McCullers v. Williamson

Decision Date13 September 1965
Docket NumberNo. 23009,23009
Citation221 Ga. 358,144 S.E.2d 911
PartiesClark N. McCULLERS et al. v. Hugh WILLIAMSON et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Plaintiffs as residents, citizens, taxpayers, and parents of children of the Walton County Schools district have such interest in the offices held by defendants as members of the Board of Education and as Count School Superintendent to test the right of defendants to hold their offices by writ of quo warranto.

2. While the Constitution required that the amendment be submitted to the voters of each political subdivision directly affected by it and approved by a majority of those voting, it was not necessary that this amendment be submitted to and approved by the majority of those voting in the Social Circle School District as the amendment did not directly affect said district.

3. The amendment to the Constitution became a part of the Constitution when ratified as required by the Constitution, and the provision that its effective date will be determined by resolution of the present Monroe City Board of Education and the Walton County Board of Education approving the merger violates no provision of the Federal or State Constitutions and thus is constitutional.

4. Those provisions of the amendment providing for the selection and composition of the members of the board of education for the new school system whereby three members are elected from the City of Monroe by its mayor and council and one member from each of the four county areas to be appointed by the grand jury with the superintendent being elected by the board does not violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

Edenfield, Heyman & Sizemore, Newell Edenfield, W. Dan Greer, Atlanta, for plaintiffs in error.

Preston & Benton, William L. Preston, Terrell W. Benton, Jr., Monroe, for defendants in error.

Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Alfred L. Evans, Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for party at interest not party to record.

MOBLEY, Justice.

Clark N. McCullers, Donald E. Garrett, and J. C. Shepard, Jr., as relators filed their information in the nature of a quo warranto, naming Hugh Williamson, George W. Felker, III, Aubrey Coker, and Clyde Pearce as respondents, alleging substantially as follows: that McCullers and Garrett are residents of Loganville, Ga. and Shepard of Social Circle, Ga., and all are residents, citizens and taxpayers of Walton County, Ga., and Shepard is parent of a child enrolled in the independent school system of Social Circle, Ga.; that respondents, Williamson, Felker and Coker, all of Monroe, Ga., are claiming to be members of the Board of Education of Walton County, and Pearce is claiming to be Superintendent of Walton County Schools; that the respondent board members and superintendent are claiming their respective offices under authority of a purported constitutional amendment of 1956 (H. R. No. 105-300f) (Ga.L.1956, p. 433), but that said purported constitutional amendment is illegal, null and void, and that for that reason the board members and superintendent should be ousted from their offices. The grounds of the attack upon the constitutionality of the Act will be stated and ruled upon in the opinion. A general demurrer to the petition as amended was sustained and the information in the nature of a quo warranto was dismissed.

The exception is to that judgment.

1. The parties bringing this proceeding have the standing to bring it. The petition alleges that all are residents, citizens, and taxpayers of Walton County, and two of them are parents of children enrolled in the Walton County Schools and the other is a parent of a child enrolled in the Social Circle Independent School System.

Code § 64-201 provides that the writ of quo warranto 'must be granted at the suit of some person either claiming the office or interested therein.' The plaintiffs, as residents, citizens, and taxpayers have such interest in the offices as given them the right to test the right of the members of the board of education and county school superintendent to hold their offices. 'Where the purpose is to declare the office vacant, any citizen and taxpayer may file a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto.' Kidd v. Nelson, 213 Ga. 417(1), 99 S.E.2d 123, and cases cited.

2. Prior to, and at the time, the resolution was adopted by the General Assembly and submitted to the votes for ratification or rejection, three separate and distinct school systems existed in Walton County, to wit: Monroe City School System, the Walton County School System, and the Independent School System of Social Circle. The resolution provided that Art. VIII, Sec. V, Par. I. (Code Ann. § 2-6801) of the Constitution of Georgia of 1945 be amended by adding thereto proscribed provisions, one of which provided that all of Walton County, exclusive of that area within the corporate limits of Social Circle, shall compose one school district under control and management of a Walton County Board of Education and to be known as Walton County Schools.

The resolution provided that if a majority of the qualified registered voters residing in the existing county system and of the Monroe City School System voting in the election approve the amendment, such amendment shall become a part of the Constitution of this State.

The petition alleges that a majority of those voting in the election in each of those systems approved the amendment, but that a majority of the voters of the Social Circle Independent School System voted against ratification.

Relators' contention is that the proposed amendment affected the Social Circle Independent School System, and that the approval of the majority of the voters of that system voting in the election was required before the local constitutional amendment could become a part of the constitution. It is agreed that the amendment was not submitted separately to the Social Circle Independent School System for ratification or rejection by the voters, as was required, if Social Circle Independent School System is directly affected. Further, in the county wide vote, the voters of Social Circle School System voted, and the majority of those voting voted against the adoption of the amendment. In either event, it has not been ratified by the voters of the Social Circle School District.

At the time of submission of the amendment, the constitution, Art. XIII, Sec. I, Par. I (Code § 2-8101), provided in part '* * * if such proposed amendment directly affects only one or more political subdivisions of the State, then it shall also be advertised in the area to be directly affected thereby'; and further declared 'if the proposed amendment is not one that directly affects the whole state, but only one or more subdivisions thereof, said amendment shall not become a part of this Constitution unless it receive both a majority of the electors qualified to vote voting thereon in the State as a whole, and also a majority of the electors qualified to vote voting thereon in the particular subdivision of [sic] subdivisions affected.'

If the amendment directly affects the Social Circle Independent School System within the meaning of the above quoted provision of the Constitution, it has not been ratified by the people as required by the Constitution, is not a part of the Constitution, and is null and void, and the respondent members of the Board of Education of the Walton County Schools and the Superintendent of said school are not legally holding said offices, as such offices have never been created and do not exist.

At the time of adoption of the amendment and at all times since, Social Circle Independent School District had the right to give up its independent system and go into the county system by a majority vote of those voting in an election. Code Ann. §§ 32-1201, 32-1202, 32-1203 (Ga.L.1926, Ex.Sess., p. 40). It has not done so, nor is it alleged that it plans to do so. The thrust of the argument of the plaintiffs in error is that Social Circle is affected by the amendment, not because it provides for its merger with the county, which it does not do, but because, if it should ever decide to do so, it would have to merge with a different system (provided by the amendment) from that which existed prior to the amendment, and for that reason Social Circle is affected. The significant differences in the old and new systems are that, before the amendment, Social Circle could merge with the Walton County System which did not include the Monroe System; the Board of Education consisted of five members appointed by the grand jury, and the County School Superintendent was elected by the people and his qualifications were fixed by statute. Under the amendment, the Monroe City School System is added to the Walton County System; until such time as Social Circle may come into the system, the board of education would consist of seven members, three of whom would be named by the Mayor and Council of Monroe from residents of Monroe, and four members from Walton County, Exclusive of Monroe and Social Circle, would be appointed by the Walton County grand jury. If Social Circle should vote to come into the system there would be nine members, one of whom would come from Social Circle appointed by the Mayor and Council of Social Circle.

The only references in the amendment to Social Circle are: (1) 'All of Walton County exclusive of that area lying within the limits of the City of Social Circle shall compose one school district.' Rather than affecting Social Circle this simply left it alone, just where it was. (2) 'At such time as Social Circle may vote to come into the system the Board shall be composed of nine members * * * (3) one member from Social Circle appointed by the Mayor and Council of Social Circle.' And, Social Circle is included in 'Area A' from which area one member would be elected by the grand jury. While the...

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13 cases
  • Smith v. Abercrombie
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • December 4, 1975
    ...may define the classes as it chooses so long as the classification is not arbitrary and unreasonable. See McCullers v. Williamson, 221 Ga. 358, 365, 144 S.E.2d 911 (1965). There is nothing, however, in the Fourteenth Amendment that prohibits a state from creating different kinds of politica......
  • Camp v. Williams
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • September 30, 2022
    ...office may seek a writ of quo warranto "to inquire into the right of any person to any public office"), and McCullers v. Williamson , 221 Ga. 358, 360 (1), 144 S.E.2d 911 (1965) (holding that residents and taxpayers of Walton County had a sufficient "interest" in the offices of the local bo......
  • Lilly v. Heard
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 30, 2014
    ...public office may seek a writ of quo warranto “to inquire into the right of any person to any public office”); McCullers v. Williamson, 221 Ga. 358, 360(1), 144 S.E.2d 911 (1965) (holding that residents and taxpayers of Walton County had a sufficient “interest” in the offices of the local b......
  • Morgan v. Department of Offender Rehabilitation, 66098
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • April 27, 1983
    ...and the law will be upheld." Fulton County School District v. Sanders, 242 Ga. 298, 300, 248 S.E.2d 670 (1978); McCullers v. Williamson, 221 Ga. 358, 144 S.E.2d 911 (1965). Moreover, the "validity of the state's classifications here does not depend upon their absolute correctness nor upon t......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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