McCoy v. State

• Decision Date: 24 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. CR,CR
• Citation: 925 S.W.2d 391,325 Ark. 155
• Parties: Corinthian McCOY, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 96-6.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 391

925 S.W.2d 391

325 Ark. 155

Corinthian McCOY, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR 96-6.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

June 24, 1996.

Joe Kelly Hardin, Benton, for Appellant.

Clint Miller, Deputy Atty. General, Little Rock, for Appellee.

CORBIN, Justice.

Appellant, Corinthian McCoy, was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder and attempted second-degree murder, and sentenced by the Saline County Circuit Court to life in the Arkansas Department of Correction. McCoy appeals the circuit court's judgment of conviction, and this court has jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to Ark.Sup.Ct.R. 1-2(a)(2). McCoy raises two points on appeal: (1) The trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce items seized in an illegal search of appellant's vehicle; and (2) the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to introduce appellant's custodial statement, as it was involuntary and taken without regard to appellant's request for an attorney. We affirm.

In the early-morning hours of August 6, 1994, a shooting occurred at Jimmy Dirden's Club in Benton, Arkansas, which resulted in the death of Willie Mills and the injury of Raymond Lewis. Benton Police officers discovered a piece of metal in the club's parking lot that was similar to a .22 caliber bullet. Raymond Lewis, who suffered a gunshot wound to the leg, told officers that a black male driving a light-colored big car, such as an Oldsmobile or a Buick, left Dirden's and began shooting from inside his vehicle into a crowd of people standing outside the club. Lewis told the officers that the vehicle driven by the shooter had no license plate, and that the man who did the shooting was kin to Demetrius Woods.

Officers spoke to Demetrius Woods, who stated that he was present when the crime occurred and that it was his cousin Corinthian who did the shooting. Woods told police that he did not know Corinthian's last name, but that he did know that Corinthian had recently received a traffic ticket for no vehicle license in Alexander or Bryant, Arkansas. Woods also stated that at the time of the incident, Corinthian was driving a big, light-colored car, possibly an Oldsmobile, which had no license plate.

Investigating officers subsequently located the Arkansas State Police officer who issued the traffic ticket to the individual known to the officers only as "Corinthian." A copy of the traffic citation, which was written for no vehicle license, revealed that the driver of the vehicle was identified as Corinthian McCoy and that the vehicle driven was a white Oldsmobile. Upon having identified appellant as the suspect, officers located appellant's residence in Little Rock, Arkansas, and arrested him later that same day of the shooting. Officers also located the vehicle in question at appellant's residence and identified it as a 1980 light gray Oldsmobile Delta 88 bearing no license plate. Upon his arrest, appellant was interviewed by a police detective and denied any involvement in the shooting. Officers seized the vehicle from appellant's residence and later conducted a search of its contents pursuant to a search warrant. The only evidence of the crime found during the search of the vehicle was a .22 caliber bullet.

Prior to appellant's trial, a hearing was conducted on the motions to suppress appellant's statement and the evidence recovered in the search. After hearing the testimony presented, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress the physical evidence, stating that there was sufficient identification of the vehicle in the affidavit to support application for the search warrant. After reviewing the contents of the statement itself the trial court also denied appellant's motion to suppress the custodial interview.

I. Search of the Vehicle

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence found in a search of the vehicle appellant was driving on the night of the shooting. Specifically, appellant argues that the affidavit for search warrant insufficiently identified the proper vehicle to be searched, and that the trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify beyond the information contained in the affidavit. The state argues that appellant lacked standing to challenge the search as he did not present any proof that he owned or legally possessed the automobile. We agree.

It is well settled that a proponent of a motion to suppress bears the burden of establishing that his Fourth Amendment rights have been violated. Rockett v. State, 319 Ark. 335, 891 S.W.2d 366 (1995) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature. Rockett, 319 Ark. 335, 891 S.W.2d 366; State v. Hamzy, 288 Ark. 561, 709 S.W.2d 397 (1986). The pertinent inquiry regarding standing to challenge a search is whether a defendant manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the area searched and whether society is prepared to recognize that expectation as reasonable. Littlepage v. State, 314 Ark. 361, 863 S.W.2d 276 (1993), (citing United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268 (10th Cir.1989)). This court will not reach the constitutionality of a search where a defendant has failed to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the object of the search. Littlepage, 314 Ark. 361, 863 S.W.2d 276. A defendant has no standing to question the search of a vehicle owned by another person, unless he can show that he gained possession from the owner or from someone who had authority to grant possession. Id.; State v. Barter, 310 Ark. 94, 833 S.W.2d 372 (1992).

In the hearing below, appellant presented no proof whatsoever that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car. Appellant's argument to the trial court attacked the search warrant on the basis that there was no evidence linking the car found at his residence with the car involved in the crime; however, counsel's questions and remarks indicated a different line of attack, specifically, that the car was not appellant's. Through cross-examination of Officer Jimmy Holiman, appellant's counsel elicited testimony to the effect that the officer had no evidence to indicate that appellant was the actual owner of the vehicle and that a check of the car's VIN (vehicle identification number), showed the owner as Irma L. Brooks. Through this line of questioning, appellant's counsel all but admitted that appellant had no expectation of privacy in the vehicle.

Appellant took the stand during the suppression hearing, but his testimony was limited to the subject of his custodial statement. Appellant offered no proof that the car was his or that he lawfully possessed it. Because appellant failed to establish lawful possession of the car, we conclude he had no standing to challenge the search of the car. For that reason, we do not reach the merits of his argument on appeal, and we affirm the trial court's ruling.

II. Custodial Statement

For his second point, appellant argues that the police obtained a custodial statement from him in violation of his rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Appellant asserts that his waiver of Miranda rights was not made voluntarily, that his request for counsel was denied, and that he made the statement under duress and threats from the officer. We do not find any of these arguments persuasive, and therefore we affirm.

When voluntariness of a statement is an issue, we make an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the statement. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996). We will reverse the ruling of the trial court only if that ruling was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Magar v. State, 308 Ark. 380, 826 S.W.2d 221 (1992). A custodial statement is presumed involuntary, and the burden is on the state to show that the statement was voluntarily given. Misskelley, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702. A confession based on threats of harm is inadmissible. Duncan v. State, 291 Ark. 521, 726 S.W.2d 653 (1987). In making a determination of whether a statement was voluntarily made, this court will...