McCulley v. People

• Citation: 463 P.3d 254
• Decision Date: 18 May 2020
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 18SC577
• Parties: Brian Keith MCCULLEY, Petitioner v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

463 P.3d 254

Brian Keith MCCULLEY, Petitioner

v.The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent

Supreme Court Case No. 18SC577

Supreme Court of Colorado.

May 18, 2020

Attorneys for Petitioner: Reppucci Law Firm, P.C., Jonathan D. Reppucci, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kevin E. McReynolds, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 The Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act ("SORA") bars an individual who "has more than one conviction" for unlawful sexual behavior from petitioning a court to discontinue the requirement to register as a sex offender. § 16-22-113(3)(c), C.R.S. (2019). The question in this case is whether a defendant who has successfully completed a deferred judgment nonetheless still "has [a] conviction" for purposes of the bar in section 16-22-113(3)(c).

¶2 Construing the language of the statute as a whole in the context of the overarching statutory scheme, and considering the commonly understood legal effect of a successfully completed deferred judgment as set forth in section 18-1.3-102(2), C.R.S. (2019), we conclude that a "conviction" for purposes of the bar in section 16-22-113(3)(c) does not include a successfully completed deferred judgment. Because the defendant in this case successfully completed his deferred judgment, he no longer "has more than one conviction" for purposes of section 16-22-113(3)(c) and is therefore eligible to petition the court to discontinue his duty to register. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶3 In 2000, as part of a plea agreement, Brian Keith McCulley pled guilty to one count of second degree sexual assault under section 18-3-403(1)(a), C.R.S. (2000) (a class 4 felony), pursuant to a four-year deferred judgment and sentence. Under the agreement, McCulley also pled guilty to one count of third degree sexual assault in violation of section 18-3-404(1)(c), C.R.S. (2000) (a class 1 misdemeanor).¹ The district court accepted the plea agreement, and McCulley received a four-year deferred judgment and sentence on the felony charge.² The court entered judgment of conviction on the misdemeanor and sentenced McCulley to sixty days in jail and two years of probation. The only condition of probation was that McCulley comply with the terms of the deferred judgment. As a condition of his deferred judgment, McCulley was required to register as a sex offender, which he did.

¶4 In 2004, McCulley successfully completed the terms of his deferred judgment and sentence. The district court ordered McCulley's guilty plea withdrawn and dismissed the felony charge. Thus, only a single judgment of conviction ultimately entered in McCulley's case—on the misdemeanor. McCulley continued to register as a sex offender.

¶5 In 2016, McCulley filed a petition with the district court under section 16-22-113, seeking to discontinue the requirement that he register as a sex offender. As grounds for his petition, McCulley relied on section 16-22-113(1)(b), which permits an offender convicted of third degree sexual assault (as that offense existed when McCulley pled guilty) to petition for removal from the sex offender registry ten years after the offender's "final release from the jurisdiction of the court for such offense."³

¶6 The People opposed McCulley's petition, citing an exception in section 16-22-113(3)(c), which states that a person is not eligible for relief under the statute if he "has more than one conviction" for unlawful sexual behavior. The People observed that SORA broadly defines "conviction" to include "having received a deferred judgment and sentence." § 16-22-102(3), C.R.S. (2019). Because McCulley received a deferred judgment and sentence as part of his plea agreement, the People argued, he was ineligible to petition the court to discontinue sex offender registration, even though he "ultimately successfully completed" the deferred judgment. The trial court agreed and denied McCulley's petition, reasoning "it only matters whether the person has been convicted of more than one charge of unlawful sexual behavior." (Emphasis added.)

¶7 McCulley moved for reconsideration, citing the court of appeals' decision in People v. Perry , 252 P.3d 45 (Colo. App. 2010), which held that for purposes of section 16-22-113(3)(b) (an adjacent provision of the statute), a successfully completed deferred judgment and sentence is not a "conviction." Perry , 252 P.3d at 49. Relying on the holding in Perry , McCulley contended that a successfully completed deferred judgment does not constitute a "conviction" under section 16-22-113(3), and because he stands convicted of only the misdemeanor, he is eligible to petition for deregistration.

¶8 The district court declined to reverse course. It acknowledged that once successfully completed, a deferred judgment generally "no longer ... constitutes a conviction." However, the court opined that "the legislative intent [of SORA] was that [offenders] would have to continue to register even if they had successfully completed a deferred sentence."

¶9 McCulley appealed. A unanimous panel of the court of appeals affirmed the district court's order, reasoning that SORA's definition of "conviction" includes "having received a deferred judgment" and that unlike the contextual concerns that animated the Perry division's interpretation of subsection (3)(b), nothing in the language or context of section 16-22-113(3)(c) suggested an intent for the definition of "conviction" to carry a different meaning. People v. McCulley , 2018 COA 90, ¶¶ 10–15, ––– P.3d ––––. We granted certiorari review.⁴

II. Legal Principles

A. Standard of Review and Principles of Statutory Construction

¶10 The construction of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. Doubleday v. People , 2016 CO 3, ¶ 19, 364 P.3d 193, 196. In construing a statute, our primary purpose is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Id. To do so, we look first to the language of the statute, giving its words and phrases their plain and ordinary meaning. Id. "We read statutory words and phrases in context, and we construe them according to the rules of grammar and common usage." Id. We must interpret the statute as a whole and in the context of the entire statutory scheme, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. Id. at ¶ 20, 364 P.3d at 196 ; see also Whitaker v. People , 48 P.3d 555, 558 (Colo. 2002) ("We must read the statute as a whole, construing each provision consistently and in harmony with the overall statutory design, if possible.").

B. Deferred Judgments

¶11 A deferred judgment and sentence is a unique dispositional alternative to the traditional guilty plea. Finney v. People , 2014 CO 38, ¶ 14, 325 P.3d 1044, 1050. Under the deferred sentencing statute, a court accepting a defendant's guilty plea may (with the consent of the defendant, his counsel, and the district attorney) postpone entry of judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence for up to four years. § 18-1.3-102(1)(a) ; Finney , ¶ 14, 325 P.3d at 1050 ; Kazadi v. People , 2012 CO 73, ¶ 12, 291 P.3d 16, 20. As a condition of continuing the case, the court is empowered to implement probation-like conditions of supervision. § 18-1.3-102(2) ; Kazadi , ¶ 12, 291 P.3d at 20.

¶12 If the defendant fully complies with the conditions of the deferred judgment and sentencing agreement, "the plea of guilty previously entered shall be withdrawn and the charge upon which the judgment and sentence of the court was deferred shall be dismissed with prejudice." § 18-1.3-102(2). But if the defendant violates the conditions of the agreement, the court may "revoke the deferral and enter judgment and sentence upon his guilty plea." Kazadi , ¶ 13, 291 P.3d at 20 (citing § 18-1.3-102(2) ). In short, "a deferred judgment is a privilege, where the defendant is the primary beneficiary of a procedure that ultimately may result in dismissal of the charges against him or her." People v. Manzanares , 85 P.3d 604, 607 (Colo. App. 2003).

¶13 We have held that in a deferred judgment and sentence agreement, the court's acceptance of the defendant's guilty plea "yields a conviction." M.T. v. People , 2012 CO 11, ¶ 11, 269 P.3d 1219, 1221 ; see also § 16-7-206(3), C.R.S. (2019) ("The acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty ... acts as a conviction for the offense."). In other words, during the pendency of the deferred judgment and sentence period, a defendant may be treated for some purposes as "convicted," even though no judgment of conviction has entered. See, e.g. , Hafelfinger v. Dist. Court , 674 P.2d 375, 377 (Colo. 1984) (holding that a defendant whose deferred judgment and sentence had not yet been completed had a conviction for purposes of a statute governing personal recognizance bonds).

¶14 But as noted, upon the successful completion of the conditions of the deferred judgment and sentence agreement, the defendant's previously entered guilty plea "shall be withdrawn" and the charge "shall be dismissed with prejudice." § 18-1.3-102(2) ; see also M.T. , ¶ 11, 269 P.3d at 1221. Accordingly, a defendant in this situation generally is no longer "convicted." Hafelfinger , 674 P.2d at 377 n.3. But see M.T. , ¶ 1, 269 P.3d at 1220 (concluding that a successfully completed and dismissed deferred judgment constitutes a "conviction" for purposes of section 24-72-308(3)(c), C.R.S. (2019), which prohibits the sealing of records "pertaining to a conviction" involving unlawful sexual behavior).

C. Sex Offender Registration Act

¶15 SORA, §§ 16-22-101 to - 115, C.R.S. (2019), provides for a "centralized registration system to track offenders in order to ‘protect the community and ... aid law enforcement officials in investigating future sex crimes.’ " Ryals v. City of Englewood , 2016 CO 8,...