McCool v. Austal U.S.

• Docket Number: CA 22-00170-KD-MU
• Decision Date: 21 September 2022
• Parties: MICHAEL MCCOOL and DEIDRE DRINKARD, Plaintiffs, v. AUSTAL USA, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

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MICHAEL MCCOOL and DEIDRE DRINKARD, Plaintiffs, v. AUSTAL USA, LLC, Defendant.

No. CA 22-00170-KD-MU

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division

September 21, 2022

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

BRADLEY MURRAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This cause is before the Magistrate Judge for issuance of a report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(S), on Plaintiffs' Complaint (Doc. 1-1, PageID. 9-16), the Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts II-V (Doc. 2), Plaintiffs' motion to remand (Doc. 9), and Austal's response to motion to remand and reply in support of motion to dismiss Counts II-V (Doc. 11). Based on the contents of these pleadings, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint (the sole federal claim) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, leaving only state law claims which should be REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, as this Court should DECLINE, in its discretion, to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims.^[1]

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 25, 2022, Plaintiffs Michael McCool and Deidre Drinkard filed a five-count complaint against Defendant Austal USA, LLC,^[2] in the Circuit Court of Mobile County Alabama, arising out of Austal's June 12, 2020 termination of Plaintiff Michael McCool after the Defendant learned that McCool had a firearm (a pistol) in his truck. (See Doc. 1-1, PageID. 10-16). Plaintiff McCool asserted four claims: (1) a violation of Alabama Code § 13A-11-90-Count I (id., PageID. 12); (2) a violation of the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution-Count II (id., PageID. 13); (3) a violation of Article I, § 26 of the Alabama Constitution-Count III (see id., PageID. 13-15); and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress-Count IV (id., PageID. 15). McCool's wife, Deidre Drinkard, asserted a claim for loss of consortium-Count V (id., PageID. 15-16).

Austal timely removed the Plaintiffs' action to this Court on April 29, 2022, within thirty days of its receipt of service of the Complaint on March 31, 2022. (See Doc. 1 PageID. 2). As grounds for removal, Austal avers solely that this Court has original federal jurisdiction over Plaintiff McCool's Second Amendment claim (Count II) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Id., PageID. 2-3).

The other bases for relief asserted by Plaintiffs under Alabama state law all arise out of the same set of facts and are part of the same case and controversy (i.e., Plaintiff McCool's alleged wrongful termination from Austal and the alleged loss of consortium Plaintiff Drinkard claims to have suffered as a result thereof) so that this Court has supplemental jurisdiction of them within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Section 1367(a).

(Id., PageID. 3).

Within a week of filing its notice of removal, Defendant Austal filed a motion to dismiss Counts II-V of Plaintiffs' Complaint, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (See Doc. 2). Plaintiffs responded with a motion to remand (Doc. 9). On June 3, 2022, Austal filed its response to motion to remand and reply in support of motion to dismiss Counts II-V of Plaintiffs' Complaint. (Doc. 11). This matter is, therefore, ripe for a decision.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

A. Federal Jurisdiction and Removal. “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and there is a presumption against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such that all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction are to be resolved in favor of remand.” Russell Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Overlook Gardens Properties, LLC v. ORIX USA, L.P., 927 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Allen v. Christenberry, 327 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir.) (“[R]emoval statutes should be construed narrowly, with doubts resolved against removal.”), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 877, 124 S.Ct. 277, 157 L.Ed.2d 140 (2003); University of South Alabama v. American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, federal courts are directed to construe removal statutes strictly.... Indeed, all doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.”); see Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree[.]” (internal citations omitted)). Moreover, the removing defendant must bear “the burden of demonstrating federal jurisdiction.” Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Stated differently, because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction “[i]t is . . . presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction[.]” Kokkonen, supra, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. at 1675 (internal citations omitted).

Generally speaking, a defendant like Austal may remove a case from state court to federal district court if the case is a civil action over which the district court would have had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”). Original jurisdiction includes federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).^[3] And “[w]hether a claim arises under federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is generally determined by the well-pleaded complaint rule, ‘which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.'” Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1310 (11th Cir. 2001), quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). “A well-pleaded complaint presents a federal question where it ‘establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.'” Smith, 236 F.3d at 1292, quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 2728, 103 S.Ct. 2840, 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983); see also Cornelius v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 452 Fed.Appx. 863, 865 (11th Cir. Nov. 29, 2011) (recognizing that under § 1331, “a federal court will have jurisdiction only when the plaintiff's cause of action is conferred by federal law or when there is some ‘contested[, substantial] federal issue' and the exercise of jurisdiction is ‘consistent with congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal courts ....' Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 l.Ed.2d 257 (2005).”)).

1. Brief Analysis. Here, despite Plaintiffs' argument in their motion to remand that Count II of the Complaint (alleging a violation of McCool's Second Amendment rights) was included in error (see Doc. 9, PageID. 53-58), such a claim was in fact included (see Doc. 1-1, PageID. 13 (“The Defendant's actions have infringed upon the Plaintiff's right to bear arms as set out in the second amendment to the U.S. Constitution[.] [] The Defendant knowingly terminated the Plaintiff's employment for exercising his right to bear arms. [] The Defendant intentionally terminated the Plaintiff's employment for exercising his right to bear arms.”)) and it is apparent to the undersigned that Plaintiffs' properly-pled complaint on its face presents a federal question (namely, whether Plaintiff's Second Amendment rights were violated). Indeed, in their Complaint, Plaintiffs highlight (by underlining, using bold lettering, and all caps) that Count II is a claim for “VIOLATION OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.” (Doc. 1-1, PagelD. 13). Accordingly, this Court can properly exercise subject-matter jurisdiction (that is, federal question jurisdiction) over this decidedly federal law claim, see Baggett v. First Nat'l Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The question whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is measured as of the time the Complaint was filed.”), which remains part of Plaintiffs' complaint despite the contents of the motion to remand. That Plaintiffs have now realized that they can state no viable Second Amendment claim against Austal (see Doc. 9) simply cannot inform a finding by this Court that a Second Amendment claim (and, consequently, a federal question) does not appear on the face of Plaintiffs' properly-pled complaint filed in the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama on February 25, 2022.

B. Pleading Standard. The sufficiency of a Plaintiff's claims to proceed beyond the pleading stage and into discovery, is governed by the plausibility standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550, U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and further detailed in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). In Twombly, the United States Supreme Court expressly abrogated the Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) “no set of facts” pleading standard, holding that test “has earned its...