McGraw v. Parsons

• Decision Date: 19 June 1985
• Docket Number: Docket No. 77003
• Citation: 142 Mich.App. 22,369 N.W.2d 251
• Parties: S. Tenney McGRAW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald H. PARSONS, Defendant-Appellant. 142 Mich.App. 22, 369 N.W.2d 251
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 251

369 N.W.2d 251

S. Tenney McGRAW, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald H. PARSONS, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 77003.

142 Mich.App. 22, 369 N.W.2d 251

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Nov. 13, 1984.

Decided April 15, 1985.

Released for Publication June 19, 1985.

[142 MICHAPP 23] Fischer, Franklin, Ford, Simon & Hogg by Mark W. McInerney, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Hardig, Goetz, Heath, Merritt & Reebel by Joseph L. Hardig, Jr. and Joseph L. Hardig III, Birmingham, for defendant-appellant.

Before HOOD, P.J., and BRONSON and TAHVONEN ^*, JJ.

TAHVONEN, Judge.

On August 10, 1972, the Oakland County Circuit Court entered a consent judgment in favor of plaintiff McGraw and against defendant Parsons, in the amount of $66,666.66, plus interest. The judgment remained unsatisfied, and on May 27, 1982, plaintiff commenced the instant action to renew the judgment pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 600.5809; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.5809. Defendant was served with the complaint and summons in Palm Beach County, Florida.

[142 MICHAPP 24] Defendant filed a motion for accelerated judgment averring that he had been a resident of Florida since 1977, and therefore the Oakland County Circuit Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The motion was denied and the question certified for immediate appeal, but this Court denied leave to appeal.

Defendant subsequently filed an answer admitting that the August 10, 1972, judgment was valid and remained unsatisfied, and again asserting lack of personal jurisdiction by way of an affirmative defense. Defendant further alleged that interest on the judgment from and after the date of entry was inappropriate. On February 27, 1984, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and awarded statutory judgment interest. M.C.L. Sec. 600.6013; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.6013. Defendant appeals as of right.

I DID THE TRIAL COURT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT?

Defendant concedes that had plaintiff proceeded by obtaining a writ of scire facias, which is considered an extension of the original action, mere notice, rather than an independent ground for assertion of personal jurisdiction, would be all that is required. Defendant contends, however, that the present action to renew the judgment under M.C.L. Sec. 600.5809; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.5809 was a new action which required plaintiff to independently establish personal jurisdiction over defendant. Defendant asserts that, since he has not resided or transacted any business in Michigan since 1977, no personal jurisdiction exists.

While there does not appear to be any Michigan decision directly on point, we agree with other [142 MICHAPP 25] jurisdictions which have generally deemed any action on the judgment, whether pursuant to a new complaint or a writ of scire facias, to be a continuation of the original action such that jurisdiction is proper in the court which rendered the original judgment. See Smith v. Carlson, 8 Ill.2d 74, 132 N.E.2d 513 (1956); Bahan v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 191 So.2d 668 (La.App.1966); Donellan Jerome, Inc. v. Trylon Metals, Inc., 270 F.Supp. 996 (N.D.Ohio, 1967); First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Coffeyville v. Liebert, 195 Kan. 100, 403 P.2d 183 (1965).

In addition, an independent basis for assertion of limited personal jurisdiction over defendant exists under M.C.L. Sec. 600.705; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.705, which states in part:

"The existence of any of the following relationships between an individual or his agent and the state shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable a court of record of this state to exercise limited personal jurisdiction over the individual and to enable the court to render personal judgments against the individual or his representative arising out of an act which creates any of the following relationships:

"(1) The transaction of any business within the state."

This section was intended to bestow upon the courts the broadest grant of jurisdiction consistent with due process. Sifers v. Horen, 385 Mich. 195, 188 N.W.2d 623 (1971). To exercise limited personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, due process requires only that the defendant have certain "minimum contacts" with the state such that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed.2d 95 (1945); Khalaf v. Bankers & [142 MICHAPP 26] Shippers Ins. Co., 404 Mich. 134, 273 N.W.2d 811 (1978).

We apply a three-part test for determining whether a given set of circumstances provides sufficient minimum contacts between a nonresident defendant and a forum state to support limited personal jurisdiction. In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (CA6, 1972). First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). Second, the cause of action must arise from defendant's activities in the forum state. Finally, the acts of defendant must have substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over defendant reasonable. In-Flight Devices Corp, supra, p. 226, quoting Southern Machine Co., Inc. v. Mohasco Industries, Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 381, (CA6, 1968). An important factor bearing upon the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction is whether defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he would have reasonably anticipated being haled into court there. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).

In the present case defendant was a resident of Michigan prior to 1977 and did substantial business within the state. Plaintiff made a loan to defendant in 1968, which defendant failed to repay. The instant cause of action clearly arose from defendant's activities here, including the initial loan, the consent judgment and defendant's failure to satisfy his obligations under the consent...