McCarthy v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 08 May 1987
• Citation: 191 Cal.App.3d 1023,236 Cal.Rptr. 833
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Daniel McCARTHY, as Director, California Department of Corrections, et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Contra Costa County, Respondent; CONTRA COSTA COUNTY et al., Real Parties in Interest. A038425.

Page 833

236 Cal.Rptr. 833

191 Cal.App.3d 1023

Daniel McCARTHY, as Director, California Department of Corrections, et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Contra Costa County, Respondent CONTRA COSTA COUNTY et al., Real Parties in Interest.

A038425.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1, California.

May 8, 1987.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul D. Gifford and Morris Lenk, Deputy Attys. Gen., San Francisco, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Victor J. Westman, County Counsel, and Arthur W. Walenta Asst. County Counsel, Martinez, Lawrence D. Saler, City Atty., City of San Pablo, Office of City Atty., Albany, for real parties in interest.

THE COURT: ^*

Petitioners Daniel McCarthy, Director of the California Department of Corrections, Ron E. Koenig, Chairman of the California Board of Prison Terms, Edward Veit, Deputy Director of the California Department of Corrections, and the California Department of Corrections seek extraordinary relief to compel respondent court to vacate and set aside its orders denying their motion for change of venue and restraining and enjoining them from returning Lawrence Singleton, a paroled inmate, to the County of Contra Costa. For reasons we shall explain, we determine that state parole officials are statutorily authorized to return a released parolee to the county from which the parolee was committed, i.e., committed to prison, or to such other county as would serve the best interests of the public and the parolee. (Pen.Code, § 3003, subds. (a), (b).) We further determine that the exercise of such statutory authority by state parole officials may not be enjoined but is subject to judicial review for any palpable abuse of discretion. Finally, we will conclude that where, as here, the underlying action is brought by a county or other local agency against a nonresident, the action must--upon request--be transferred for trial to a neutral county or, alternatively, heard as a nonjury cause by a disinterested judge from another county assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. (Code of Civ.Proc., § 394, subd. (1).)

In view of the statewide importance of novel issues presented requiring prompt resolution, and since the matter has been adequately briefed by the parties following due notice to real parties that issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance would be considered, and because no useful purpose will be served in issuing an alternative writ, we determine that this is a proper case to order the issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance. (Code of Civ.Proc., §§ 1088, 1104; Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 177-180, 203 Cal.Rptr. 626, 681 P.2d 893).

BACKGROUND

In October 1978, the Stanislaus County Grand Jury returned an indictment charging Lawrence Singleton with several aggravated offenses, including attempted murder, perpetrated against a 15-year-old victim, Mary V., whom he had picked up hitchhiking. A change of trial venue to San Diego County was ordered as a result of extensive pretrial publicity. Evidence presented at trial disclosed repeated acts of sexual violence ending, tragically, when Singleton left his victim to die after traumatically amputating her hands. The victim survived to testify, resulting in a jury finding of guilty as to the substantive charges. Singleton was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 14 and 1/3 years under the then applicable provisions of the Determinate Sentencing Law. (Pen.Code, § 1170 et. seq.) ¹ The conviction and sentence was affirmed on appeal. (People v. Singleton (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 418, 169 Cal.Rptr. 333.) With reduction of the term for good conduct and related credits provided by statute (Pen.Code, §§ 2900.5, 2931-2933), Singleton became eligible for parole receiving a mandatory release date of April 25, 1987. (Pen.Code, § 3000.) Once a prisoner has served a determinate term, the Board of Prison Terms has no discretion to grant or withhold parole under the mandatory "kick-out" provisions of the governing statute. (People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 529, fn. 12, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251.) In such circumstances, parole is a matter of statutory right no matter how despicable the underlying crime or reprehensible the malefactor.

Singleton's imminent release on parole and anticipated return to a Bay Area community as widely reported have provoked widespread public indignation and led to legal proceedings seeking to prevent parole officials from returning him to communities within Contra Costa County. As a consequence of the temporary restraining order issued by respondent court (as well as that of the San Francisco Superior Court in a separate but related proceeding), parole authorities have been required literally to shunt the parolee from one place to another in their abortive attempts to discharge their official parole responsibilities. Petitioners now seek extraordinary relief including mandamus review of the order denying change of venue (Code of Civ.Proc., § 400; see also Magee v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 201, 211, fn. 3, 109 Cal.Rptr. 758) disapproved on another point in People v. Norris (1985) 40 Cal.3d 51, 56, 219 Cal.Rptr. 7, 706 P.2d 1141 and temporary restraining order.

DISCUSSION

Place of Parole

Under the statutory scheme governing parole, the Board of Prison Terms is empowered to establish and enforce rules and regulations concerning parole, including specified terms and conditions of a given parole. (Pen.Code, §§ 3053, 3053.5.) "These conditions may govern the location in which the parolee resides, the persons with whom he associates and lives, the places in which he may travel, his use of intoxicants, and other aspects of his life." (People v. Burgener, supra, 41 Cal.3d 505, 531, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251.) Prior to the 1982 enactment of Penal Code section 3003, ² the board and its predecessor adult authority had virtually unbridled discretion in placing or returning parolees to a community.

Review of the legislative history of the statute, which we may properly judicially notice (see Commodore Home Sysyems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 218, fn. 9, 185 Cal.Rptr. 270, 649 P.2d 912) is instructive. Assembly Bill No. 2564, as originally introduced by Assembly Member Moorhead, would have required the parole authorities to return a parolee to the jurisdiction from which he or she was committed, without exception. (6 Assem.J. (1981-1982 Reg.Sess.) p. 9994.) The Moorhead bill was introduced in apparent response to an expressed concern that certain counties were becoming "dumping grounds" for many parolees strongly suggesting a need to modify the existing system so that parolees would be more equitably distributed throughout the state. Though initially opposed by the correctional authorities on the grounds that the legislative proposal denied parole authorities necessary discretion to deviate from the policy that parolees be returned to the county of commitment, a revised version of the bill was eventually reported out and passed by the Legislature with the support of those agencies.

The relevant history clearly reflects the legislative intent to "require the board, when releasing an inmate on parole, to return the inmate to the county from which he or she was committed, unless, after consideration including various specified factors, the board determines that it is in the best interests of the public and of the parolee that he or she be returned to another county and places its reasons in writing." (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 2564, 6 Stats. 1982 (Reg.Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 511.)

By its terms, Penal Code section 3003 mandates the return of Singleton to the county that committed him to state prison, absent a determination by the parole authority that the best interests of the public and parolee require a different county of return. Nevertheless, petitioners argue that the county from which a person was "committed" to prison is the county in which he or she committed the charged crime--here, Stanislaus County. The argument flies in the face of established principles of construction.

"When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge in it." (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895, 231 Cal.Rptr. 213, 726 P.2d 1288.) However, "courts resist blind obedience to the putative 'plain meaning' of a statutory phrase where literal interpretation would defeat the Legislature's central objective." (Leslie Salt Co. v. San Francisco Bay conservation Etc. Com. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 605, 614, 200 Cal.Rptr. 575.)

It is noteworthy that the Legislature has elsewhere used the terms "commitment" or "committed" to indicate the procedure by which a court of competent jurisdiction orders a defendant into the custody of an officer until legally discharged. (See e.g., Pen.Code, §§ 875, 876, 877, 877a, and 881.) Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature intended a similar meaning in adopting the language contained in section 3003.

Still, it is at least arguable that parole authorities invariably would treat the county in which the offense was committed as the county from which a prisoner was committed. While the background materials provided indicate that the Legislature was aware of Department of Corrections' parallel guidelines when it passed Assembly Bill No. 2564, there is no indication that it was likewise aware of the Department's interpretation thereof which neglected to consider the effect of a change of venue in defining the term "committed." Moreover, a reading of the term "committed" to mean the county from which the defendant was sentenced clearly implements the Legislature's intention to equitably distribute parolees statewide, particularly in view of the broad discretion granted to the board under subdivision (b) to alter the legislative mandate where...