McKitrick v. Gibson
| Decision Date | 19 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 20190811,20190811 |
| Citation | 496 P.3d 147 |
| Parties | Cathy MCKITRICK, Appellant, v. Kerry GIBSON, City of Ogden, and Ogden City Records Review Board, Appellees. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Jeffrey J. Hunt, David C. Reymann, Jeremy M. Brodis, Salt Lake City, for appellant
Peter Stirba, Valerie Wilde, Salt Lake City, for appellee Kerry Gibson
Stephen F. Noel, Ogden, for appellee Ogden City Clinton R. Drake, Bountiful, for appellee Ogden City Records Review Board
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Cathy McKitrick, a freelance journalist, sought government records related to an investigation into alleged official misconduct by Kerry Gibson, a former Weber County Commissioner. The Ogden City Records Review Board granted her records request. But Gibson petitioned for judicial review of that decision. In the district court, McKitrick moved to dismiss. She argued that Gibson lacks standing under the Utah Government Records Access and Management Act to seek judicial review of an appeals board's access decision. Gibson opposed, arguing that his petition should proceed—statutory standing aside—because he meets the tests for traditional and public interest standing.
¶2 This case therefore poses the question contemplated by the concurrence in Haik v. Jones : May a statutory claimant who lacks statutory standing proceed on the basis of traditional or alternative standing? 2018 UT 39, ¶ 41 & n.11, 427 P.3d 1155 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). We did not answer that question in Haik , but we do so now. And we hold that the answer is no. A statutory claimant must have statutory standing, and the presence of traditional or alternative standing will not cure a statutory standing deficiency. We therefore reverse the district court's interlocutory order denying McKitrick's motion to dismiss and remand for dismissal of Gibson's petition for judicial review.
¶3 In late 2017, then Weber County Commissioner Kerry Gibson was accused of misusing public resources for personal benefit, including, among other things, misappropriating county equipment to make improvements to the Gibson family farm. Shortly thereafter, the Ogden City Police Department opened an investigation into the allegations against Gibson and subsequently referred the matter to Davis County.2 The Davis County Attorney's Office found no illegality related to the work done on the farm and insufficient evidence to support the other allegations. So Davis County declined to bring formal charges against Gibson.
¶4 After Davis County closed its investigation, McKitrick filed a records request under the Utah Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA), UTAH CODE §§ 63G-2-101 –901, seeking "the contents and findings of the police investigation." Gibson objected. And Ogden City denied McKitrick's request. The City determined that "the public's interest in disclosure does not outweigh the City's interest in classifying [the] records as private and protected," and it classified the records accordingly.3
¶5 As permitted by GRAMA, McKitrick appealed the denial to the Ogden City Chief Administrative Officer. See id. § 63G-2-401(1). The chief administrative officer affirmed the decision below, concluding that the records had been properly classified by Ogden City as private and protected under GRAMA.
¶6 McKitrick again appealed, this time to the Ogden City Records Review Board (Review Board), a local appeals board established by Ogden City as authorized by GRAMA. See id. § 63G-2-701(5)(c). Ogden City was the named respondent in the appeal. At the Review Board hearing, Ogden City argued against disclosure because, among other things, releasing the records would compromise the identities of other persons involved in the investigation of Gibson.
¶7 Although Gibson was not an official party to the Review Board proceedings, he had the opportunity to be heard at the hearing through his attorney. Gibson argued that disclosure of the records would constitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of [his] personal privacy" because, as evidenced by the decision of the Davis County Attorney's Office not to file charges, the allegations underlying the investigation proved "unsubstantiated."
¶8 After reviewing the records and "carefully considering the interests favoring access and the interests favoring restriction," the Review Board reversed the denial and ordered release of the records with limited redactions. In making its decision, the Review Board reasoned that while the names of any complainants or witnesses were properly classified as private under GRAMA subsection 302(2)(d), "the public's right [to] access and to know the information regarding the investigation of Mr. Gibson as a public official and the alleged misuse of public funds outweigh any interest in restricting the records." In its order authorizing release, the Review Board noted the right of "any party" to appeal the decision to the district court as governed by GRAMA sections 701(6) and 404.
¶9 Respondent Ogden City elected not to appeal the decision. And as the prevailing party, McKitrick did not appeal the decision. But Gibson, claiming standing under Ogden City Municipal Code subsection 4-5-25(G)(3) and section 4-5-25(H) (2018),4 filed a petition for judicial review. In his petition, Gibson argued that disclosure of the records "would constitute a ‘clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy’ ... not outweighed by any public interest" because, among other reasons, release of the records could cause significant personal and professional harm. Gibson's petition named only Ogden City and the Review Board as respondents.
¶10 McKitrick moved to intervene. She subsequently filed a motion to dismiss Gibson's petition, alleging, in relevant part, that because Gibson is neither a "political subdivision" nor a "requester," he lacks standing under GRAMA to petition the district court for review of the Review Board's decision. Gibson opposed, claiming that under our precedent, his satisfaction of the requirements for traditional or public interest standing renders "a[ny] lack of statutory standing ... immaterial."
¶11 Following oral argument, the district court concluded that in light of "ambiguities in GRAMA" and constitutional concerns surrounding the right to privacy, "a person who asserts a privacy interest in records has standing to appeal the decision of a local appeals board granting access to those records." It therefore denied McKitrick's motion to dismiss.
¶12 We granted leave to McKitrick to appeal from the district court's interlocutory order denying her motion to dismiss.
¶13 We exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).
¶14 "A ruling on a motion to dismiss presents a legal question that we review for correctness, affording no deference to the district court's decision." Turner v. Staker & Parson Cos. , 2012 UT 30, ¶ 7, 284 P.3d 600. Likewise, "[t]he interpretation ... of a statute [is a] question[ ] of law that we review for correctness." Castro v. Lemus , 2019 UT 71, ¶ 11, 456 P.3d 750 (citation omitted). And while standing generally presents a mixed question of law and fact "because it involves the application of a legal standard to a particularized set of facts," the question of whether a specific individual has standing to assert a claim is primarily a question of law. Hinkle v. Jacobsen , 2019 UT 72, ¶ 18, 456 P.3d 738 (citation omitted). We review factual findings with deference, but "we give minimal discretion to the district court on determinations of whether a given set of facts fits the legal requirements for standing." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶15 McKitrick argues that Gibson lacks standing under the plain language of GRAMA. And she contends that because Gibson is a statutory claimant—as he is proceeding under the mechanism established in GRAMA for judicial review of a local appeals board decision—he must have statutory standing to proceed and may not resort to any other form of standing to gain access to the courts. Gibson disagrees. He argues both that he has statutory standing under GRAMA and that because he meets the requirements for traditional standing, "he [nonetheless] need not rely upon the statute for authority" to judicially challenge the records’ release.5
¶16 The Utah Legislature has seen fit to establish, under the rubric of GRAMA, a process for appellate review of governmental entities’ GRAMA-related decisions. And despite his status as the subject of the records here, we conclude that Gibson is not within the scope of those authorized by the legislature to seek such review. Further, we hold that because Gibson lacks standing under the plain terms of the statute (GRAMA) through which he stakes his claim, that claim may not proceed even though Gibson has traditional standing.
¶17 "[I]n Utah, as in the federal system, standing is a [threshold] jurisdictional requirement." Gregory v. Shurtleff , 2013 UT 18, ¶ 11, 299 P.3d 1098 () (citation omitted). And it is axiomatic that where the right of action is one created by statute, "the law creating the right can also prescribe the conditions of its enforcement." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde , 920 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Utah 1996) (quoting Parmley v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co. , 64 Utah 125, 228 P. 557, 560 (1924) ).
¶18 Gibson is a statutory claimant, relying on provisions of GRAMA to seek judicial review of an appeals board's access decision. Accordingly, we first ask whether Gibson meets the requirements for standing under GRAMA—in other words, whether he is one of the persons the statute allows to seek judicial review of appeals board decisions regarding access to government records.
¶19 "When...
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