McAllister v. St. Louis Merchants' Bridge Terminal Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 March 1930
• Docket Number: 27144
• Parties: Florence McAllister, Administratrix of Estate of William McAllister, v. St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Railway Company, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

25 S.W.2d 791

324 Mo. 1005

Florence McAllister, Administratrix of Estate of William McAllister, v. St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Railway Company, Appellant

No. 27144

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 5, 1930

Editorial Note:

This Pagination of this case accurately reflects the pagination of the original published, though it may appears out of sequence. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Rehearing Granted, Reported at 324 Mo. 1005 at 1020.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Granville Hogan, Judge.

Affirmed.

J. L. Howell and R. E. Blodgett for appellant.

(1) There was not sufficient evidence to justify the submission of this cause to the jury, and the court should have directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. Illinois State Trust Co. v. Ry. Co., 5 S.W.2d 368; St. Louis-San Francisco Railroad Co. v. Conarty, 238 U.S. 243; Lang v. Railroad Co., 255 U.S. 455; McCalmont v. Railroad Co., 283 F. 736; Rittenhouse v. Railroad Co., 299 Mo. 199; C. R. I. & P. Railroad v. Guthridge, 179 P. 590; Schendel v. Ry. Co., 206 N.W. 436; Nealis v. Ry. Co., 218 N.W. 125; P. & R. Ry. Co. v. Cannon, 296 F. 302. (2) Plaintiff's instruction numbered 1 was erroneous in that it was based upon facts not in evidence. Schendel v. Ry. Co., 206 N.W. 436.

Abbott, Fauntleroy, Cullen & Edwards and Charles P. Noell for respondent.

(1) The separation of the cars, taken in connection with the proof that the coupler was broken, is evidence sufficient to establish negligence and liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and under the common law. Gotschall's Case, 244 U.S. 66; C. B. & Q. Railroad Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 559; Meade v. Water & Steam Sup. Co. (Mo.), 300 S.W. 515; Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. 64; Eckhardt v. Electric Mfg. Co. (Mo.), 235 S.W. 170. (2) Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish a prima-facie case for the plaintiff. Frisco v. Railroad Co., 200 Mo.App. 691; Union Stock Yards Co. v. Conoyer (Nebr.), 59 N.W. 950; C. B. & Q. Railroad Co. v. Gunderson (Ill.), 51 N.E. 704; Schlerth v. Railroad, 115 Mo. 87; Lynch v. Railroad Co., 208 Mo. 1; Rine v. Railroad Co., 100 Mo. 228. (3) Circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show that the violation of the Federal Act was a proximate cause of the injury. Erie Railroad Co. v. Caldwell, 264 F. 947; Erie Railroad Co. v. Russell, 183 F. 722; Philadelphia & R. Railroad v. Eisenhart, 280 F. 271; Davis v. Wolff, 263 U.S. 243; B. & O. Railroad Co. v. Tittle, 4 F.2d 818; Minneapolis etc. Railroad Co. v. Goneau, 269 U.S. 406; Tennessee Railroad Co. v. Drake, 276 F. 393; Donegan v. B. & O., 165 F. 869. (4) The fact that the coupler broke, causing the train of cars to part and causing the two loaded cars in question to roll down switch track 21, was sufficient to establish a violation by defendant of the Safety Appliance Act. Phila. & R. Ry. Co. v. Eisenhart, 280 F. 275; M. & St. L. Railroad Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U.S. 66, 61 L.Ed. 995; L. & N. Railroad Co. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617, 61 L.Ed. 931. (5) The so-called rule that an inference cannot be placed upon an inference, or that a fact established by inference cannot be used as the basis for a further inference or deduction, is not a sound rule of law, or, at any rate, is one that cannot be applied, and is not generally applied, as a general, all-embracing rule, as a test by which to determine whether a case is made for the jury where circumstantial evidence must be relied upon. The true rule is that is passing upon a demurrer to the evidence the plaintiff is to be accorded the benefit of every inference which may be fairly and legitimately drawn from the facts in evidence -- every inference which a jury might, with any degree of propriety, have inferred in plaintiff's favor; that the court is not at liberty to make inferences of fact in favor of the defendant to countervail or overthrow either presumptions of law or inferences of fact in favor of the plaintiff; that any number of inferences may be so drawn and utilized in plaintiff's behalf, provided the facts in evidence afford a reasonable basis therefor; and that where circumstantial evidence is relied upon to estalish the causal connection, the real question is whether the circumstances afford substantial evidence from which it may fairly be inferred that there is reasonalbe probability that the injury resulted proximately, in a natural continuous sequence, from the negligence or wrongful act, so as to take the case out of the realm of conjecture and within the field of legitimate inference. 1 Wigmore on Evidence (2 Ed.) 258, sec. 41; Buesching v. Gas Light Co., 73 Mo. 219; Stewart v. Gas Light Co. (Mo.), 241 S.W. 909; Hatchett v. Rys. Co. (Mo.), 175 S.W. 878; Lynch v. Railroad, 208 Mo. 1, 21; Rine v. Railroad, 100 Mo. 228; Troll v. Drayage Co., 254 Mo. 332; Souder v. Railroad, 100 Mo. 673; Settle v. Railroad, 127 Mo. 336; Daly v. Pryor, 197 Mo.App. 583; Reynolds v. Casualty Co., 274 Mo. 83; Briscoe v. Railroad, 200 Mo.App. 691; Hays v. Railroad, 111 U.S. 228, 28 L.Ed. 410; National Biscuit Co. v. Litzky, 22 F.2d 939, 56 A. L. R. 583; Northern Railway Co. v. Page, 274 U.S. 65, 71 L.Ed. 929; Cincinnati etc. Ry. Co. v. Thorp, 223 F. 615; Shugart v. Ry. Co., 133 F. 509; McDonald v. Ry. Co., 74 F. 104; Railway v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 24 L.Ed. 256; Postal Telegraph Co. v. Zopfi, 73 F. 609; Burghardt v. Ry. Co., 206 Mich. 545, 5 A. L. R. 1333; Fuchs v. St. Louis, 133 Mo. 199. (6) The rule of the Federal courts pertinent to the matter in hand is that it is only necessary for the plaintiff to establish by evidence circumstances from which it may fairly be inferred that there is reasonable probability that the injury resulted proximately from the negligence or wrongful act, so as to take the case out of the realm of conjecture and within the field of legitimate inference. Hays v. Railroad, 111 U.S. 228, 28 L.Ed. 410; National Biscuit Co. v. Litzky, 22 F.2d 939, 56 A. L. R. 583; Northern Railway Co. v. Page, 274 U.S. 65, 71 L.Ed. 929; Cincinnati etc. Ry. Co. v. Thorp, 223 F. 615; Shugart v. Ry. Co., 133 F. 509; McDonald v. Ry. Co., 74 F. 109; Railway v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 24 L.Ed. 256; Postal Telegraph Co. v. Zopfi, 73 F. 609.

Lindsay, C. Seddon and Ellison, CC., concur.

OPINION

LINDSAY

Upon the original hearing of this cause on appeal the judgment rendered in favor of respondent was affirmed, in accordance with an opinion prepared and filed by the Presiding Judge of this Division. Later, appellant's motion for a rehearing was sustained, and the cause was again submitted upon the original briefs, and upon a supplemental brief filed on behalf of respondent.

The vital question in the case, and the question uppermost in mind in granting a rehearing, was that of whether a submissible case was made in the showing of a causal connection between the existence of a defective car coupler, and the death of respondent's husband. A further consideration of the record and of the questions raised, and particularly the question especially under consideration in granting the rehearing, has led to the conclusion that the right result was reached under the original submission.

The issues, the evidence, the effect of the authorities cited by appellant, and the conclusion reached thereon are admirably set forth in the original opinion. Except for some brief additional statements relative to the question of proof of causal connection between the defective coupler and the death of respondent's husband, nothing can be added to the original opinion. The statements therein contained and herein adopted are as follows:

"Plaintiff sued for damages resulting from fatal injuries alleged to have been received by her husband, William McAllister. The action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and Safety Appliance Act against several defendants, but dismissed as to all except appellant, St. Louis Merchants Bridge Terminal Railway Company. The deceased was employed as a switchman at the time his mortal injuries were received and plaintiff's specifications of negligence were as follows:

"'(1) By reason of the carelessness and negligence of the defendants in hauling and using in the said train on their lines two freight cars on which the coupling apparatus on such cars were out of repair, old, worn and defective, and the drawbars, couplers, knuckles, knuckle locks and pins of which were old, worn and defective, so that they were likely to become uncoupled and allow the train to part, and by reason thereof the train did come apart as they were switching same, causing two cars to roll down a track and run upon and over William McAllister, killing him instantly, in violation of the laws of the United States and of the Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893 (27 Statutes at Large 531 Chap. 196), as amended by Act of March 2, 1903 (32 Statutes at Large 943, Chap. 976).

"'(2) The said two cars were being used and hauled on their lines by the defendants, common carriers by railroad engaged in interstate commerce, and were being used in connection with engines, tenders and cars used in moving interstate commerce, and were not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact, in violation of the laws of the United States and of the Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893 (27 Statutes at Large 531, Chap. 196), as amended by Act of March 2, 1903 (32 Statutes at Large 943, Chap. 976), but were equipped with couplers which were not in workable and usable condition, in that while used in the aforesaid train which was being moved and switched at Madison, Illinois, the couplers of the said cars came apart, causing cars to run over William McAllister, who was killed instantly.

"'(3) The agents and servants on said train, while doing the switching, moved the said cars by their engine...