible of Bagley, Hickey, Evans & Statkus, Cheyenne, for defendants.

Blair Trautwein, Amicus Curiae Committee, The Wyoming Trial Lawyers Association, Cheyenne, filed an amicus curiae brief.

Before THOMAS ^*, ROSE, ROONEY ^**, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, Justice.

The United States District Court for the District of Wyoming certified to this court ¹ the following question pertaining to the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, §§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804, W.S.1977:

"If an employee is injured in the month immediately subsequent to the month of hire and prior to the reporting date for the month of hire, how does W.S. § 27-12-103(c) operate regarding the potential loss of employer immunity?"

We have agreed to answer this question which requires an interpretation of the statutory provisions relating to an employer's exposure to suit for failure to pay the premiums on an injured employee's earnings.

FACTS

In late July of 1982, defendant Keith Titus hired plaintiff Joseph Mauler to perform plumbing and other work in the renovation of the Plains Hotel in Cheyenne, Wyoming. On August 4, 1982, plaintiff sustained work-related injuries when a portion of the hotel's ceiling collapsed on him. Plaintiff applied for and has received benefits for his injuries from the worker's compensation fund.

Plaintiff brought this action in federal district court, alleging that his employer, Titus, a co-employee, Bill Nation, and a contractor, Mike Gregorio, caused his injuries through their willful and wanton or negligent conduct. Defendants Titus and Nation moved the court to dismiss the claims against them or, in the alternative, to grant summary judgment, based on their immunity to suit under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act.

In resistance to the defendants' motion, plaintiff asserted that Titus had lost his immunity to suit by his failure to make timely payments to the worker's compensation fund, as required by § 27-12-201(a), W.S.1977, ² for the months of May, June, July and August, 1982. Affidavits of R. Peter Simpson, principal compliance officer for the Worker's Compensation Division of the State of Wyoming, establish that Titus submitted the disputed payments and payroll reports, together with statutory penalties for late payment, ³ as follows:

The Federal District Court asks this court to determine whether an employer, who has contributed to the worker's compensation fund according to the above schedule, retains his immunity to suit under Wyoming law.

IMMUNITY PROVISIONS OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT

The Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act represents a compromise between the employer and the employee: in exchange for contributing to the compensation fund for the benefit of the injured or the heirs of a deceased employee, the employer receives absolute immunity from all common-law rights of action in tort for the employee's work-related injury or death. Parker v. Energy Development Co., Wyo., 691 P.2d 981 (1984); Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., Wyo., 687 P.2d 885 (1984); Meyer v. Kendig, Wyo., 641 P.2d 1235 (1982). Article 10, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution, as amended in 1914, authorizes the Worker's Compensation Act and confers immunity upon employers contributing on behalf of their employees "as required by law":

" * * * As to all extra hazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for the accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each person injured in such employment or to the dependent families of such as die as the result of such injuries, except in case of injuries due solely to the culpable negligence of the injured employee. * * * The right of each employee to compensation from such fund shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any and all rights of action against any employer contributing as required by law to such fund in favor of any person or persons by reason of any such injuries or death." (Emphasis added.)

Section 27-12-103(a), W.S.1977, restates the Constitution's exclusive-remedy provisions:

"The rights and remedies provided in this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] for an employee and his dependents for injuries incurred in extrahazardous employments are in lieu of all other rights and remedies against any employer making contributions required by this act, or his employees acting within the scope of their employment unless the employees are culpably negligent, but do not supersede any rights and remedies available to an employee and his dependents against any other person."

Section 27-12-103(c), W.S.1977, describes the conditions which must occur before an employer can be considered out of compliance with the law and subject to suit:

"This act does not limit or affect any right or action by any employee and his dependents against an employer for injuries received while employed by the employer when the employer at the time of the injuries has not qualified under this act for the coverage of his eligible employees, or having qualified, is either delinquent in the payment of premium on an injured employee's earnings for three (3) months immediately prior to the date of injury, or one (1) quarterly payroll reporting period when privileged to report quarterly. When an employee's employment starts within the month or yearly quarter of the date of injury, the status of delinquency or not contributing shall not apply until after the regular payroll reporting date."

Under the express provisions of this statute, an injured employee may sue his employer in tort if the employer is delinquent in making contributions on that injured employee's earnings for three months (or one quarter) immediately prior to the injury. In the event an employee incurs an injury in the month or quarter of his hire, "the status of delinquency" applies after the regular payroll reporting date rather than immediately prior to the date of injury. In answering the question certified to this court, we must determine the statute's application to an employee injured in the month following the month of his employment, a situation not explicitly covered by § 27-12-103(c).

Plaintiff's Position

Plaintiff focuses on the language in Art. 10, § 4 of the Constitution and similar language in § 27-12-103(a) which says that the Worker's Compensation Act provides an injured employee's exclusive remedy against an employer contributing to the compensation fund "as required by law." Plaintiff contends that his employer failed to contribute as required by law since payments for the months of May, June, July and August, 1982, were submitted late, in violation of § 27-12-201(a), supra n. 2. Therefore, plaintiff urges, his employer was delinquent and cannot claim the immunity available to lawfully contributing employers under our worker's compensation enactments. Plaintiff rounds out this position by characterizing the specific provisions of § 27-12-103(c) as exceptions to the general rule of no immunity for noncomplying employers, mandated by the Constitution and § 27-12-103(a). Since the present employment situation does not fit within the circumstances described by § 27-12-103(c), the rule of common-law liability controls, according to plaintiff.

Alternatively, plaintiff suggests that the last sentence of § 27-12-103(c) applies to all situations where an employee has worked less than three months at the time of his injury. ⁵ In such cases, the employer's payment record on the injured employee's earnings as of the next regular reporting date after the injury would control the employer's immunity to suit. Under this theory, an employee who had worked only one month at the time of his injury could, in addition to claiming worker's compensation benefits, sue his employer in tort if the employer were one day late in paying the premium on that month's earnings.

Legislative Intent

A basic tenet of our judicial system holds that a statute must be read in light of its purpose. People v. Platte Pipe Line Company, Wyo., 649 P.2d 208, 212 (1982). We do not think plaintiff's reading of our worker's compensation laws comports with the legislative intent in establishing an industrial insurance program to provide relief to injured workers. Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., supra; Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981 (1918).

Under our rules of statutory interpretation, we have a duty to make sense out of a statute and give full force and effect to the legislative product. McGuire v. McGuire, Wyo., 608 P.2d 1278, 1285 (1980). We presume legislative enactments to be reasonable and logical, Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295, 1298 (1979), and will ascertain intent from the language of the statute whenever possible. McGuire v. McGuire, supra; Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, supra. In addition, we must interpret together statutes relating to the same subject to avoid conflicting and confusing results. Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, supra.

Section 27-12-103(c), as we have said, provides that an employer loses his immunity to suit if he is

" * * * delinquent in the payment of premiums on an injured employee's earnings for three (3) months immediately prior to the date of injury."

For an employee injured in the month of hire,

" * * * the status of delinquency or not contributing shall not apply until after the regular payroll reporting date."

To ascertain the legislative intent with respect to an employer's loss of immunity when an employee is injured in the month following his hire, we must determine the meaning of the term "delinquent" as used in the statute and then decide...