McElrath v. Burley, 97-1210

• Decision Date: 26 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-1210,97-1210
• Citation: 707 So.2d 836
• Parties: 73 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,314, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D647 Ronald M. McELRATH, not individually, but in his capacity as Executive Director of the Florida Commission On Human Relations, Appellant, v. Ronna S. BURLEY, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 836

707 So.2d 836

73 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,314, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D647

Ronald M. McELRATH, not individually, but in his capacity as Executive Director of the Florida Commission On Human Relations, Appellant, v. Ronna S. BURLEY, Appellee.

No. 97-1210.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

Feb. 26, 1998.

Robert Butterworth, Attorney General, and William H. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Richard E. Johnson of Spriggs & Johnson, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Michael R. Masinter, Fort Lauderdale, for amici ACLU and NELA.

DAVIS, Judge.

Ronald M. McElrath, in his capacity as Executive Director of the Florida Commission on Human Relations, appeals an order of the circuit court holding unconstitutional a portion of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. The trial court ruled that

[t]he sequence of procedures in which an aggrieved person must prevail under § 760.11(7), Florida Statutes, before being allowed to sue for damages in Circuit Court is so unduly burdensome as to violate the right of access to courts and due process under the constitutions of Florida and the United States.... The differential impact of the requirements of § 760.11(7) on charging parties based on factors other than merit of their claims violates the right of equal protection of the law under the constitutions of Florida and the United States.

Because we find that the statute is not an unconstitutional denial of access to courts and does not violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the Florida and United States constitutions, we reverse.

Ronna Burley filed a claim with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) asserting that she was a victim of sexual discrimination at work. Her claim was rejected within 180 days, and a determination was issued by FCHR that there was no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred ("no-cause finding"). Ms. Burley did not follow the procedure set forth in section 760.11(7) and file an administrative complaint to challenge that ruling. Instead she filed a declaratory judgment action against appellant McElrath in his official capacity only, seeking, inter alia, to have section 760.11(7) declared unconstitutional as a denial of access to courts and violative of due process and equal protection. Ms. Burley argued that the statute was unconstitutional because both claimants who receive a determination by FCHR of reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred and those claimants whose claims are not processed within 180 days, regardless of merit, have the right to proceed directly to circuit court without having to go through the administrative process to which the statute relegated Burley after issuance of the no-cause determination. She argued that it is unduly burdensome for those in her position, who receive a no-cause finding within 180 days, to have to go through a full administrative hearing at the Department of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), prevail, successfully defend that recommended order before FCHR, and then be required to renounce the benefits won at the administrative level to have the right to go to circuit court.

"A legislative enactment is presumed valid and will not be declared unconstitutional unless it is demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute conflicts with some designated provision of the constitution. Whenever reasonably possible and consistent with the protection of constitutional rights, courts will construe statutes in such a manner as to avoid conflict with the constitution." Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So.2d 411, 413-14 (Fla.1981), receded from on other grounds, Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109, 1115 (Fla.1986). The burden of proof below was on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the statute was not constitutional by negating every conceivable basis for upholding the law. See Gallagher v. Motors Ins. Corp., 605 So.2d 62, 68-69 (Fla.1992).

The constitutional right of access to courts guaranteed by Article I, Section 21, of the Florida Constitution, protects only rights which existed at common law or by statute prior to the enactment of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution. See Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla.1973); Strohm v. Hertz Corp., 685 So.2d 37, 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), review denied mem., 697 So.2d 512 (Fla.1997); Caloosa Property Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Palm Beach County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 429 So.2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The claims of employment discrimination and retaliatory discharge raised by Ms. Burley did not exist at common law. See Hullinger v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 548 So.2d 231, 233 (Fla.1989); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So.2d 1327, 1330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Protection from employment discrimination and retaliatory discharge in Florida are statutory rights legislatively created in 1977. Id.; see also Florida Dep't of Community Affairs v. Bryant, 586 So.2d 1205, 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). The legislature created these rights in derogation of the common law rule that Florida employees may be hired or fired at will. See Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So.2d at 1330. Plaintiff had no constitutional right of access to courts for these claims. Thus, the challenged statute is not unconstitutional as an improper restriction of the right of access.

The judgment below states no valid grounds for concluding that the statute unconstitutionally violates Ms. Burley's right to equal protection, and we reject that conclusion. In doing so, we apply the rational basis test because no suspect class or violation of fundamental rights has been implicated. See Florida League of Cities, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Regulation, 603 So.2d 1363, 1368 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); see also Schwarz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d 1387, 1391 (11th Cir.1998).

Under this "minimal scrutiny," the statute must be sustained if "any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Schwarz v. Kogan, 132 F.3d at 1393. See also Gallagher v. Motors Ins. Corp., 605 So.2d at 69. Indeed, "where there is a 'plausible' reason for a legislative enactment, it is 'constitutionally irrelevant whether that reason in fact underlay the legislative decision.' " Id. In order to sustain her burden, the plaintiff must first show that she was treated under the law differently from similarly situated persons, then that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her, and finally, that there was no rational basis for the discrimination. "Under the rational basis test, it is not necessary to inquire whether the statutory classification effects a permissible goal in the best possible manner, as some degree of imprecision or inequality is permitted." Ciancio v. North Dunedin Baptist Church, 616 So.2d 61, 62 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). This is a heavy burden, and "any doubt [must] be resolved in favor of an enactment's constitutionality." Id. at 63.

Ms. Burley's equal protection argument is premised on her theory that two plaintiffs with identical charges may be treated differently because one who receives a timely no-cause determination must proceed through the administrative process challenged herein, but one whose claim is not examined expeditiously and who receives no determination within the 180-day period may proceed to circuit court on a claim for damages without having to go through the administrative process. This claim is insufficient to support an equal protection violation. As the Florida Supreme Court explained in In re...