McCoy v. VanKirk

• Decision Date: 16 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 24019.,24019.
• Citation: 201 W.Va. 718,500 S.E.2d 534
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Dr. James C. McCOY, Plaintiff below, Appellant, v. Fred VANKIRK, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Highways, Defendant below, Appellee, and Rite Aid of West Virginia, Inc., a West Virginia Corporation, Intervenor below, Appellee.

500 S.E.2d 534

201 W.Va. 718

Dr. James C. McCOY, Plaintiff below, Appellant, v. Fred VANKIRK, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Highways, Defendant below, Appellee, and Rite Aid of West Virginia, Inc., a West Virginia Corporation, Intervenor below, Appellee.

No. 24019.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted October 8, 1997.

Decided December 16, 1997.

Joyce F. Ofsa, Trina L. Leone, Mark A. Sadd, Spilman, Thomas & Battle, Charleston, for Appellant McCoy.

Anthony G. Halkias, Jeff Miller, West Virginia Division of Highways, Charleston, for Appellee Fred VanKirk.

William E. Hamb, Christopher L. Hamb, Hamb & Poffenbarger, Charleston, for Appellee Rite Aid of West Virginia. STARCHER, Justice:

This appeal concerns the interpretation and constitutionality of W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19 [1994], which allows the Commissioner of the Division of Highways, appellee Fred VanKirk, ("Commissioner") to dispose of certain unneeded highways real estate. The dispute between the parties centers on whether, under the statute, the Commissioner may constitutionally give preferential treatment to an owner of land adjoining the highways property being sold by offering the adjoining landowner the right of first refusal to purchase the highways property for "fair market value." Under the statute, the general public (that is, persons who do not own adjoining property) must buy surplus highways property at a public auction for the "highest and best price therefor."

On September 10, 1996, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County entered an order holding that W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19 violates the equal protection guarantees of the United States and West Virginia Constitutions by giving preferential treatment to abutting landowners as opposed to non-abutting landowners. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV; W.Va. Const., art. III, § 10. The circuit court also found that the statute violates the West Virginia constitutional requirement that the object of each act of the legislature must be contained in its title. See W.Va. Const., art. VI, § 30.

After reviewing the complex language of the statute, we hold that the statute requires the Commissioner to give preferential treatment to any landowner who owns land adjoining highways property when selling that property pursuant to W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19. We conclude that the legislative creation of this distinction between abutting landowners and the general public is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose, and does not violate equal protection. Additionally, the title of the act as amended in 1994 was sufficient to apprise any interested party of its nature, and the title thus meets constitutional requirements. We therefore reverse the circuit court's order, and remand the case for further proceedings.

I. Facts and Background

The West Virginia Division of Highways owns a 4.65 acre plot of land in Jackson County, West Virginia, and has used the land since 1942 for its county maintenance garage. In 1995, the Commissioner determined that the property was no longer needed for present or future highways purposes and could therefore be sold pursuant to W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19 [1994].¹ An appraiser valued the property at $925,000.00. The appellant, Dr. James McCoy, owns (and has owned since approximately 1974) a plot of land that abuts the highways property. The appellant also owns several other nearby non-abutting plots that he has developed for commercial use.

In February 1996, the Commissioner announced that the aforementioned highways property would be sold at a public auction. On February 26, 1996, the appellant filed this declaratory judgment action against the Commissioner to stop the auction, arguing that W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19 requires that highway property first be offered for sale to abutting landowners at fair market value before being publicly auctioned. On March 2, 1996, the appellant and the Commissioner negotiated an agreed order that allowed the sale of the property by public auction, subject to a right of first refusal in any abutting property owners.

The Commissioner held a public auction on April 19, 1996. Several commercial interests placed bids on the property, but the highest bid was made by the intervenor below and appellee, Rite Aid of West Virginia, Inc. ("Rite Aid"), for $1.45 million. The appellant was present at the auction but did not bid.

By letter dated May 2, 1996, the Commissioner offered to sell the property to the appellant according to his statutory right of first refusal; however, the Commissioner determined the fair market value of the property to be the auction bid of $1.45 million. On June 4, 1994, the appellant wrote that he agreed to exercise his right to purchase the property, but reserved the right to challenge the manner in which the Commissioner determined the fair market value of the property. Shortly thereafter, the appellant filed a motion for the determination of fair market value with the circuit court.

Appellee Rite Aid filed a motion to intervene in this declaratory judgment action on May 8, 1996, arguing that by giving preferential treatment to abutting landowners such as appellant McCoy, W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19 violated the equal protection clauses of the United States and West Virginia Constitutions. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV; W.Va. Const., art. III, § 10. Additionally, Rite Aid argued that the statute was unconstitutional because, when it was enacted in 1994, it failed to meet the West Virginia constitutional requirement that the title of legislative enactments reflect the purpose of the statute. See W.Va. Const., art. VI, § 30, infra.

On September 10, 1996, the circuit court entered an order holding W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19 [1994] was not applicable to the appellant because he was not a "principal abutting landowner" as defined by the statute. Furthermore, the circuit court found W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19 [1994] to be unconstitutional on two grounds, concluding that it violated the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution the West Virginia Constitution; and that it violated the West Virginia constitutional requirement that every statute enacted by the legislature express its objective in the title. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the Commissioner had no authority to offer the State property to the appellant for first refusal, and ordered the Commissioner to convey the property to Rite Aid. The appellant appeals the circuit court's order.

II. Discussion

A. Statutory Construction

The central issue in this case is the interpretation of W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19, and the delineation of the different classes of individuals under the statute who may purchase surplus State highways property (property that the Commissioner has deemed unnecessary for present or future State highways purposes) by different means at different prices. We conclude that W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19 creates three different groups of potential purchasers of surplus highways property, and conclude that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the statute and its conclusion that the appellant was not an "abutting landowner" who possessed a right of first refusal to purchase the property at fair market value.

"Interpreting a statute presents a purely legal question subject to our de novo review on which neither party bears the burden of proof." Syllabus Point 1, West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n v. Garretson, 196 W.Va. 118, 468 S.E.2d 733 (1996). We have said that "[a] statute that is ambiguous must be construed before it can be applied." Syllabus Point 1, Farley v. Buckalew, 186 W.Va. 693, 414 S.E.2d 454 (1992). The initial step in construing an ambiguous statute is to ascertain the legislative intent behind the statute. Syllabus Point 1, Ohio County Comm'n v. Manchin, 171 W.Va. 552, 301 S.E.2d 183 (1983).

To determine the intent of the Legislature, we must examine the statute in its entirety:

In the construction of a legislative enactment, the intention of the legislature is to be determined, not from any single part, provision, section, sentence, phrase or word, but rather from a general consideration of the act or statute in its entirety.

Syllabus Point 1, Parkins v. Londeree, 146 W.Va. 1051, 124 S.E.2d 471 (1962).

When construing an ambiguous enactment in light of the Legislature's intent, courts are not free to read into the language of a statute what is not there, but should apply the statute as written. Mills v. Van Kirk, 192 W.Va. 695, 699, 453 S.E.2d 678, 682 (1994). Undefined words and terms in a legislative enactment will be given their "common, ordinary, and accepted meaning." Syllabus Point 1, Miners in General Group v. Hix, 123 W.Va. 637, 17 S.E.2d 810 (1941), overruled on other grounds, Lee-Norse Co. v. Rutledge, 170 W.Va. 162, 291 S.E.2d 477 (1982)

. Additionally, "when a statute's language is ambiguous, a court often must venture into extratextual territory in order to distill an appropriate construction." State ex rel. McGraw v. Scott Runyan Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 194 W.Va. 770, 777, 461 S.E.2d 516, 523 (1995).

The Commissioner and Rite Aid contend that there are only two classes of purchasers under the statute: a "principal abutting landowner," which is defined as "an individual from whom the real estate was acquired" or their heirs, and who have a right of first refusal to purchase surplus property from the Commissioner; and the general public, who must purchase the property at a public auction. The appellant contends there is a third class: "abutting landowners" whose property adjoins surplus highways property, who have a right of first refusal to buy the property at fair market value. The appellant further contends that he is in this last class and should be allowed the first right of refusal to purchase the subject property. We agree with the appellant's construction of the statute.

We begin our analysis in this case by examining the history of W.Va.Code, 17-2A-19. The statute was first...