McClure v. Serv. Partners
| Decision Date | 23 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | 2005-UP-401 |
| Parties | Karen McClure, Respondent, v. Service Partners, LLC, and Travelers Indemnity Company, Appellants. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted May 1, 2005
Appeal From Anderson County Alexander S. Macaulay, Circuit Court Judge
Byron Putnam Roberts, of Columbia, for Appellants.
Anthony L. Harbin and Larry A. Welborn, of Anderson, for Respondent.
Service Partners, LLC, and Travelers Indemnity Company appeal the circuit court's decision reversing the Workers' Compensation Appellate Panel (Full Commission) and finding Karen McClure suffered a compensable injury by accident while in the course and scope of her employment with Service Partners. We affirm. [1]
All parties admit the underlying facts in this case are undisputed. On the date of the incident, November 19, 1999 McClure was an employee of Service Partners. She informed her supervisor, Scott Hawkins, she was taking the mail to a drop box. Hawkins asked if he could accompany her to pick up lunch while she was out. Hawkins accompanied McClure even though McClure had not intended to eat lunch.
McClure drove her personal vehicle on the errand. McClure and Hawkins drove to a mail drop box located in the parking lot of a Sonic Restaurant, which was where Hawkins wanted to get lunch. While waiting to pick up his lunch, Hawkins offered to unload a mirror McClure purchased the night before and still had in her car.
After Hawkins' suggestion, McClure drove to her home instead of returning to the office. When they arrived at her home Hawkins unloaded the mirror while McClure remained in the car. McClure and Hawkins then headed back to the office.
During the return trip, and prior to reaching the location of the mailbox and Sonic Restaurant, McClure's vehicle was involved in an accident. McClure suffered multiple injuries during the accident, including injuries to her back shoulder, left arm, and pelvis. Anderson Orthopaedic Clinic saw McClure for her injuries; however, she failed to indicate that she sustained the injuries in a work-related incident. On the patient questionnaire, McClure did not check that she was injured at work but instead indicated that she was injured in an automobile accident.
In August 2001, she filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, alleging injury to her back, left shoulder, and left arm. The single commissioner found she sustained an injury by accident arising in the course and scope of her employment. The Full Commission reversed this finding in a split decision. The Full Commission found the accident did not arise out of her employment nor was it in the course and scope of her employment.” Additionally, the majority found the errand was more than a slight deviation, ” and McClure was no longer on a dual-purpose mission when she took the mirror to her home. Finally, the Full Commission determined the errand was of no benefit to Service Partners and denied McClure's claim for benefits.
McClure appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court found where all facts are undisputed, the determinations to be made by the court are questions of law and not of fact. The court found McClure was in the care and control of her employer throughout the errand, was on a dual-purpose trip, and made at worst, a slight deviation.” The court reversed the decision of the Full Commission and reinstated the order of the single commissioner. This appeal followed.
The Administrative Procedures Act establishes the standard of review for decisions by the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission. Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 134-35, 276 S.E.2d 304, 306 (1981). In workers' compensation cases, the Full Commission is the ultimate fact finder.” Shealy v. Aiken County, 341 S.C. 448, 455, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000). The final determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence is reserved to the Full Commission.” Id.
In an appeal from the Full Commission, this court, as well as the circuit court, may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Supp. 2004). The appellate court can reverse or modify the Full Commission's decision only if the claimant's substantial rights have been prejudiced because the decision is affected by an error of law or is clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Id.
Gibson v. Spartanburg Sch. Dist. No. 3, 338 S.C. 510, 517, 526 S.E.2d 725, 729 (Ct. App. 2000)(citations omitted).
Service Partners contends the circuit court erred in reversing the decision of the Full Commission. Service Partners asserts the circuit court erred in finding McClure's injury was compensable: (1) because she was in the care and control” of her employer; (2) under the dual-purpose doctrine; and (3) because the trip to her house was only a slight deviation. We disagree.
Service Partners first argues the decision of the circuit court should be reversed because it applied an incorrect standard of review. Service Partners maintains the circuit court improperly substituted its own findings of fact for those of the Full Commission. However, as stated above, when there are undisputed facts, the determination of whether an injury by accident is compensable becomes a question of law for the court to determine and not one of fact. Gibson, 338 S.C. at 517, 526 S.E.2d at 729.
Additionally, Service Partners failed to contest the standard of review employed by the circuit court in a motion to reconsider pursuant to Rule 59(e), SCRCP. Therefore, the issue is not preserved for review on appeal. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ().
Service Partners contends the circuit court erred in finding McClure suffered a compensable injury by accident that arose in the course and scope of her employment. Service Partners asserts it was error for the court to find the accident was compensable because McClure was in the care and control” of her employer at the time. We disagree.
To be compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act, an injury by accident must both arise out of” and be in the course of” employment. S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160 (Supp. 2004). The claimant has the burden of proving facts that will bring the injury within the Workers' Compensation law. Clade v. Champion Labs., 330 S.C. 8, 11, 496 S.E.2d 856, 857 (1998). Additionally, workers' compensation statutes are construed liberally in favor of coverage.” Peay v. U.S. Silica Co., 313 S.C. 91, 94, 437 S.E.2d 64, 65 (1993).
‘Arising out of' refers to the injury's origin and cause.... For an injury to ‘arise out of' employment, the injury must be proximately caused by the employment. The injury arises out of employment when there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury.” Osteen v. Greenville County Sch. Dist., 333 S.C. 43, 50, 508 S.E.2d 21, 24-25 (1998) (citations omitted).
In Broughton v. South of the Border, 336 S.C. 488, 520 S.E.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1999), this court stated:
The phrase in the course of the employment” refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurred. An injury occurs in the course of” employment within the meaning of the Workers' Compensation Act when it occurs within the period of employment at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of his [or her] duties and while fulfilling those duties or engaged in something incidental thereto.
Id. at 498, 520 S.E.2d at 639 (citations omitted).
As a general rule, employees going to or coming from the place where their work is to be performed is not engaged in performing any service growing out of or incidental to their employment, and therefore, an injury sustained by accident at such time does not arise out of and in the course of their employment. Aughtry v. Abbeville County Sch. Dist. No. 60, 332 S.C. 453, 458-59, 504 S.E.2d 830, 833 (Ct. App. 1998), rev'd on other grounds by, 340 S.C. 604, 533 S.E.2d 885 (2000).
However, South Carolina has recognized a number of exceptions to this rule. Among these are: (1) Where, in going to and returning from work, the means of transportation is provided by the employer, or the time that is consumed is paid for or included in the wages; (2) Where the employee, on his way to or from his work, is still charged with some duty or task in connection with his employment....
Medlin v. Upstate Plaster Serv., 329 S.C. 92, 95, 495 S.E.2d 447, 449 (1998).
In Sexton v. Freeman Gas Co., 258 S.C. 15, 187 S.E.2d 128 (1972), our supreme court considered facts analogous to those in the instant case. In Sexton, the claimant left work driving a company vehicle, which contained a two-way radio on which he could be summoned to perform company business at any time. While he left for a personal errand to get his haircut, the court found he was continuously subject to his employer's control.” Sexton, 258 S.C. at 18, 187 S.E.2d at 129....
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