McAnaw v. Tiffin
| Decision Date | 20 April 1898 |
| Citation | 45 S.W. 656,143 Mo. 667 |
| Parties | McAnaw, Appellant, v. Tiffin et al |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied 143 Mo. 667 at 680.
Appeal from Clinton Circuit Conrt. -- Hon. William S. Herndon Judge.
Affirmed.
Carlton Henry, H. T. Herndon and J. J. McAnaw for appellant.
(1) A release deed in the ordinary form may convey title. Wilson v. Albert, 89 Mo. 537. (2) A release or quitclaim deed does not operate upon the land itself nor upon the title directly. Bogy v. Shoab, 13 Mo. 380. (3) A mere naked release deed to one not in possession or having a vested interest would be void. Branham v. Mayor, 24 Call, 606; Bennett v. Irwin, 3 Johns. 366; Kerr v. Freeman, 33 Miss. 292. (4) At most it can only convey such interest as the maker can lawfully convey. Bogy v Shoab, 13 Mo. 380; Gibson v. Chouteau, 39 Mo. 568; Ridgeway v. Halliday, 59 Mo. 455; Merritt v. Merritt, 62 Mo. 150. (5) And as in this case the deed contains no words of conveyance except remise release and quitclaim; as a primary conveyance it can only operate through the statute of uses. Wilson v. Albert, 89 Mo. 537; Pray v. Pierce, 7 Mass. 381; Russell v. Coffin, 8 Pick. 143; Jackson v. Beach, 1 Johns. 401; Perry v. Price, 1 Mo. 553. (6) The affinity does not support the consideration of love or affection. Hopkins, Real Prop. 410; Jackson v. Caldwell, 1 Cow. 640. Nor could it operate to lessen the effect of the valuable consideration. 1 Lewin on Trust (* p. 74), C. 13; McKinney v. Seattles, 31 Mo. 54. (7) "This deed is made upon the understanding" is a clause which denotes a condition. St. Louis v. Wiggins, 88 Mo. 619. (8) Where a deed is made by an aged parent to child on agreement to support, a failure to perform, child will forfeit the land on grounds in the nature of a condition subsequent. Blake v. Blake, 56 Wis. 392; Delong v. Delong, 56 Wis. 514; Leach v. Leach, 4 Ind. 628; Reed v. Burns, 13 Ohio St. 49; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 3 Mon. 327; Scott v. Scott, 3 B. Mon. 2; Yonkum v. Yonkum, 77 Ill. 85; Devereaux v. Cooper, 11 Vt. 103; Richter v. Richter, 12 N.E. 698; Staley v. Howell, 52 N.W. 888; Alford v. Alford, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 245. Some cases hold such deeds in the nature of mortgages with strict defeasance. Saper v. Guernsey, 71 Pa. St. 219; Bethalem v. Annis, 40 N.H. 34; Bryant v. Erskine, 55 Me. 153; Evans v. Norris, 6 Mich. 369; Hawkins v. Clermont, 15 Mich. 513. (9) When a deed imposes duties upon grantee, and the grantee does not perform them, and such duties are not judicially enforcible or remediable, either because the grantee is under disability or because the duty is of a personal nature, the grantor's only remedy is to recover the land. Tiedeman, Real Prop., sec. 797; Bishop, Contracts, secs. 74 and 78. (10) As the grantor was in possession the breach of condition revested title. O'Brien v. Wagner, 94 Mo. 93. (11) As viewed from an equity standpoint, the action of the guardian and the grantee AdaL.; they both taking a statu quo ante, amounted to a rescission; she voluntarily abandoning her duties under the deed and the guardian taking the land. Kerr v. Bell, 44 Mo. 125. (12) The feoffment deed or contract of an insane person made after inquest of lunacy is void. Rannels v. Gerner, 80 Mo. 474; Coleman v. Farrar, 112 Mo. 84; Wait v. Maxwell, 5 Pick. 217; Griswold v. Butler, 3 Conn. 231; Pearl v. McDonnell, 3 Marsh. 658. (13) The feoffment of an insane person made prior to inquest is voidable. 5 Bacon's Abdg. [Johns. Ed.] 26; 2 Kent. Com. 236; 2 Bla. Comm. 291; 3 Wash. Real. Prop. 249, 250. (14) All contracts and dispositions of property by insane person prior to inquest of sanity are by statute in Missouri placed on the footing of feoffments and are voidable only with power in the guardian to ratify or disaffirm. R. S. 1889, sec. 5542; Rannels v. Gerner, 80 Mo. 474; Coleman v. Farrar, 112 Mo. 84; Halley v. Troester, 72 Mo. 73; Tolson v. Garner, 15 Mo. 492. (15) The acts of the guardian in entering, taking and holding possession, and of Ada L. in abandoning her duties under the deed, are a disaffirmance of the deed. Ashnead v. Reynolds, 127 Ind. 444; Nichols v. Thomas, 53 Ind. 53; Crawford v. Scovill, 94 Pa. St. 48; Judge v. Stone, 44 N.H. 593; Hull v. Louth, 109 Ind. 315; Key v. Davis, 1 Md. 32; Brown v. Freed, 43 Ind. 253; Flanders v. Davis, 19 N.H. 139; Somers v. Pumphrey, 24 Ind. 231; Hovey v. Hobson, 23 Me. 451; Allis v. Billings, 6 Met. 415; Gibson v. Soper, 6 Gray, 279. (16) As to what it takes to constitute a disaffirmance of voidable deeds, see Leitensdorfer v. Hempstead, 18 Mo. 269; Kerr v. Bell, 44 Mo. 125; Baker v. Kennett, 54 Mo. 82; Mfg. Co. v. Lamb, 81 Mo. 224.
Turney & Goodrich for respondents.
(1) The deed of an insane person not under guardianship and the deed of an infant are placed upon the same footing and are governed by the same rules. They are not void but voidable. They convey seizin and title which continue in the grantee until the deed is legally set aside or until the party claiming under it is actually ousted from possession of the premises by some one authorized to disaffirm the deed. Tiedeman on Real Prop. , sec. 792; Shipley v. Brown, 125 Mo. 445; Watts v. Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 126 Mo. 630; Wait v. Maxwell, 5 Pick. 217; Tolsons' Adm'r v. Garver, 15 Mo. 494; Allis v. Billings, 6 Met. 415. (2) The deed of an insane person not under guardianship can be avoided only by his guardian subsequently appointed his heir or legal representatives. Hill v. Taylor, 125 Mo. 343; Breckenridge v. Ormsby, 19 Am. Dec. 72; Rollet v. Heiman, 120 Ind. 511; Tiedeman on Real Prop. , sec. 792. (3) Acts of disaffirmance by the guardian of an insane person resting wholly in parol or of an uncertain or doubtful character will not avoid the deed of his ward made before office found. Washington v. Collins, 13 Mo.App. 1; Allis v. Billings, 6 Met. 415. (4) The heirs and legal representatives of an insane person may ratify his voidable deed; and if the ratification is after the death of the maker and before a suit instituted by the guardian to set aside the deed is brought to trial, the acts of the guardian will not affect title acquired under the deed. (5) The deed of an insane person, conceding the insanity, can not for that reason alone be avoided at the suit of a creditor of the grantor. Rollet v. Heiman, 16 Am. St. Rep. 340. (6) This plaintiff is not even a creditor of the grantor. He is a creditor of the grandson of the grantor and he can not assail the deed for any reason. Schoul. Dom. Rel., p. 571. (7) A quitclaim deed conveys to the grantee the title of the grantor and is as effectual for that purpose as a deed of general warranty. Wilson v. Albach, 89 Mo. 537; Bray v. Conrad, 101 Mo. 331; Allis v. Billings, 6 Met. 415. The deed in this case is the ordinary printed form in use by all conveyancers; and will be found at some point in the chain of half the titles in this State. In nothing is it peculiar or unusual.
This is an action of ejectment for the possession of lots ten and twelve, block fifty-seven, in the city of Cameron, Clinton county. The action was begun on the twenty-fifth day of September, 1895, against E. E. Dickover and Clayton Tiffin, the petition being in the ordinary form.
The defendant Clayton Tiffin filed his separate answer, alleging that on the twenty-eighth day of January, 1892, he contracted in writing with Peter F. Clark, now deceased, for the sale of said lots to him and in pursuance to such contract put said Clark in possession of said lots on said date; that on the twenty-fifth day of September, 1895, he and his wife conveyed all their interest in the lots to Margaret Clark. He disclaims any interest in the lots. The defendant Dickover by his separate answer admits that he was in possession on and before April 21, 1895, but alleges that his possession was lawful as tenant of Peter F. Clark now deceased. Admits that he occupied said lots as such tenant from the date aforesaid to the first day of January, 1896, and that since said date he has occupied the lots as tenant of Margaret Clark, whom he alleges is the owner. Margaret Clark, on her motion, in which she alleges among other things that she is executrix of the estate of Peter F. Clark, deceased, was made a party defendant. Margaret Clark, by her separate answer, denies that on the twenty-first day of September, 1895, or at any other time, the defendants or either of them unlawfully entered said premises or any part thereof and unlawfully withholds possession thereof from plaintiff. But she admits that the defendant Dickover at said date was, and before and since has been in possession of said lots and premises as tenants of Peter F. Clark, now deceased, and of this defendant, and she alleges that his possession was and is lawful. She then sets up an equitable defense to the suit. The trial was before the court and a jury.
Samuel Matthis, Sr., is the common source of title. On the trial plaintiff showed that by sheriff's deed of date September 17, 1895, he had acquired whatever title or interest Samuel Matthis, Jr., had in the lots, proved the value of the rents and profits, and rested.
Defendants then read in evidence the following deeds to wit:
First. "This indenture made on the tenth day of June, A. D 1891, by and between Samuel Matthis, Sr., of the county of Clinton and State of Missouri, party of the first part, and Ada L. Matthis, of the county of Clinton and State of Missouri, party of the second part, witnesseth that the said party of the first part, in consideration of the sum of love, affection and care of myself and one hundred dollars to him in hand paid, by the said party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby...
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