McCarthy v. Commissioner of Correction

• Decision Date: 26 February 1991
• Docket Number: No. 14062,14062
• Citation: 587 A.2d 116,217 Conn. 568
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: John J. McCARTHY v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

Page 116

587 A.2d 116

217 Conn. 568

John J. McCARTHY v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

No. 14062.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 31, 1990.

Decided Feb. 26, 1991.

L.D. McCallum, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Clarine Nardi Riddle, then Atty. Gen., for appellant-appellee (respondent).

John W. Watson, Asst. Public Defender, for appellee-appellant (petitioner).

Before PETERS, C.J., and SHEA, CALLAHAN, COVELLO and BORDEN, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The petitioner, John J. McCarthy, an inmate of the state prison at Somers, brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the judicial district of Tolland. In his petition he alleged that he was illegally confined for two reasons pertinent to this appeal. He first claimed that the respondent's method of calculating good time ¹ credits on his consecutive sentences was incorrect and deprived him of good time to which he was statutorily entitled, and also deprived him of the equal protection of the law guaranteed to him by the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution. Second, he contended that the respondent improperly refused to credit him with presentence jail time ² to which he was entitled for the period from September 4, 1980, to September 28, 1982. The habeas court agreed with the petitioner as to his first claim and granted the requested relief. The court, however, disagreed with the petitioner's second claim.

The petitioner is currently held in the state prison pursuant to two orders of the Superior Court. The first, a mittimus issued by the Superior Court for the judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport on June 26, 1981, ordered that the petitioner be imprisoned for an indeterminate term of not less than ten years nor more than twenty years for several burglaries and larcenies. He is presently serving that term. The second, a mittimus issued by the Superior Court for the judicial district of Danbury on January 11, 1983, ordered that the petitioner be imprisoned for a definite term of six years as a result of six consecutive one year sentences for multiple counts of burglary and larceny. The petitioner's six year sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to his ten to twenty year sentence. All the crimes for which the petitioner was sentenced were committed in 1980.

I

In his first claim, the petitioner argues that he is entitled under General Statutes § 18-7 ³ to have his ten to twenty year sentence aggregated with his six year sentence and to have his sentences construed as one continuous term of imprisonment for the purpose of calculating his good time credits. He argues, further, that he is entitled under General Statutes § 18-7a(a) ⁴ to have his good time credited at the rate of fifteen days per month for the sixth and each subsequent year of his aggregated sentence. If correct, the petitioner will serve his entire six year sentence receiving good time credit at the rate of fifteen days per month. The respondent, on the other hand, argues that § 18-7 has no application to the petitioner, that the petitioner received two separate and distinct sentences that must be served as such, and that the petitioner must be released or paroled from his ten to twenty year sentence before he can commence serving his six year sentence. If the respondent is correct, the petitioner, under § 18-7a(a), will receive good time credit of only ten days per month for the first five years of his six year sentence rather than the fifteen days per month to which he claims to be entitled. The habeas court determined that the provision of § 18-7 mandating the aggregation of consecutive sentences for the purpose of calculating a prisoner's good time credits was applicable to the petitioner and ordered the respondent "to construe the petitioner's 10 to 20 year sentence and his six year sentence as one continuous term for the purpose of calculating [his] good time." We agree.

The relevant portion of § 18-7 provides: "When any prisoner is held under more than one conviction, the several terms of imprisonment imposed thereunder shall be construed as one continuous term for the purpose of estimating the amount of commutation which he may earn under the provisions of this section." The amount of commutation or diminution of his sentence, i.e., good time credit, that a prisoner can earn by good conduct and obedience to the rules of the institution under § 18-7 is "[s]ixty days for each year, and pro rata for a part of a year, of a sentence which is not for more than five years; and ninety days for the sixth and each subsequent year, and pro rata for a part of a year...."

The legislature repealed the existing § 18-7 by the enactment of Public Acts 1976, No. 76-358, § 1. Public Act No. 76-358, § 1, then reenacted § 18-7 in its previous form except that the words "sentenced to a term of imprisonment prior to October 1, 1976," were inserted in the third sentence so that the third sentence of the present § 18-7 ⁵ reads: "Any prisoner sentenced to a term of imprisonment prior to October 1, 1976, may, by good conduct and obedience to the rules of said institution, earn a commutation or diminution of his sentence, as follows: Sixty days for each year, and pro rata for a part of a year, of a sentence which is not for more than five years; and ninety days for the sixth and each subsequent year and pro rata for part of a year...." (Emphasis added.)

In the same session the legislature enacted Public Acts 1976, No. 76-358, § 2. ⁶ That section of Public Act No. 76-358 increased the amount of statutory good time credits to which a prisoner sentenced after October 1, 1976, is entitled, from the previous annual sixty and ninety day limits of § 18-7 to "ten days for each month, and pro rata for a part of a month, of a sentence which is for not more than five years, and fifteen days for each month, and pro rata for part of a month, for the sixth and each subsequent year of a sentence of more than five years." ⁷ There is no provision in § 2 of Public Act No. 76-358 that multiple prison sentences be aggregated and construed as one continuous term for the purpose of calculating the amount of good time that a prisoner may earn.

In order to resolve the petitioner's first claim, it is necessary, therefore, to determine whether, by its repeal, revision and reenactment of § 18-7 and its enactment of § 18-7a(a), the legislature intended to exclude prisoners sentenced after October 1, 1976, from the statutory mandate of § 18-7 that consecutive sentences of imprisonment be aggregated and treated as one continuous term of imprisonment for the purpose of calculating good time credits.

As revised and reenacted by the 1976 legislature, § 18-7 manifestly limited its provision concerning the amount of good time an inmate of the state prison could earn to those inmates sentenced before October 1, 1976. Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638, 642-43, 410 A.2d 475 (1979). ⁸ All the other provisions of the previous § 18-7, however, were reenacted and left intact. Those provisions that were left unchanged relate generally to the duties and prerogatives of the warden of the prison and the commissioner of correction in relation to the inmates. Included among the reenacted provisions is that which states: "When any prisoner is held under more than one conviction, the several terms of imprisonment imposed thereunder shall be construed as one continuous term for the purpose of estimating the amount of commutation which he may earn under the provisions of this section." General Statutes § 18-7. Whether the legislature by its reenactment of that provision of § 18-7 and its silence concerning the aggregation of sentences in § 18-7a(a) intended that the aggregation provision of § 18-7 apply to prisoners sentenced after October 1, 1976, is unclear.

Because the statutes in question are ambiguous, it is necessary that we address the statutes' legislative history and other criteria for guidance in determining the legislature's intent. State v. Grullon, 212 Conn. 195, 200, 562 A.2d 481 (1989); State v. Champagne, 206 Conn. 421, 428, 538 A.2d 193 (1988). "The basic rule of statutory construction requires us to ascertain the intention of the law-making body ... and to construe the statute in a manner that effectuates that intent." (Citations omitted.) Green v. Warden, 178 Conn. 634, 637-38, 425 A.2d 128 (1979); State v. Grullon, supra, 212 Conn. at 199, 562 A.2d 481; State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 553, 522 A.2d 753 (1987); Holmquist v. Manson, 168 Conn. 389, 393, 362 A.2d 971 (1975).

The legislative history of Public Act No. 76-358 reveals that the manifest intention of the legislature in enacting it was to consolidate good time statutes and make good time equal and uniform throughout the correctional system by eliminating multiple systems of crediting good time, by increasing standard good time, by eliminating meritorious time service awards, ⁹ and by repealing separate good time statutes for community correctional centers and the Cheshire correctional institution. Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Humane Institutions, 1976 Sess., January 27, pp. 53-55, 65-68; see Frazier v. Manson, supra, 176 Conn. at 651, 410 A.2d 475. There is nothing in the legislative history of Public Act No. 76-358 to indicate that the legislature intended to abrogate the aggregation of consecutive sentences for the purpose of calculating a prisoner's good time. ¹⁰

The intention of the legislature as to whether multiple sentences of imprisonment should be construed as one continuous term is, moreover, manifested in other existing statutes. For example, General Statutes § 18-98b ¹¹ requires that "[w]hen any person is held under more than one conviction the several terms of imprisonment imposed thereunder shall be construed as one continuous term for purposes of determining eligibility for any outstandingly meritorious performance...