Marcus Associates, Inc. v. Town of Huntington

• Decision Date: 26 October 1978
• Citation: 382 N.E.2d 1323,410 N.Y.S.2d 546,45 N.Y.2d 501
• Parties: , 382 N.E.2d 1323 MARCUS ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellant, v. TOWN OF HUNTINGTON et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 546

410 N.Y.S.2d 546

45 N.Y.2d 501, 382 N.E.2d 1323

MARCUS ASSOCIATES, INC., Appellant, v. TOWN OF HUNTINGTON et al., Respondents.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 26, 1978.

Joseph Stern, Farmingdale, for appellant.

Ronald Glickman, Town Atty., Huntington (Frank J. Mack, Huntington, of counsel), for respondents.

OPINION OF THE COURT

COOKE, Judge.

We hold that the challenged zoning ordinance amendment of the Town of Huntington is valid and therefore affirm the ruling of the Appellate Division.

Plaintiff Marcus Associates is the owner of four undeveloped building plots in the Town of Huntington, Suffolk County. These four lots, together with eight others not relevant to the present litigation, were acquired by Marcus in 1967 and 1968. At that time, the property was zoned R-40 and was thus restricted to one acre residential use. Upon application of Marcus and other local property owners, the town board rezoned the subject land, placing it in an I-1 light industrial district. Subsequently, on February 25, 1975, defendant amended the use restrictions applicable to I-1 districts, adding the following limitations: "A building or premises shall be used for not more than 3 permitted uses and by not more than three occupants. Each separate use shall occupy no less than 20,000 square feet of building gross floor area" (Huntington Town Code, § 62-6.1, subd. 10).

Desiring to construct a building containing more than the permissible number of uses, plaintiff commenced this action to obtain a declaration of the zoning amendment's invalidity. Following trial, Special Term concluded that plaintiff had not carried its burden of proving the ordinance unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. A sharply divided Appellate Division upheld the determination of Special Term (57 A.D.2d 116, 393 N.Y.S.2d 727). ^* Plaintiff now appeals to this court, urging that enactment of the subject amendment was beyond the town's zoning power and violative of the State and Federal Constitutions.

That a legislative enactment will be presumed constitutional is an elementary but significant principle of law. The strength of this presumption, sometimes underestimated, has been repeatedly underscored by the courts of this State (see, e. g., Wiggins v. Town of Somers, 4 N.Y.2d 215, 218, 173 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581, 149 N.E.2d 869, 870; 1 Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice, § 2.11, p. 54). In this vein, we recently stated: "The exceedingly strong presumption of constitutionality applies not only to enactments of the Legislature but to ordinances of municipalities as well. While this presumption is rebuttable, unconstitutionality must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt and only as a last resort should courts strike down legislation on the ground of unconstitutionality" (Lighthouse Shores v. Town of Islip, 41 N.Y.2d 7, 11, 390 N.Y.S.2d 827, 830, 359 N.E.2d 337, 341). It is against this backdrop that the ordinance must be evaluated.

To withstand judicial scrutiny, a municipality's exercise of its zoning power "must be founded upon a legislative delegation to so proceed" (Matter of Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 370, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 145, 285 N.E.2d 291, 296). Such a legislative delegation is found in section 261 of the Town Law which empowers the town board, "(f)or the purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of the community, * * * to regulate and restrict * * * the density of population, and the location and use of building, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes". We find the Town of Huntington amendment to be well within the ambit of this broad grant (see Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481, 484, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385, 388, 330 N.E.2d 403, 405).

In so holding, we reject plaintiff's argument that population density is a proper subject of zoning regulation in residential but not industrial areas. The plain language of section 261 refutes any such contention, and certainly indicates that population density may be regulated in any setting, whether industrial or residential. Absent other factors not present here, an unambiguous statute such as this must be applied in accordance with its express terms. "Courts should not * * * add restrictions or limitations where none exist, nor should they interpret what has no need of interpretation" (Matter of Erie County Agric. Soc. v. Cluchey, 40 N.Y.2d 194, 200, 386 N.Y.S.2d 366, 369, 352 N.E.2d 552, 555). Thus, given the proper circumstances, a town board is not without regulatory power over industrial population density.

We turn now to consider the alleged constitutional infirmity. As often stated, a constitutional attack upon a zoning measure will succeed where the property owner establishes " 'that no reasonable return may be had from any permitted use' " (McGowan v. Cohalan, 41 N.Y.2d 434, 436, 393 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378, 361 N.E.2d 1025, 1027; Williams v. Town of Oyster Bay, 32 N.Y.2d 78, 82, 343 N.Y.S.2d 118, 122, 295 N.E.2d 788, 790, see 1 Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice, § 2.15, p. 64). Stated conversely, it is not enough to show that the subject land has merely suffered a significant diminution in value as a result of the zoning regulations (see Salamar Bldrs. Corp. v. Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221, 227-228, 325 N.Y.S.2d 933, 938-939, 275 N.E.2d 585, 588-589).

Notably, plaintiff has offered no evidence demonstrating its inability to realize a reasonable return on the regulated land. To the contrary, the record reveals that an overwhelming majority of the successfully developed parcels in the zone conform to the strictures of the recent amendment. Viewed in this light, the ordinance can hardly be said to deprive plaintiff of all reasonable use of the zoned plots (see, e. g., ...