MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Limbach
Decision Date | 02 February 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 92-1199,92-1199 |
Citation | 625 N.E.2d 597,68 Ohio St.3d 195 |
Parties | MCI TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION, Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. LIMBACH, Tax Commr., Appellee and Cross-Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, John C. Duffy, Jr., Beth Heifetz, Timothy B. Dyk, Walter Nagel and Douglas A. Richards, Cleveland, for appellant and cross-appellee.
Lee I. Fisher, Atty. Gen., Barton A. Hubbard and James C. Sauer, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee and cross-appellant.
In paragraph four of its notice of appeal filed with the BTA, MCI asserted that the commissioner's application of R.C. 5727.10 to it denied it equal protection of the laws, and, in paragraph five, that the commissioner's failure to apply the general personal property tax statute to it, R.C. 5711.22, also denied it equal protection. The commissioner, in her Proposition of Law No. III, asserts the notice of appeal was specific enough to challenge the statutes on their face but not specific enough to challenge them as applied to MCI. MCI, in its Proposition of Law No. V on cross-appeal, maintains that the commissioner is hypertechnically attempting to deny it an appeal.
According to Buckeye Internatl., Inc. v. Limbach (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 264, 267, 595 N.E.2d 347, 350:
"Failure to include errors in the notice of appeal to the BTA results in the BTA's lack of jurisdiction over the errors and the court's inability to review such errors."
Citing Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Limbach (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 381, 383, 575 N.E.2d 146, 147, we concluded that Buckeye had raised an alternate argument, rather than a distinct, separate objection, because "it specified the commissioner's action that it questioned, cited the statute under which it objected, and asserted the treatment it believed the commissioner should have applied to the income." Id., 64 Ohio St.3d at 268, 595 N.E.2d at 350. Moreover, we stated:
"In resolving questions regarding the effectiveness of a notice of appeal, we are not disposed to deny review by a hypertechnical reading of the notice." Id.
Here, MCI set forth the action it contested, stated that this action denied it equal protection of the laws, and asserted the statute under which it should have been taxed. Under Buckeye, the notice sufficiently sets forth the claim that the statutes were unconstitutionally applied to MCI.
The BTA understood its role to be a receiver of evidence for constitutional challenges. Accordingly, it did so, giving the parties wide latitude in presenting the evidence. The BTA determined no facts on the constitutional questions. The commissioner, however, in her Proposition of Law No. IV, contends that the BTA not only receives evidence in this type of case, but must weigh the evidence and determine the facts necessary for the court's review of the constitutional questions. Since the BTA did not make findings of fact, the commissioner asserts that we should remand the case for the BTA to comply.
In Cleveland Gear Co. v. Limbach (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 229, 520 N.E.2d 188, paragraph three of the syllabus, we held:
We explained the process, 35 Ohio St.3d at 232, 520 N.E.2d at 191-192:
Under Cleveland Gear, the BTA need only receive evidence for us to make the constitutional finding. This is because the BTA accepts facts but cannot rule on the question. On the other hand, we can decide the constitutional questions but have a limited ability to receive evidence. Thus, the BTA receives evidence at its hearing, but we determine the facts necessary to resolve the constitutional question.
In Proposition of Law No. III, MCI argues that the commissioner's assessing it for personal property tax purposes at one hundred percent of true value while assessing resellers at thirty-one percent violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and Ohio Constitutions. In her Proposition of Law No. V, the commissioner responds that the record does not support a finding that she or the General Assembly intentionally and systematically discriminated between MCI and similarly situated taxpayers so as to deny MCI equal protection.
According to Nordlinger v. Hahn (1992), 505 U.S. 1, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 L.Ed.2d 1, 12:
In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster Cty. (1989), 488 U.S. 336, 109 S.Ct. 633, 102 L.Ed.2d 688, the United States Supreme Court upheld the power of the state to divide different kinds of property into classes and to assign to each a different tax burden so long as those divisions and classifications are neither arbitrary nor capricious. However, the court rejected the Webster County assessor's application of the state tax law in a manner that resulted in an unreasonable disparity in assessed value between the taxpayer's property and similarly situated property. It held that the intentional, systematic undervaluation of such other property unfairly deprived the taxpayer of its rights under the Equal Protection Clause. Finally, the court held that the offended taxpayer was not, in attacking the discrimination, limited to seeking an upward revision of the taxes for the other members of the class, but could seek a downward adjustment of its own property. Id. at 344-346, 109 S.Ct. at 638-639, 102 L.Ed.2d at 697-699.
Similarly, in Boothe Financial Corp. v. Lindley (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 247, 6 OBR 315, 452 N.E.2d 1295, paragraphs one and two of the syllabus, we held:
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