McDonald's Corp. v. Robinson Industries, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 August 1991
• Docket Number: 07-CA-59419,Nos. 07-CA-59270,s. 07-CA-59270
• Citation: 592 So.2d 927
• Parties: McDONALD'S CORPORATION v. ROBINSON INDUSTRIES, INC. and Mississippi State Highway Commission. McDONALD'S CORPORATION and Robinson Industries, Inc. v. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION OF MISSISSIPPI.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 927

592 So.2d 927

McDONALD'S CORPORATION v. ROBINSON INDUSTRIES, INC. and Mississippi State Highway

Commission.

McDONALD'S CORPORATION and Robinson Industries, Inc. v. STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION OF MISSISSIPPI.

Nos. 07-CA-59270, 07-CA-59419.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Aug. 21, 1991.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Feb. 12, 1992.

Stephen W. Rimmer, Stephen E. Gardner, Young Scanlon & Sessums Firm, Shane F. Langston, Langston & Frazer, Robert H. Weaver, James L. Jones, Watkins Ludlam & Stennis, Jackson, for appellant.

Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Alan M. Purdie, Henry C. Clay, III, Asst. Attys. Gen., John H. Price, Jr., Susan L. Runnels, Thomas Price Alston Jones & Davis, Jackson, for appellee.

En Banc.

SULLIVAN, Justice, for the Court:

In 1984, the Mississippi State Highway Commission initiated condemnation proceedings in the Special Court of Eminent Domain in the First Judicial District of Hinds County for property owned by McDonald's Corporation and leased by Robinson Industries. The property is located on the west frontage road of I-55 North, just south of Briarwood.

The Highway Commission submitted a statement of values estimating damages of $219,500.00. However, the jury awarded damages in the amount of $225,000.00 to McDonald's and $275,000.00 to Robinson, for a total of $500,000.00. The Highway Commission appealed to this Court.

In State Highway Commission of Mississippi v. McDonald's Corp., 509 So.2d 856 (Miss.1987), we noticed as plain error, under Supreme Court Rule 6(b), that McDonald's had only a revocable permit giving it access to the frontage road and that therefore McDonald's and Robinson were being paid for land they did not own. We affirmed a judgment in the amount of $1,000.00 subject to McDonald's and Robinson entering a remittitur of $499,000.00 within fifteen days of the decision. If McDonald's and Robinson refused to enter a remittitur, we ordered that the case be reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with our opinion.

McDonald's and Robinson petitioned this Court for a rehearing. They supplied this Court, for the first time, with a deed dated June 21, 1957. The deed was from Theo Costas to the Highway Commission and conveyed to the Highway Commission certain property which included "all abutters rights of access in and to said highway appurtenant to grantor's remaining property, including any and all existing rights of access," but excepted

the right of access from grantor's property to that section of frontage road beginning opposite Station 387+03 and ending opposite Station 403+30 from the left of said center line, and beginning opposite Station 387+03 and ending opposite Station 404+10 on the right of said center line as shown on plat attached hereto and made a part hereof by reference.

Another deed was supplied to show that the heirs of Costas conveyed the subject property to Franchise Realty Interstate Corporation on December 17, 1976. Franchise Realty has since merged with McDonald's.

McDonald's and Robinson also supplied an affidavit by Robert Barnes, a civil engineer who had been employed by the Highway Commission for eighteen years. Barnes stated, that in his professional opinion "the tract of property owned by McDonald's Corporation lies between Station No. 403+03 and 387+03."

The Mississippi State Highway Commission argued that this Court should not consider new evidence which was not part of the record on appeal. We denied the petition for rehearing without a written opinion.

McDonald's and Robinson refused to enter a remittitur. Instead, McDonald's initiated proceedings in chancery court to prove that it did have access rights to the frontage road. McDonald's asked the court to enjoin the Highway Commission from proceeding with the retrial in the Special Court of Eminent Domain until the chancery court had made a determination concerning the access rights.

The Highway Commission filed a Motion to Dismiss and asked that Rule 11 sanctions be imposed. The Highway Commission contended that the proceeding in chancery court was barred since this Court had made a ruling in the case. On April 6, 1988, the Chancery Court dismissed the case on the ground of res judicata and imposed Rule 11 sanctions. McDonald's has appealed that decision.

The Special Court of Eminent Domain retried the case. McDonald's and Robinson contended that this Court was incorrect as to its ruling regarding the access rights to the frontage road and asked that the case be transferred to chancery court for a determination on the issue since an eminent domain court does not have jurisdiction over questions of title. The Eminent Domain Court denied the request and proceeded with the retrial. On April 27, 1988, the court awarded damages in the amount of $2,100.00 to each condemnee for a total of $4,200.00. McDonald's and Robinson have appealed that decision.

These two appeals have been consolidated for review upon Motion filed by McDonald's. McDonald's and Robinson assign a number of errors in the two appeals. Most of the assignments of error deal with the jurisdiction of the eminent domain court. Our discussion of the court's jurisdiction disposes of the majority of assignments. Two remaining assignments deal with Rule 11 sanctions and attorney's fees.

LAW

I. MAY AN EMINENT DOMAIN COURT TRY TITLE?

The question of whether an eminent domain court can try title involves two issues. First, is an eminent domain court prohibited from trying title? Secondly, may title be tried only in chancery court?

A. IS AN EMINENT DOMAIN COURT PROHIBITED FROM TRYING TITLE?

Until 1971, the jurisdiction of the court of eminent domain was exercised by a justice of the peace and a jury. Code of 1892, ch. 40, Sec. 1680; Code of 1906, ch. 43, Sec. 1855; Code of 1927, ch. 24, Sec. 1561; Code of 1930, ch. 26, Sec. 1481; Mississippi Code of 1942 Sec. 2750. The function of the justice of the peace, in an eminent domain proceeding, was ministerial rather than judicial. In fulfilling that function, the justice could only take those steps as were "precisely marked out by the statute." Sullivan v. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Co., 85 Miss. 649, 660, 38 So. 33, 34 (1904).

In 1971, the Legislature revised the statutes on eminent domain by repealing those sections dealing with eminent domain, Secs. 2749-2782 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, and reenacting a new chapter. 1971 General Laws of Mississippi, ch. 520. The reenactment is codified in chapter 27 of the Mississippi Code of 1972. See Miss.Code Ann. Secs. 11-27-1 to 11-27-91 (1972 & Supp.1990). Jurisdiction of the special court of eminent domain is now exercised by virtue of Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 11-27-3 (1972) which reads:

A special court of eminent domain is hereby created, to consist of a judge, jury, and such other officers and personnel as hereinafter set out, and it shall have and exercise the jurisdiction and powers hereinafter enumerated. The original powers and jurisdiction shall be and is hereby fixed in the county court in each county that has elected to come under the provisions of section 9-9-1 Mississippi Code of 1972, or that may hereafter come under the provisions of said section 9-9-1, and in every other county of this state, the original powers and jurisdiction shall be and is hereby fixed in the circuit court of such county, which said powers and jurisdiction may be exercised in full either in termtime or vacation, or both.

Historically, this Court has limited the subject matter jurisdiction of the court of eminent domain. No statute, the Court has said, gives the court of eminent domain any power other than the power to determine the amount of compensation. The Court has thus limited the jurisdiction based on a strict construction of the eminent domain statutes. However, the Legislature has made changes in the statutes dealing with eminent domain over the years. An examination of those changes reveals that the reasoning upon which this Court relied to limit the jurisdiction of the eminent domain court is no longer viable.

Those cases which address the limited jurisdiction of an eminent domain court usually do so when Section 17 of the Mississippi Constitution is involved, i.e. a challenge is made as to whether the contemplated use is public. Section 17 provides that

[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use, except on due compensation being first made to the owner or owners thereof, in a manner to be prescribed by law; and whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be public shall be a judicial question, and, as such, determined without regard to legislative assertion that the use is public.

In Vinegar Bend Lumber Co. v. Oak Grove & Georgetown Railroad Co., 89 Miss. 84, 43 So. 292 (1906), this Court discussed at some length the limited jurisdiction of an eminent domain court in relation to a question raised under Section 17.

The right to take private property is a judicial question, made so by the constitution, and no form of charter, or powers granted in the charter, can take the settlement of this question away from the courts. The right to condemn and take is dependent upon two things: First, a provision in the charter authorizing it; and, second, that the right will be exercised for only such purposes as the constitution allows private property to be taken, to-wit: for public purposes.

Section 1680, Code 1892, provides for the creation of a special court of eminent domain to exercise the jurisdiction and powers enumerated in the chapter. Section 1681 provides how the court shall be organized.... On a review of the whole chapter on the subject of eminent domain, we unhesitatingly arrive at the conclusion that the legislature never intended to create a tribunal of full jurisdiction to try any and all issues that might be raised on the subject of the right to condemn. The court created by this chapter is a special...