McAdam v. Fed. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.

• Citation: 288 Mass. 537,193 N.E. 362
• Parties: McADAM v. FEDERAL MUT. LIABILITY INS. CO.
• Decision Date: 10 December 1934
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

288 Mass. 537

193 N.E. 362

McADAM

v.FEDERAL MUT. LIABILITY INS. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Dec. 10, 1934.

Suit by Cecillia McAdam against the Federal Mutual Liability Insurance Company. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Goldberg, Judge.

E. Martin and P. Thibodeau, both of Boston, for appellant.

M. J. Dray, of Hyde Park, for appellee.

PIERCE, Justice.

This is a suit in equity which was submitted to a judge of the Superior Court upon the bill, answer, and agreed statement of facts. A decree was entered for the plaintiff, and the case comes before this court on the appeal of the defendant. The plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant liability insurance company under the provisions of the automobile compulsory insurance law, the amount of a judgment in favor of the plaintiff which was obtained on July 10, 1933, as the result of an action against one Otto V. Carlson for personal injuries, expenditures for medicine, medical care and attention, including doctor's bills and X-rays, following an accident which occurred on March 2, 1929, when an automobile driven by said Carlson was in collision with another automobile in which the present plaintiff was a passenger. Carlson was an assured of the defendant insurance company and was covered by a statutory policy issued on January 10, 1929. There was no extra-territorial or property damage coverage.

The issue formulated by the defendant is, ‘Can the plaintiff maintain this bill in equity, which was commenced * * * [by writ dated] August 24, 1933, under G. L. c. 214, § 3, cl. 10, to satisfy a judgment obtained on July 10, 1933, against an assured of the defendant in an action of tort on a general verdict for bodily injuries, expenses for medicines, medical care and attention, doctors' bills, and X-rays on account of a statutory Massachusetts motor vehicle liability policy that was issued by the defendant to its assured on January 10, 1929?’

The policy in question was a Massachusetts motor vehicle liability policy issued on January 10, 1929, and contained only the statutory coverage, and in so far as is important in this case it indemnified ‘against loss by reason of the liability to pay damages to others for bodily injuries, includingdeath at any time resulting therefrom, sustained during the term of this Policy.’ St. 1925, c. 346, § 2, as amended by St. 1926, c. 368, § 2, St. 1928, c. 381, § 4. This statute was amended by St. 1930, c. 340, § 1, and as amended reads: “Motor vehicle liability policy' * * * provides indemnity * * * against loss by reason of the liability to pay damages to others for bodily injuries, including death at any time resulting therefrom, or consequential damages consisting of expenses incurred by a husband, wife, parent or guardian for medical, nursing, hospital or surgical services in connection with or on account of such bodily injuries or death, sustained during the term of said policy. * * *' It is the contention of the insurance company that the amendment to the statute, adding indemnity for ‘consequential’ damages, is a legislative declaration that it was never intended that consequential damages, however defined, should be covered by any statute until 1930, that is to say, the Legislature had in mind when it enacted St. 1930, c. 340, § 1, that persons receiving ‘bodily injuries' had no statutory insurance protection which covered medical bills, doctors' bills, X-rays or nursing expenditures, and that it indicated by St. 1930, c. 340, § 1, its intention to cover only ‘consequential’ damages sustained by the persons named in the statute then enacted, on account of such bodily injuries.

The case of Cormier v. Hudson, 284 Mass. 231, 187 N. E. 625, relied on by the defendant, does not support its contention that a person suffering bodily injuries caused by the wrong of another may not recover against that person, and ultimately under the statute against the insurer of the wrongdoer, by way of compensation all expenses caused by the injury which are incurred in an attempt to avoid or lessen the damages sustained. Such damages include medicine, medical attendance, and reasonable compensation for care and nursing. Lewis v. Springfield, 261 Mass. 183, 187, 158 N. E. 656;Mitchell v. Springfield, 261 Mass. 188, 158 N. E. 658;Cassidy v. Constantine, 269 Mass. 56, 168 N. E. 169, 66 A. L. R. 1186. Indeed, the inference is strong that the Legislature did not provide protection of the sort referred to in St. 1930, c. 340, for a person suffering from bodily injuries, because it supposed such person was fully provided for by existing statutes. The damages for bodily injuries sustained by the party injured are both consequential and direct results of the injuries, while the pecuniary damages caused by the injury, sustained by others, are entirely consequential. Williams v. Nelson, 228 Mass. 191, 196, 117 N. E. 189, Ann. Cas. 1918D, 538;Wilson v. Grace, 273 Mass. 146, 154, 173 N. E. 524.

The record discloses that...