McKean v. Colvin

• Decision Date: 16 March 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:13–CV–2585.
• Citation: 150 F.Supp.3d 406
• Parties: Joanne McKEAN, Plaintiff v. Carolyn W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

150 F.Supp.3d 406

Joanne McKEAN, Plaintiff

v.Carolyn W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 1:13–CV–2585.

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed March 16, 2015.

Jonathan P. Foster, Sayre, PA, for Plaintiff.

Timothy S. Judge, William J. Nealon Federal Building, Scranton, PA, for Defendant.

ORDER

CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER, Chief Judge.

AND NOW, this 16th day of March, 2015, upon consideration of the report (Doc. 19) of Magistrate Judge Gerald B. Cohn, recommending the court vacate the decision of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) and remand the above-captioned matter for further proceedings with respect to the application for disability benefits of plaintiff Joanne McKean, wherein Judge Cohn concludes that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (requiring the ALJ's findings to be “supported by substantial evidence”), and finds that the ALJ's failure to adequately explain his rejection of certain medical opinions, failure to explain credibility determinations, and impermissible reliance on a lay interpretation of medical evidence prevent meaningful review of the ALJ's decision, and it appearing that neither plaintiff nor the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) have objected to the report, and that the Commissioner has expressly waived the opportunity to do so, (see Doc. 20), and that there is no clear error on the face of the record,¹ see Nara v. Frank,

488 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir.2007) (explaining that “failing to timely object to [a report and recommendation] in a civil proceeding may result in forfeiture of de novo review at the district court level”), it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. The report (Doc. 19) of Magistrate Judge Cohn is ADOPTED.

2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of Joanne McKean and against the Commissioner as set forth in the following paragraph.

3. The Commissioner's decision denying Joanne McKean's application for disability insurance benefits is VACATED. This matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner with instructions to conduct a new administrative hearing, develop the record fully, and evaluate the evidence appropriately in accordance with this order and the report (Doc. 19) of Magistrate Judge Cohn.

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO VACATE THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER AND REMAND THE CASE TO THE COMMISSIONER FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

GERALD B. COHN, United States Magistrate Judge.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Procedural Background

On November 23, 2010, Joanne McKean (“Plaintiff”) filed an application for Title II Social Security Disability insurance benefits (“DIB”), with a date last insured of June 30, 2014,¹ and a disability onset date of May 25, 2010.² (Administrative Transcript (hereinafter, “Tr.”), 21, 23, 136). After the claim was denied at the initial level of administrative review, the ALJ held a hearing on April 2, 2012. (Tr. 37–60). On May 22, 2012, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (Tr. 18–36). On July 11, 2012, Plaintiff filed a request for review with the Appeals Council (Tr. 8–9), which the Appeals Council denied on September 25, 2013, thereby affirming the decision of the ALJ as the “final decision” of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1–7).

On October 17, 2013, Plaintiff filed the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), to appeal a decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying social security benefits. (Doc. 1). On January 29, 2014, the Commissioner (“Defendant”) filed an answer and an administrative transcript of proceedings. (Doc. 8, 9). On May 15, 2014, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of the appeal. (Doc. 14 (“Pl. Brief”)). On May 28, 2014, Defendant filed a brief in response. (Doc. 16 (“Def. Brief”)). On November 05, 2014, the Court referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. On November 26, 2014, Plaintiff submitted a statement indicating intent to waive submission of a reply brief. (Doc. 18).

II. Relevant Facts in the Record

Plaintiff was born on June 17, 1968, and thus was classified by the regulations as a younger person through the date of the ALJ decision rendered on May 22, 2012. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c). Plaintiff completed the twelfth grade and got a business diploma from a non-accredited college. (Tr. 30, 42). Plaintiff's past relevant work includes working as a photographer and slitting machine operator. (Tr. 42, 55).

III. Legal Standards and Review of ALJ Decision

To receive disability or supplemental security benefits, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) ; accord 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). A claimant for disability benefits must show that he or she has a physical or mental impairment of such a severity that:

[H]e is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

The Commissioner uses a five-step evaluation process to determine if a person is eligible for disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 ; accord Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. If the Commissioner finds that a Plaintiff is disabled or not disabled at any point in the sequence, review does not proceed. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The Commissioner must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment; (4) whether the claimant's impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) whether the claimant's impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. Before moving on to step four in this process, the ALJ must also determine Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).

The disability determination involves shifting burdens of proof. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. See Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir.1993). If the claimant satisfies this burden, then the Commissioner must show at step five that jobs exist in the national economy that a person with the claimant's abilities, age, education, and work experience can perform. Id. The ultimate burden of proving disability within the meaning of the Act lies with the plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) ; 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a).

When reviewing the Commissioner's decision denying a claim for disability benefits, the Court must uphold the findings of the Commissioner so long as those findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir.1988) ; Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir.2008). Substantial evidence is a deferential standard of review. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir.2004). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ ” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) ). Substantial evidence requires only ‘more than a mere scintilla’ of evidence, Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir.1999) (quoting Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir.1995) ), and may be less than a preponderance. Jones, 364 F.3d at 503. If a reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion reached by the Commissioner, then the Commissioner's determination is supported by substantial evidence. Monsour Med. Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir.1986) ; Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir.1999) ; Johnson, 529 F.3d at 200.

A. ALJ Bias

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ was biased against Plaintiff due to her obesity. Pl. Brief at 16–17. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, on April 2, 2012, after the administrative hearing concluded, Plaintiff's counsel was still in the room and heard the ALJ comment to the vocational expert, “I'll tell you how you get fat, you eat too much.” Pl. Brief at 16. In response to the ALJ's statement, on April 19, 2012, Plaintiff's counsel mailed the ALJ a letter and an article about the various factors that may contribute to an individual's obesity. Pl. Brief at 16–17; (Tr. 227–228). Plaintiff additionally argues that remand to a different ALJ is appropriate. Pl. Brief at 17.

The Third Circuit has held that claimants are entitled to have evidence evaluated by an unbiased adjudicator. See Hummel v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir.1984). The right to an impartial decision-maker is of even greater importance in administrative proceedings in light of the absence of procedural safeguards which are normally available in judicial matters. See Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 903 (3d Cir.1995). Nonetheless, hearing officers are provided a presumption of impartiality unless a plaintiff is able to demonstrate that they have “display[ed] deep-seated favoritism or unequivocal antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed that remarks by the ALJ during the hearing that are...