Mayfield v. Goshen Volunteer Fire Co. Inc.

• Decision Date: 02 August 2011
• Docket Number: No. 18378.,18378.
• Citation: 301 Conn. 739,22 A.3d 1251
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Patricia H. MAYFIELD, Commissioner of Laborv.GOSHEN VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY, INC.

301 Conn. 739

22 A.3d 1251

Patricia H. MAYFIELD, Commissioner of Labor

v.GOSHEN VOLUNTEER FIRE COMPANY, INC.

No. 18378.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 18, 2011.Decided Aug. 2, 2011.

Richard T. Sponzo, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, former attorney general, and Philip M. Schulz, assistant attorney general, for the appellant (plaintiff).Ian E. Bjorkman, New Haven, for the appellee (defendant).ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, McLACHLAN, EVELEIGH and HARPER, Js.HARPER, J.

The plaintiff, Patricia H. Mayfield, the commissioner of labor (commissioner), appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction the commissioner's warrant application seeking to inspect the premises of the defendant, Goshen Volunteer Fire Company, Inc. (fire company), to investigate whether the fire company was in compliance with the requirements of Connecticut's Occupational Safety and Health Act (act),¹ General Statutes § 31–367 et seq.² The commissioner contends that the trial court improperly concluded that the fire company does not fall within the act's definition of a covered employer as “the state and any political subdivision thereof....” General Statutes § 31–367(d). We agree with the trial court and, accordingly, affirm its judgment.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The fire company is a nonprofit, nonstock membership corporation that serves as the primary source of fire suppression for the town of Goshen (town).³ All members of the fire company are volunteers; they receive no salary or pension but are eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits from the town. The fire company has its own bylaws and constitution, under which its members elect officers, who are in turn responsible for the company's operations; the town plays no role in officer selection or operations. The town has an oral contract with the fire company for fire protection, which may be terminated on sixty days' notice. The fire company leases its land, which it previously gave to the town, and its building from the town for $1 per year. Many of the company's vehicles are town financed, though the company has purchased some through independent fundraising.

The present litigation arose after the commissioner was denied access to the fire company's firehouse for the purpose of conducting an inspection to see if it was in compliance with safety and health requirements. In response, the commissioner applied to the Superior Court for a warrant to inspect the firehouse pursuant to General Statutes § 31–374(a). The warrant application alleged that a videotape of members of the fire company conducting a “live burn” training exercise without wearing full protective gear required under the respiratory protection standards of the act provided probable cause to believe that conditions in the firehouse posed a threat to health or safety.

The fire company moved to dismiss the warrant application for want of subject matter jurisdiction. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion, holding that the fire company falls outside the scope of the act, which grants the commissioner jurisdiction only over an “[e]mployer,” which is defined in § 31–367(d) as “the state and any political subdivision thereof....” The trial court reasoned that, because it is not a unit of government but, rather, an independent corporation, the fire company does not fall within the meaning of “political subdivision” in § 31–367(d) and therefore is not an employer under the act. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the commissioner's warrant application. This appeal followed.

The commissioner claims that the trial court improperly limited its analysis to the question of whether the fire company itself is apolitical subdivision of the state, contending that the fire company should be deemed a covered employer if it is an agency of a political subdivision. The commissioner further contends that the fire company's status as an agency of the town should be determined by applying the “functional equivalent” test developed in case law to determine whether a nominally private corporation is a “[p]ublic agency”; General Statutes § 1–200(1); for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act. General Statutes § 1–200 et seq. The commissioner contends that, under this test, the fire company is an agency of the town and, accordingly, an employer subject to the act. The fire company responds by claiming that the trial court properly construed the plain and unambiguous meaning of the term political subdivision in § 31–367(d) to exclude the fire company and that the act's text does not support reliance on the functional equivalent test. We agree with the fire company.

Before turning to the merits of the commissioner's claim, we first address the proper standard for this court's review. “The standard of review for a court's decision on a motion to dismiss is well settled. A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction.... [O]ur review of the court's ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tayco Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 294 Conn. 673, 679, 986 A.2d 290 (2010). The issue in this case, namely, whether the trial court properly concluded that the fire company is not a political subdivision for purposes of § 31–367(d), is one of statutory construction. It is therefore a question of law over which we exercise plenary review. Id.

“When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pasquariello v. Stop & Shop Cos., 281 Conn. 656, 663–64, 916 A.2d 803 (2007).

We begin with General Statutes § 31–369, which sets forth the act's scope. That section provides in relevant part: “This chapter applies to all employers, employees and places of employment in the state except the following: (1) Employees of the United States government; and (2) working conditions of employees over which federal agencies other than the United States Department of Labor exercise statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or regulations affecting occupational safety and health.” (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 31–369(a). Despite what would appear at first blush to be broad coverage, § 31–367 clarifies and constrains the act's scope by specifying in relevant part: “ ‘Employer’ means the state and any political subdivision thereof”; General Statutes § 31–367(d); and “ ‘[e]mployee’ means any person engaged in service to an employer in a business of his employer....” General Statutes § 31–367(e). Because the definition of employee requires that there be a statutory employer, the threshold inquiry regarding the coverage of § 31–369(a) must be whether the fire company can be characterized properly as an employer in § 31–367(d) by virtue of falling within the bounds of “the state and any political subdivision thereof....”

The act does not define the term political subdivision. “Such silence does not, however, necessarily equate to ambiguity....” Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 419, 862 A.2d 292 (2004). Rather, “[t]he test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Orr, 291 Conn. 642, 654, 969 A.2d 750 (2009).

Examination of other labor provisions included in title 31 of the General Statutes also does not yield any definition of political subdivision. In the absence of a statutory definition, we turn to General Statutes § 1–1(a), which provides: “In the construction of the statutes, words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language; and technical words and phrases, and such as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood accordingly.” “To ascertain the commonly approved usage of a word, we look to the dictionary definition of the term.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stone–Krete Construction, Inc. v. Eder, 280 Conn. 672, 678, 911 A.2d 300 (2006). Black's Law Dictionary, quoting directly from an opinion of this court that predates the act's passage, State ex rel. Maisano v. Mitchell, 155 Conn. 256, 263, 231 A.2d 539 (1967), has defined political subdivision as “[a] division of the state made by proper authorities thereof, acting within their constitutional powers, for purpose of carrying out a portion of those functions of state which by long usage and inherent necessities of government have always been regarded as public.” ⁴ Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979).

The legislature's use of this term throughout the General Statutes accords with this dictionary definition and more specifically enumerates...