McAuliffe v. Carlson

• Decision Date: 08 January 1973
• Docket Number: No. 107736,107736
• Citation: 303 A.2d 746,30 Conn.Supp. 118
• Court: Connecticut Court of Common Pleas
• Parties: Robert A. McAULIFFE v. Adolf G. CARLSON, Commissioner of Finance and Control.

Page 746

303 A.2d 746

30 Conn.Supp. 118

Robert A. McAULIFFE v. Adolf G. CARLSON, Commissioner of Finance and Control.

No. 107736.

Court of Common Pleas of Connecticut, Hartford County.

Jan. 8, 1973.

Stephen Wizner, of New Haven, for plaintiff.

Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., and Edward F. Pasiecznik, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

NORTON M. LEVINE, Judge.

The plaintiff was originally confined at the community correctional center in Hartford, where he had been sentenced by the Circuit Court in the fifteenth Circuit for 360 days, for the crime of breaking and entering. On September 21, 1971, he was transferred to the security treatment center in Middletown, and remained there under treatment for 218 days. Thereafter, he was billed by the defendant for the total sum of $1098.07, covering the care furnished him, pursuant to §§ 17-294, 17-295 and 17-318 of the General Statutes.

In a letter dated September 13, 1972, the plaintiff sought a refund from the defendant, under the authority of § 17-301 of the General Statutes. His basic claim was that § 17-318, pursuant to which collection had been made, was unconstitutional. The defendant denied the request for a refund in a letter dated September 28, 1972. The plaintiff thereupon prosecuted this appeal, based on the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act, hereinafter referred to as UAPA. General Statutes, c. 54.

The defendant has filed the instant motion to erase, alleging that the plaintiff is not entitled to judicial review of the defendant's action, under the UAPA; and next, that the plaintiff has failed to establish his standing to sue the state of Connecticut.

The defendant's initial argument has merit, and is dispositive of the motion to erase.

I

Under the UAPA, the plaintiff is entitled to appeal to this court only after he has received a final decision in a 'contested case.' General Statutes § 4-183(a). A 'contested case' is a proceeding where the privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency, 'after an opportunity for hearing.' § 4-166(2).

Nothing in the statutes above cited, or in the authorities submitted by counsel, reflects that the defendant was obligated to afford the plaintiff a hearing on his refund claim, or the opportunity for a hearing. The defendant's ruling, for all that appears in this record, was made by correspondence, and without a formal hearing, but otherwise in accordance with the specific statutory responsibility vested in him.

The defendant's determination obviously involved an administrative adjudication that there was no liability for a refund. Nevertheless, it was not a 'contested case,' permitting judicial review thereof, under the UAPA, since no hearing was required, or held. General Statutes § 4-177; see New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rigas, 117 Conn. 437, 444, 168 A. 22; Griffin v. Sturges, 131 Conn. 471, 476, 40 A.2d 758; Milwaukee v. Public Service Commission, 11 Wis.2d 111, 116, 104 N.W.2d 167; 1 Cooper, State Administrative Law, p. 125.

The UAPA was enacted in 1971 and became effective January 1, 1972. The General Assembly did not desire to make the UAPA a vehicle for appeal of any and all administrative orders or decisions made by a state agency or official.

The act was clearly designed to permit appeals only upon compliance with the statutory conditions set forth therein, including specific provisions for the conduct of a hearing, or the opportunity for a hearing.

Any contrary ruling would inundate the courts with innumerable appeals, initiated without statutory foundation, and frequently of a petty or unmeritorious character.

They would be prosecuted by a host of disappointed petitioners from the multitude of decisions and orders made daily by various state agencies and officials. As a practical matter, many such decisions are informal, and relatively minor in nature. Because of these factors, the General Assembly logically concluded that no hearing was necessary, as a condition of their validity.

Moreover, neither the legislative history nor the express provisions of the UAPA compel a conclusion that the UAPA was designed to open the floodgates, so as to permit judicial review thereunder of a great mass of these informal (i.e. nonhearing) administrative rulings.

There is no constitutional right to judicial review of administrative action. Frederick v. Schwartz, 296 F.Supp. 1321, 1322 (D.Conn.), remanded, 402 U.S. 937, 91 S.Ct. 1624, 29 L.Ed.2d 105. Appeals to the courts from administrative officers or boards exist only under statutory authority. Young v. Tynan, 148 Conn. 456, 457, 172 A.2d 190; Windsor v. Windsor Police Dept. Employees Assn., Inc., 154 Conn. 530, 534, 227 A.2d 65. Unless the statute clearly permits such appeals, the courts are without jurisdiction to entertain them. East...