Patterson v. Town of Tracy City

• Citation: 191 S.W.2d 432,183 Tenn. 160
• Parties: PATTERSON et al. v. TOWN OF TRACY CITY et al.
• Decision Date: 05 January 1946
• Court: Supreme Court of Tennessee

191 S.W.2d 432

183 Tenn. 160

PATTERSON et al. v. TOWN OF TRACY CITY et al.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

January 5, 1946

Appeal from Chancery Court, Grundy County; T. L. Stewart Chancellor.

Suit by S. J. Patterson and others against the Town of Tracy City and others, wherein the complainants challenged the validity of certain ordinances. From a decree of dismissal, the complainants appeal.

Affirmed.

Frank Hickerson, of Winchester, for appellants complainants below.

George S. Buckner, of Murfreesboro, for appellees.

CHAMBLISS Justice.

Citizen residents of the Town of Tracy City challenge the validity of two companion ordinances which (1) prohibit the running at large unattended of live stock within the corporate limits and (2) provide for the impounding of such live stock. The chancellor sustained a demurrer and dismissed the bill and complainants below appealed.

The charge of invalidity is upon two alleged grounds, (1) that the ordinances are indefinite and unreasonable, and (2) that the act incorporating the town is unconstitutional and void. We consider first the attack upon the act, being Chapter 158 of the Private Acts of 1945, which is alleged to be void because violative of the provision in Section 17, Article II, of the Constitution that, 'No bill shall become a law, which embraces more than one subject; that subject to be expressed in the title'; that the body of this act is broader than the caption. The title of the Act reads:

'An Act to incorporate the Town of Tracy City, in the County of Grundy, and State of Tennessee, and to provide for the election of officers thereof, and prescribe their duties; to define the corporate limits and prescribe the powers and duties of said Municipal Corporation; to provide for the raising of the revenue for the support of said incorporated Town and for other purposes.'

The particulars in which it is charged that the body of the act is broader than the caption, are thus specified on the brief of appellant:

'1. Because the body appoints and elects the Mayor and Aldermen from the enactment until the first Monday in February, 1946 and until their successors are elected and qualified and provides that the said board of Mayor and Aldermen so appointed or elected my fill any vacancy occurring.

'2. Because by Section 18 of the Act it undertakes to prescribe qualifications for its officers and officials elected by the Town Council.

'3. Because in Section 3 of the body of the Act qualifications are prescribed for the candidates for the offices of Mayor and Aldermen.'

Perhaps no provision of our Constitution has been more prolific of discussion in our reported cases, each case dependent for its decision upon its particular facts. Certain governing principles have been declared again and again. These are clearly restated by Mr. Justice Cook in Hunter v. Conner, 152 Tenn. 258, 268, 269, 227 S.W. 71, 73. After noting that the general purpose of this provision of the Constitution was 'to give notice of the nature of the proposed legislation and prevent surprise and fraud in the enactment of laws,' citing Memphis Street Railway Co. v. Byrne, 119 Tenn. 278, 104 S.W. 460, the opinion proceeds:

'To meet this constitutional requirement it is not necessary for the title to index the details of the act or give a synopsis of it. Memphis Street Railway Co. v. Byrne, 119 Tenn. 278, 104 S.W. 460. It is sufficient to direct the mind to the object of the proposed legislation (Truss v. State, 13 Lea [311], 312); the general purpose being accomplished, if the caption states the object of the legislation so that the legislative intent may be gathered from the words used (Van Dyke v. Thompson, 136 Tenn. 136, 189 S.W. 62; Ryan v. [Louisville & N.] Terminal Co., 102 Tenn. [111], 126, 50 S.W. 744, 45 L.R.A. 303.) The legislature must determine how broad and comprehensive the object of the act shall be, and the particularity to be employed in the title defining it ( State v. Cumberland Club, 136 Tenn. 84, 188 S.W. 583), but the question of whether the provisions of the act are congruous and germane must be determined by the court upon an inspection of its terms. Frazier v. Railroad, 88 Tenn. 138, 12 S.W. 537.'

Expressing the same thought in somewhat different language, we said in Texas Co. v. Fort, 168 Tenn. 679 at page 683, 80 S.W.2d 658, at page 660: 'The details of the plan were not required to be set forth in the title. * * * The title discloses the result aimed at; the method is for the body of the act. The 'subject' only is called for in the title, not the story; the purpose to do a certain thing, not just how it is to be done.'

As well said by Mr. Justice McKinney, in McMahan v. Felts, 159 Tenn. 435, 438, 439, 19 S.W.2d 249, 250, directly applicable to the instant case:

'Manifestly the subject of the Act of 1921 was 'the creation of the Coopertown Special School District in Robertson County.' That subject would impress upon any reasonable mind the general nature and character of the legislation proposed. Whatever is of sufficient import to direct the mind to the subject of proposed legislation meets the object of the Constitution. Memphis St. Railroad Co. v. Byrne, 119 Tenn. [278], 307, 104 S.W. 460; Truss v. State, 81 Tenn. [311], 312.

'When the subject of a statute is sufficiently stated in the title, the manner, mode, means, or instrumentalities of its enforcement, administration, or accomplishment may be embraced in its body, though not recited or stated in the title. Van Dyke v. Thompson, 136 Tenn. [136], 143, 189 S.W. 62.

'Illustrative of this principle, we cite the following cases, where it was held that the subject of the act was sufficiently expressed in the title:

' Cannon v. Mathes, 55 Tenn. [504], 515. 'An act to fix the State tax on property.'

' State v. McConnell, 71 Tenn. 332, 'An act to create and establish the sixteenth judicial circuit in this State.'

' State v. Yardley, 95 Tenn. [546], 550, 32 S.W. 481, 482, 34 L.R.A. 656, 'An act to protect hotel, inn, and boarding-house keepers.'

' Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Transportation Co., 128 Tenn. [277], 287, 160 S.W. 522, 525, 'An act to provide for the organization of corporations.'

' State ex rel. v. Persica, 130 Tenn. [48], 54, 168 S.W. 1056, 1058, 'An act to define and more effectually provide for the abatement of certain public nuisances.'

'Tested by these decisions, and many others of like import that could be cited, it is manifest that, had the caption of the Act of 1921 merely recited, 'An act creating a special school district in the 13th Civil District of Robertson County, Tennessee, known as the 'Coopertown Special School District," it would have sufficiently recited the subject of the proposed legislation.'

Tested by the foregoing rules, it is obvious that the subject of the act now before us is sufficiently set forth in the caption. The members of the legislature and the inhabitants of the territory affected were advised by the title of a purpose to incorporate the town, with all that commonly goes with, is incidental to, such an incorporation. For the governmental details of election of officials, their powers and prerogatives, those concerned could look to the body of the act.

The specific complainants of the title which appear to be stressed on the brief of appellants are (1) that no reference is made in the caption to provisions in the act for the election and qualifications of the mayor and aldermen, and their...