McCreary v. State
| Decision Date | 21 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | 02-21-00114-CR |
| Citation | 649 S.W.3d 902 |
| Parties | Laura MCCREARY, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: J. EDWARD NIEHAUS, BODKIN NIEHAUS DORRIS & JOLLEY, PLLC, DENTON, TEXAS.
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE: PAUL JOHNSON, CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY; ANDREA R. SIMMONS, CHIEF OF APPELLATE DIVISION, ASSISTANT CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY; ANDREW NEIFORD & ALESHA NICHOLS, ASSISTANT CRIMINAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS DENTON COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, DENTON, TEXAS.
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Birdwell
Appellant Laura McCreary appeals her conviction for false report to a peace officer, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
In October 2018, Appellant and Joseph McCreary were going through a divorce; court orders regarding Joseph's visitation rights with their son were in place. On October 10, 2018, Joseph—per the visitation orders—drove to the home where Appellant and their son resided, and he parked at the end of the driveway. While Joseph sat in his vehicle, Appellant approached, opened the locked door via the keypad, and attempted to push Joseph aside. Joseph tried to push Appellant out. He called 911. While Joseph spoke to the 911 dispatcher, Appellant yelled statements that contradicted Joseph's version of the disturbance.1
Responding police, including Officer Samuel Brandt, made contact with Joseph and questioned him about the disturbance. Joseph gave Officer Brandt a GoPro camera that had recorded the interaction between Appellant and Joseph inside the vehicle. After viewing the GoPro video, Officer Brandt spoke with Appellant and obtained a written statement.
Joseph's statements to police were consistent with the events recorded in the video, while Appellant's statements on the video were inconsistent with what was actually occurring. Appellant's subsequent verbal and written statements to police were also inconsistent with the events shown on the video. Ultimately, because of the video, police were able to determine no family-violence assault had occurred.
After additional investigation, police issued a warrant for Appellant's arrest for the offense of false report to a peace officer. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.08. The case went to trial in August 2021, and a jury found Appellant guilty.
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction.
In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the crime's essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; Queeman v. State , 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789 ; Queeman , 520 S.W.3d at 622. The factfinder alone judges the evidence's weight and credibility. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04. Instead of re-evaluating the evidence's weight and credibility and substituting our judgment for the factfinder's, we determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the evidence's cumulative force when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Murray v. State , 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) ; see Villa v. State , 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (). We must presume the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Murray , 457 S.W.3d at 448–49.
To determine whether the State has met its burden to prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we compare the crime's elements as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge to the evidence adduced at trial. See Hammack v. State , 622 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) ; see also Febus v. State , 542 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Hammack , 622 S.W.3d at 914. The law as authorized by the indictment means the statutory elements of the charged offense as modified by the factual details and legal theories contained in the charging instrument. Curlee v. State , 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) ; see Rabb v. State , 434 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ().
Under Section 37.08 of the Texas Penal Code, "[a] person commits an offense if, with intent to deceive, he knowingly makes a false statement that is material to a criminal investigation and makes the statement to ... a peace officer." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.08. Here, the State specifically alleged Appellant "intentionally and knowingly with the intent to deceive, ma[d]e a false statement, namely: that Joseph McCreary restrained or assaulted her, to a peace officer, Samuel Brandt, conducting a criminal investigation, and the said statement was material to the investigation."
Appellant contests the sufficiency of the evidence to prove only the materiality element of the offense.
Before we turn to our analysis, we must first determine when a false statement may be "material." Section 37.08 of the Texas Penal Code does not define "material" or otherwise explain the phrase "material to a criminal investigation." Id.
Unless an undefined statutory term has acquired a technical meaning, we construe it according to the rules of common usage. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011 ; Watkins v. State , 619 S.W.3d 265, 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) ; Kirsch v. State , 357 S.W.3d 645, 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Indeed, "[w]ords not specifically defined by the Legislature are to be understood as ordinary usage allows, and jurors may thus freely read statutory language to have any meaning which is acceptable in common parlance." Green v. State , 476 S.W.3d 440, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (quoting Vernon v. State , 841 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ). "Accordingly, when determining the sufficiency of evidence to support a jury verdict, reviewing courts must not employ definitions of relevant statutory words which are different or more restrictive than the jurors themselves were legally entitled to use." Vernon , 841 S.W.2d at 409.
Webster defines "material" as "being of real importance or great consequence," "essential," or "relevant, pertinent." Material , Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary (2002). Black's Law Dictionary similarly defines "material" as "[h]aving some logical connection with the consequential facts ... essential." Material , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Nevertheless, both Appellant and the State seek to have us apply a different, technical meaning to the term "material" as used in Section 37.08.2
Appellant asks us to apply a Brady -style analysis. Using this standard, Appellant's false statements would be material if, in light of all the evidence, there exists a reasonable probability that the outcome of the family-violence-assault investigation would have been different had the statements not been made. See Smith v. Cain , 565 U.S. 73, 75, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630, 181 L.Ed.2d 571 (2012) ; Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). But Brady does not always apply to questions of "materiality." Cf. Watkins , 619 S.W.3d at 279 (). Standing alone, "material" could easily be understood to mean "relevant." See id.
Section 37.08 further modifies the word "material" by the phrase "to a criminal investigation." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.08 ; cf. Watkins , 619 S.W.3d at 279–80. According to Section 37.08 ’s plain language, whether a statement is "material to a criminal investigation" could cover any aspect of a criminal investigation, not just the result. Cf. Watkins , 619 S.W.3d at 278. Nothing in the plain language of Section 37.08 indicates that the investigation's outcome, or ultimate result, determines whether a false statement is "material."
The State contends the appropriate analysis is from Section 37.04 of the Texas Penal Code, which appears in Chapter 37 immediately after the sections describing the offenses of perjury and aggravated perjury and defines a "material" statement as one that "could have affected the course or outcome of the official proceeding." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 37.04(a). Thus, the State contends that a statement is material under Section 37.08 if it has some "legitimate tendency to prove or disprove some fact" of the type that could affect the outcome of a criminal investigation, whether it did here or not.
We are not convinced the Legislature intended that the Section 37.04 "material" definition apply to the offense described in Section 37.08. The Legislature titled Chapter 37 of the Texas Penal Code, "Perjury and Other Falsification," indicating "perjury" is distinguishable from "other falsification." See generally Tex. Penal Code...
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