McKain v. Toledo City Plan Commission

• Decision Date: 26 May 1971
• Citation: 26 Ohio App.2d 171,270 N.E.2d 370
• Parties: , 55 O.O.2d 313 McKAIN et al., Appellants, v. TOLEDO CITY PLAN COMMISSION et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 171

26 Ohio App.2d 171

270 N.E.2d 370, 55 O.O.2d 313

McKAIN et al., Appellants, v. TOLEDO CITY PLAN COMMISSION et al., Appellees.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Sixth District, Lucas County.

May 26, 1971.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A municipality is not authorized to require a developer to dedicate a strip of land to the municipality without payment therefor in order to widen a main thoroughfare more than 700 feet distant from the subdivision and totally unrelated to the proposed subdivision.

2. If a subdivision regulation of municipality is within the statutory grant of power to the municipality, and within the framework of the United States and Ohio Constitutions, and if the burden cast upon the subdivider is specifically and uniquely attributable to his activity, then the regulation is permissible; but if the subdivision regulation requires the subdivider to dedicate to the municipality a strip of land more than 700 feet distant from the proposed subdivision, it is forbidden because it amounts to a confiscation of private property in contravention of constitutional prohibitions rather than reasonable regulation under the police power.

Eliot L. Kaplan, Toledo, for appellants.

Willard A. Johnson, Toledo, for appellees.

BROWN, Judge.

The appeal on questions of law and fact is dismissed and this cause is retained as an appeal on questions of law. The appeal in from a final judgment of the Common Pleas Court of Lucas County in favor of the defendants, Toledo City Plan Commission, et al., appellees herein, dismissing the petition of plaintiffs, appellants herein, which was filed pursuant to R.C. 711.09. Plaintiffs, in their petition, referred to a certain parcel of realty which they owned, and sought an approval by the Plan Commission of a final plat of a subdivision, and an order directing the Lucas County Recorder to record the plat.

A final judgment of dismissal was entered after a presentation of evidence by both parties and a finding of facts separate from conclusions of law by the Common Pleas Court.

The appeal presents the question of whether or not the plaintiffs, on the evidence presented, are entitled to an approval by the Plan Commission of the plat of the subdivision submitted and an order directing the Lucas County Recorder to record such plat.

The plaintiffs' only tract of land, comprising 3.71 acres on the northerly side of Monroe street in the city of Toledo, has a frontage on Monroe street of 250 feet. This tract has an easterly boundary of 980 feet and a westerly boundary of 842 feet, both extending northerly to Quinton avenue, and a northerly boundary comprising a frontage of 205 feet on Quinton avenue.

Carving out a portion of land from the northerly part of the 3.71 acre tract of realty, plaintiffs had prepared and submitted to the Plan Commission for approval a plat of a subdivision containing three lots with a combined frontage of 205.95 feet on Quinton avenue, which was the entire width of the tract of land (having a uniform depth of 120 feet, extending southerly) owned by the plaintiffs. This plat contained only .59 acres in the proposed subdivision, and at its southeast corner was 863 feet north of Monroe street. The proposed subdivision was described on the plat submitted as Greenbush Knolls Fourth Extension.

After the submission to it of detailed staff reports, and after holding several public hearings, the Plan Commission on or about February 19, 1970 accepted the staff recommendation and disapproved the final plat of the Greenbush Knolls Fourth Extension Subdivision for the reasons set forth in its decision, and repeated here as follows:

,'Action: It was decided that the motion should state: to disapprove the final plat of Greenbush Knolls for failure to comply with the subdivision regulations and particularly these references: Definitions on Pages 4 and 5, Section III, 17), 18), (28) (1) and (2), and on Pages 5 and 6, Section IV-A 1 ¹; C 1) and 2). Commr. Fuller seconded the motion. Motion carried.'

Actually, the sole and basic reason, as reflected by the exhibits admitted in evidence and minutes of the Plan Commission, for the Commission's disapproval of the final plat was that the master plan and official highway map of the city of Toledo, duly adopted by the city, exhibited that Monroe street, on which plaintiffs' 3.71 acre tract fronted, was designated as a dual highway, and the city of Toledo's Subdivisions Rules and Regulations provided (in Section IV, (C)(2)(a)(2)) that right-of-way widths for dual highways was to be 140 feet.

As a result of the foregoing subdivision regulation, requiring subdivision conformity with the 140 foot right-of-way widths for dual highways, the Plan Commission, as exhibited in its minutes, stated it would approve the final plat of the subdivision on condition that plaintiffs would deliver a deed to the city of Toledo for a dedication of a 30 foot strip width along the Monroe street roadway so as to widen it from its present 40 foot width from the center line to a width of 70 feet from the center line in accordance with the official highway plan. This the plaintiffs refused to do, and this was the only reason reflected in the record why the Commission refused to approve the plat. The record evidences that the Commission recognized the plat of the subdivision as being in conformity with the Subdivision Rules and Regulations in every other respect.

The Plan Commission, in making as a condition for approval of the plat the delivery of a deed by plaintiffs to the city of Toledo dedicating a 30-foot strip along Monroe street, stretched the meaning of the word 'subdivision' ² so as to include for purposes of its decision the entire 3.71 acre tract of land owned by plaintiffs rather than the .59 acres carved from the northerly portion of the larger tract. There is no logical basis or judicial precedent for this distortion of the meaning of of the word 'subdivision.'

A subdivision is a smaller part or parcel of land taken from a larger tract of land by reason of a divisional process by the landowner. Subdividing is the taking of an entire tract of land, and dividing it into smaller units designated as lots, sits, or parcels-the area or tract so divided into smaller units being known as a subdivision and evidenced by a drawing known as a plat. Ferguson v. Mathis, 96 Utah 442, 85 P.2d 827; People v. Embassy Realty Associates, 73 Cal.App.2d 901, 167 P.2d 797; 42 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d 714, Plats and Maps, Section 3; 83 C.J.S. Subdivision p. 552; Yokley Zoning Law and Practice, Volume II, Chapter 12-2, page 26. Accordingly, since plaintiffs' proposed Greenbush Knolls Fourth Extension subdivision was more than 700 feet from the Monroe street right-of-way, Toledo Subdivision Rules and Regulations, section 4(C)(2)(a)(2), pertaining to the 140 feet minimum right-of-way width for the dual highway master plan for Monroe street, is completely inapplicable and unrelated to plaintiffs' Greenbush Knolls Fourth Extension subdivision and the plat thereof, and the right of plaintiffs to its approval by the Plan Commission.

Within the framework of the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, the Legislature has a right to enact laws, and the city of Toledo has a right to enact reasonable rules and regulations governing the acceptance of a subdivision and approval of plats, and those legislative bodies have done so. In a civil action in the Common Pleas Court, pursuant to R.C. 711.09, when the plaintiffs have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that they have complied with the applicable state statutes and city rules and regulations governing subdivisions when drawing up a plat of a subdivision they submitted to the Plan Commission for approval, the Plan Commission has a mandatory duty to approve the plat and permit its recording by the county Recorder. Boxell v. Planning Comm., 10 Ohio App.2d 25, 225 N.E.2d 610. This compliance with applicable statutes and city regulations, the plaintiffs have shown in this case, and,...