McKenna v. Soto
| Decision Date | 17 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-20-0123-AP/EL,CV-20-0123-AP/EL |
| Citation | 481 P.3d 695 |
| Parties | Patrick MCKENNA, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. Javier SOTO, a Democratic Primary Candidate for Arizona House of Representatives in Legislative District 3, et al., Defendants/Appellees. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Roopali H. Desai, Marvin C. Ruth, Kristen Yost, Coppersmith Brockelman PLC, Phoenix, Attorneys for Patrick McKenna
Javier Soto, In Propria Persona, Tucson
Laura Conover, Pima County Attorney, Civil Division, Daniel Jurkowitz, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson, Attorneys for F. Ann Rodriguez and the Pima County Board of Supervisors, Ally Miller, Ramon Valadez, Sharon Bronson, Steve Christy, and Betty Villegas
¶1 This case concerns Patrick McKenna's challenge to nomination petitions filed by Javier Soto, a candidate for the Democratic Party's nomination for the Arizona House of Representatives in Legislative District 3. McKenna appealed from a superior court judgment finding that Soto obtained enough valid signatures to qualify for placement on the primary election ballot. This Court issued an order affirming the superior court's judgment in this election case. We now explain the basis for our decision.
¶2 To qualify for the primary ballot, Soto needed 413 valid signatures on his nomination petitions. See A.R.S. § 16-322(A)(3) (). Soto submitted petition sheets that contained 460 signatures.
¶3 McKenna, a qualified elector, challenged approximately 200 of these signatures pursuant to A.R.S. § 16-351(A).1 As relevant here, McKenna alleged that 40 signatures were invalid because they included an "incomplete date" and 160 signatures were invalid because they included an "incomplete address" for the signer. While all of the "incomplete date" signatures listed a day and month, none of them listed a year. Likewise, while all of the "incomplete address" signatures contained a house number and street name, none of them contained a city/town, state, or zip code.
¶4 The Pima County Recorder ("Recorder") reviewed the challenged signatures and summarized its findings in a memorandum ("Memorandum"). See § 16-351(E). The Recorder invalidated 10 of the 40 "incomplete date" signatures, relying on the Arizona Secretary of State 2019 Elections Procedures Manual ("2019 EPM"), which directs county recorders to reject signatures with "no date or an incomplete date." See Ariz. Sec'y of State, 2019 Elections Procedures Manual A58 (2019). However, it validated 130 of the 160 "incomplete address" signatures because those 130 signers provided sufficient information for the Recorder to determine that they were eligible to sign the petition. Ultimately, the Recorder determined that Soto had seven more signatures than was required for the ballot.
¶5 After a hearing, the trial court found in relevant part that six of the ten signatures invalidated by the Recorder due to "date issues" were, in fact, valid, and the Recorder properly concluded that the 130 "incomplete address" signatures were valid. Soto therefore had enough signatures to qualify for placement on the ballot, and the court denied McKenna's requested relief.
¶6 This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, § 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution and § 16-351(A).
¶7 McKenna argues the trial court erred by finding the "incomplete date" and "incomplete address" signatures valid. Typically, a nomination petition need only substantially comply with the statutory requirements; strict compliance is not necessary "[a]bsent a clear statement that the legislature intended a particular form requirement to be indispensable." Bee v. Day , 218 Ariz. 505, 507 ¶ 10, 189 P.3d 1078, 1078 (2008) ; accord Adams v. Bolin , 77 Ariz. 316, 322, 271 P.2d 472 (1954). When there is a challenge to the content of a nomination petition, we review de novo whether " ‘a petition substantially complies with the statutory requirements’ before denying access to a ballot." Bee , 218 Ariz. at 507 ¶ 8, 189 P.3d at 1078 (quoting Moreno v. Jones , 213 Ariz. 94, 101–02 ¶ 40, 139 P.3d 612, 619–20 (2006) ).
¶8 In Arizona, candidates seeking placement on an election ballot "must gather signatures from qualified electors and file them with the appropriate elections official." Jenkins v. Hale , 218 Ariz. 561, 562 ¶ 6, 190 P.3d 175, 176 (2008) (citing § 16-322(A) ). The signatures ensure candidates have "adequate support from eligible voters to warrant being placed on the ballot." Id. (quoting Lubin v. Thomas , 213 Ariz. 496, 498 ¶ 15, 144 P.3d 510, 512 (2006) ).
¶9 Nomination petitions must contain the following information for each signatory: signature; printed name; actual residence address, description of place of residence or Arizona post office box address, city or town; and date of signing. A.R.S. § 16-315(A)(4)(a)–(d).
¶10 McKenna argues the trial court erred by finding the "incomplete date" signatures valid because: (1) § 16-315(A)(4) and the 2019 EPM require a complete date; (2) a partial date cannot "substantially comply" with the complete date requirement; and (3) Soto failed to affirmatively proffer evidence supporting the court's rehabilitation of the "incomplete date" and "incomplete address" signatures. We disagree.
¶11 A prospective candidate who wishes to be placed on an election ballot must collect the signatures of qualified electors on "nomination petitions," which must contain enumerated statutory requirements, including a "date of signing." See A.R.S. §§ 16-314(B), -315(A)(4). "Date of signing" is not defined in the statute. Therefore, we must first determine what information the legislature intended a qualified signer provide in order to comply with the statutory obligation.
¶12 In interpreting a statute, our goal is to effectuate the legislature's intent. SolarCity Corp. v. Ariz. Dep't of Revenue , 243 Ariz. 477, 480 ¶ 8, 413 P.3d 678, 681 (2018). "When the plain text of a statute is clear and unambiguous," it controls unless an absurdity or constitutional violation results. State v. Christian , 205 Ariz. 64, 66 ¶ 6, 66 P.3d 1241, 1243 (2003). But when, as here, the "text alone does not resolve the parties’ dispute," we must "attempt to glean and give effect to the legislature's intent, considering the statute's context, effects and consequences, and spirit and purpose." Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sharp , 229 Ariz. 487, 490–91 ¶ 10, 277 P.3d 192, 195–96 (2012).
¶13 The intent and purpose for requiring a nomination petition to contain the information set forth in § 16-315(A)(4) is to ensure that the signer is a qualified elector. Jenkins , 218 Ariz. at 564 ¶ 19, 190 P.3d at 178. "Indeed, ‘[t]he ultimate substantive question ... is whether the signer is in all respects a qualified elector, and all the requirements in regard to residence, date of signing, verification and the like are to assist interested parties to ascertain this fact.’ " Id. at 564–65 ¶ 19, 190 P.3d at 178–79 (quoting Whitman v. Moore , 59 Ariz. 211, 225, 125 P.2d 445 (1942) ). Additionally, the date of signing is important and necessary to determine whether the signature was collected before the date the candidate filed his or her statement of interest. See A.R.S. § 16-311(H) ().
¶14 In order to ascertain whether a petition signer is a qualified elector, it is essential that the information collected in the nomination petition be thorough and complete. Accordingly, we conclude the legislature intended that the signer provide a complete date, consisting of the day, month, and year, on the nomination petition. Because Soto's nomination petitions did not contain complete dates, the signatures did not strictly comply with the requirements of § 16-315(A)(4).
¶15 Although it is uncontroverted that Soto's nomination petitions included signatures that did not contain a complete date, we must nevertheless determine whether the trial court was correct that these signatures substantially complied with § 16-315(A)(4). See Dedolph v. McDermott , 230 Ariz. 130, 133 ¶ 17, 281 P.3d 484, 487 (2012). We conclude that the questioned signatures substantially complied with the "date of signing" obligation.
¶16 In ascertaining whether the non-compliant signatures substantially comply with the statute, we look at the petition as a whole to determine whether the omission frustrates the purpose of the statute. See Bee , 218 Ariz. at 508 ¶ 13, 189 P.3d at 1079 . Because the purpose and intent underlying the "date of signing" requirement is to ensure that petition signers are qualified electors, we do not believe the legislature intended to disqualify a signature if a complete date accompanying the signature can be sufficiently established by other information contained in the petition. See Jenkins , 218 Ariz. at 565 ¶ 21, 190 P.3d at 179 ().
¶17 Applying this approach here, the trial court did not err by concluding the signatures were valid. After reviewing the petition sheet containing the eight...
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