McClendon v. State, AS-165
Decision Date | 09 November 1983 |
Docket Number | No. AS-165,AS-165 |
Citation | 440 So.2d 52 |
Parties | Lester Byron McCLENDON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Louis O. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, and Mark Rosenblum, Asst. Public Defender, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Clyde M. Collins, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jacksonville, for appellee.
At about 2:30 a.m. on November 14, 1982, Officer McDonald, who had stopped his vehicle and was in the process of issuing a citation to a motorist, observed a motorcycle run a red light. McDonald radioed Officer Baxter, who had driven past McDonald a short time before, to "stop the black motorcycle coming from behind you." Baxter stopped appellant, who was riding the only motorcycle Baxter saw, and then called McDonald to find out why he wanted him to stop the motorcycle. McDonald told Baxter he had seen the motorcycle run the red light and he wanted Baxter to issue a traffic citation. When Baxter approached appellant McClendon to issue the citation, he observed a medium-sized bulge in the pocket area of appellant's jacket. Baxter patted the area, felt a hard object, and about that time the pocket fell open revealing a pistol. Baxter seized the pistol and arrested McClendon for carrying a concealed firearm and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and he was later adjudicated guilty of both offenses. Baxter also cited appellant for running the red light. Baxter later said that when he observed him, McClendon was complying with all traffic laws.
McClendon appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that both the stop and the subsequent frisk were illegal. McClendon contends Baxter was not authorized to stop him for the traffic infraction because the violation did not occur in Baxter's presence, therefore it was not authorized by Section 901.15(5), Florida Statutes, 1 and it was a non-criminal infraction, see Section 318.14(1), Florida Statutes, therefore the stop was not authorized by Section 901.151, Florida Statutes. 2
Although appellee's brief is unresponsive to the issue of the significance of the violation being a non-criminal traffic infraction, we have concluded that the denial of the motion to suppress should be upheld on the authority of Section 901.18, which provides:
A peace officer making a lawful arrest may command the aid of persons he deems necessary to make the arrest. A person commanded to aid shall render assistance as directed...
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