McMahan v. Felts

• Decision Date: 19 July 1929
• Parties: McMAHAN v. FELTS, Treasurer, etc., et al. COVINGTON v. COOK et al.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

19 S.W.2d 249

159 Tenn. 435

McMAHAN v. FELTS, Treasurer, etc., et al.

COVINGTON v. COOK et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

July 19, 1929

Appeal from Chancery Court, Robertson County; J. W. Stout Chancellor.

Suit by T. O. McMahan against R. M. Felts. Treasurer of the Coopertown Special School District of Robertson County, and others. Decree for defendants, and complainant appeals. Affirmed.

John D Sprouse and H. C. True, II, both of Springfield, for complainant.

True & Dorsey, of Springfield, for defendants.

McKINNEY J.

The bill seeks to enjoin the sale of bonds by the authorities of the Coopertown special school district of Robertson county.

It is alleged that the sale of said bonds is authorized by chapter 698 of the Private Acts of 1929, but that said act is invalid because it violates article 2, § 17, of the Constitution, in that same is an amendatory act, and recites neither in its caption nor body the subject of the law which it proposes to amend. The original act is chapter 123 of the Private Acts of 1921, the caption of which is as follows:

"A Bill to be entitled An Act to create and establish a Special School District out of a portion of the Thirteenth Civil District of Robertson County, Tennessee, including the village of Coopertown, Tennessee, to be known as the "Coopertown Special School District;' to define its boundaries; to provide an advisory board for said school district; define the power and duties of such board, provide for the election of members thereof; provide supplementary revenue for the maintenance of the said Special School District."

The caption of the amendatory act is in this language:

"An Act to amend chapter 123 of the Acts of 1921 (Private) of the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee, being an Act creating a special school district in the 13th Civil District of Robertson County, Tennessee, known as the 'Coopertown Special School District,' by changing the boundaries of said school district so as to increase the size of said school district, and authorizing said school district to issue and sell bonds in the amount of $15,000.00 for the purpose of constructing a school building, gymnasium, purchasing a site and maintaining a school, and providing a tax for the payment of said bonds, and suspending the 15-cent tax levy provided in said Act."

The provision of the Constitution involved provides: "No bill shall become a law which embraces more than one subject, that subject to be expressed in the title. All acts which repeal, revive or amend former laws, shall recite in their caption, or otherwise, the title or substance of the law repealed, revived, or amended." The word "substance," as used in this provision of the Constitution, is synonymous with the word "subject." Memphis St. Railroad Co. v. State, 110 Tenn. 614, 75 S.W. 730; Debardelaben v. State, 99 Tenn. 653, 42 S.W. 684; State v. Runnels, 92 Tenn. 323, 21 S.W. 665; Ransome v. State, 91 Tenn. 719, 20 S.W. 310; State ex rel. v. Gaines, 1 Lea, 737.

It is not insisted that the act embraces more than one subject. The question for decision therefore is, Does the amendatory act recite in its caption or body the subject of the act which it proposes to amend?

Manifestly the subject of the act of 1921 was "the creation of the Coopertown Special School District in Robertson County." That subject would impress upon any reasonable mind the general nature and character of the legislation proposed. Whatever is of sufficient import to direct the mind to the subject of proposed legislation meets the object of the Constitution. Memphis St. Railroad Co. v. Byrne, 119 Tenn. 307, 104 S.W. 460; Truss v. State, 13 Lea, 312.

When the subject of a statute is sufficiently stated in the title, the manner, mode, means, or instrumentalities of its enforcement, administration, or accomplishment may be embraced in its body, though not recited or stated in the title. Van Dyke v. Thompson, 136 Tenn. 143, 189 S.W. 62.

Illustrative of this principle, we cite the following cases, where it was held that the subject of the act was sufficiently expressed in the title:

Cannon v. Mathes, 8 Heisk. 515, "An act to fix the State tax on property."

State v. McConnell, 3 Lea, 332, "An act to create and establish the sixteenth judicial circuit in this State."

State v. Yardley, 95 Tenn. 550, 32 S.W. 481, 482, 34 L. R. A. 656, "An act to protect hotel, inn and boarding-house keepers."

Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Transportation Co., 128 Tenn. 287, 160 S.W. 522, 525, "An act to provide for the organization of corporations."

State ex rel. v. Persica, 130 Tenn. 54, 168 S.W. 1056, 1058, "An act to define and more...