McNeer v. Beck

• Decision Date: 07 February 1928
• Docket Number: 38691
• Citation: 217 N.W. 825,205 Iowa 196
• Parties: EDWARD E. MCNEER, Appellee, v. ELLA BECK, Appellant
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

217 N.W. 825

205 Iowa 196

EDWARD E. MCNEER, Appellee, v. ELLA BECK, Appellant

No. 38691

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

February 7, 1928

Appeal from Warren District Court.--J. H. APPLEGATE, Judge.

Action to set aside deed because of the conveyer's insufficient mental capacity to execute and the conveyee's undue influence in procurement thereof. The relief was granted by the court, and accordingly the appeal was taken.

Affirmed.

O. C Brown, for appellant.

J. O Watson, for appellee.

KINDIG J. STEVENS, C. J., and EVANS, FAVILLE, and WAGNER, JJ., concur.

OPINION

KINDIG, J.

There is little disagreement here concerning the legal principles involved, but the difficulty arises in the application thereof to the facts.

Martha A. McNeer died September 1, 1926, at the age of 86 years, survived by two sons and two daughters. They were the plaintiff-appellee, Edward E. McNeer, the defendant and appellant, Ella Beck (nee Ella McNeer), and the defendants Cassius McNeer and Nettie McNeer, the latter being confined in the insane hospital at Clarinda. In 1903, the husband of Martha A. McNeer, and the father of said children, died, whereupon Martha A. succeeded to the ownership of his property, including that part affected by this litigation, which was the homestead, and described as the south 100 feet of Lots 235, 236, and 237, Mallory's Addition to the town of Milo. A few months before she died, the mother, on January 21, 1926, deeded this real estate to appellant, Ella Beck. To cancel and make ineffective this instrument, the present action was brought, basis for relief being predicated upon the grounds that: First, the grantor did not have sufficient mental capacity to make a valid transfer; and second, the execution of the conveyance was the result of undue influence exercised over this parent by her child, the appellant, who was the beneficiary through the transaction.

Answer was interposed, controverting those claims, and insisting that the document was executed and delivered without "undue influence," for services rendered in caring for and nursing that aged lady during the last months of her life. All this transpired, it is alleged in contradiction of the petition, while Martha A. McNeer possessed her mental faculties, and was capable of transacting business.

Upon these issues the district court found the equities with the appellee, and adjudged the "deed" invalid because obtained by "undue influence."

I. Controversy throughout the legal battle was waged over the proposition as to who must carry the burden of proof. Preliminary to a decision of this dispute, certain well-known legal principles will be recognized, in order that a basis may be furnished for distinction under the facts here involved.

"Undue influence," as known in law, does not arise merely because opportunity therefor has been afforded or suggestion and advice given. More must appear before a written covenant granting real estate can be held for naught. Exercise of such persuasion must be so great as to overcome the will, destroy the free agency, and make the "grantor" or donor the implement of the beneficiary's craft. Osborn v. Fry, 202 Iowa 129, 209 N.W. 303; Gilmore v. Griffith, 187 Iowa 327, 174 N.W. 273; Sutherland State Bank v. Furgason, 192 Iowa 1295, 186 N.W. 200; Olsen v. Olsen, 168 Iowa 634, 150 N.W. 1070; Steen v. Steen, 169 Iowa 264, 266, 151 N.W. 115.

II. Generally speaking, when there is absence of trust relationship, special confidence, and predominance of the beneficiary over the donor or "grantor," the "burden of proof" is upon him who attempts to establish "undue influence;" and this must be done by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Johnson v. Tyler, 175 Iowa 723, 157 N.W. 184; Sutherland State Bank v. Furgason, supra.

III. Mere blood relationship does not, of itself, create the legal trust or confidential relationship and change the requirement in the above regard. Krcmar v. Krcmar, 202 Iowa 1166; Shaffer v. Zubrod, 202 Iowa 1062.

IV. However, when there is a superiority of one over the other, a "confidential or trust relationship," then it is incumbent upon the "beneficiary" under a "deed" to rebut the presumption that the transaction was fraudulent and voidable. Pruitt v. Gause, 193 Iowa 1354, 188 N.W. 798; Curtis v. Armagast, 158 Iowa 507, 138 N.W. 873; 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence (3d Ed.), Section 956. Pruitt v. Gause, supra, contains this language:

"The relation between them [the parties to the suit] was of close and intimate confidence, a situation which calls into action a well established rule which appears to us an insuperable obstacle to the validating of the deed in controversy; for, as between persons in such relations, 'a contract by which the one having the advantage of position profits at the expense of the other will be held presumptively fraudulent and voidable, and the burden is placed upon him who claims the benefits thereof to rebut that presumption by an affirmative showing that such contract was fairly procured without undue influence or other circumstance tending to impeach its fairness.' * * * The rule is nowhere more clearly stated than by Mr. Pomeroy, who says * * *: 'The doctrine to be examined arises from the very conception and existence of a fiduciary relation. While equity does not deny the possibility of valid transactions between the two parties, yet because every fiduciary relation implies a condition of superiority held by one of the parties over the other, in every transaction between them by which the superior party obtains a possible benefit, equity raises a presumption against its validity, and casts upon that party the burden of proving affirmatively its compliance with equitable requisites and of thereby overcoming the presumption.' * * * That such is the rule is not open to question * * *."

See, also, Fitch v. Reiser, 79 Iowa 34, 44 N.W. 214; Reese v. Shutte, 133 Iowa 681, 108 N.W. 525; Vorse v. Vorse, 186 Iowa 1091, 171 N.W. 186; Lampman v. Lampman, 118 Iowa 140, 91 N.W. 1042. Previously reviewing the subject, we said, in Curtis v. Armagast, supra:

"What is called 'constructive fraud' does not necessarily negative integrity of purpose. Lampman v. Lampman, 118 Iowa 140, 91 N.W. 1042. It has been defined as 'an act which the law declares fraudulent without inquiry into its motive.' * * * Or 'such contracts or acts as, though not originating in any actual evil design or contrivance to perpetrate a fraud, yet by their tendency to deceive or mislead, or to violate confidence, are prohibited by law.' Bouvier, Law Dictionary. It has also been said to be such fraud as 'the law infers from the relationship of the parties or the circumstances by which they are surrounded, regardless of any actual dishonesty of purpose.' 14 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2d Ed.) 21. * * * The rule or presumption to which we have referred is more particularly applicable where one of the parties to such relation has, by reason of his stronger character, greater ability, and wider experience, or by his hold upon the affection, trust, and confidence of the other, obtained a dominating influence over him. The relationship of principal and agent, attorney and client, parent and child, guardian and ward, is frequently mentioned as illustrative examples; but fiduciary or confidential relations may exist under a great variety of circumstances. * * * The unfavorable presumption arises only where the child, by reason of its youth and inexperience or other special circumstances, is to some degree under the dominion, control, or paramount influence of the parent, or where the child is the dominant personage in that relationship and the parent has become the dependent one, trusting herself and her interests to his advice and guidance."

V. Confronting us is the task of utilizing those fundamental doctrines in government and control of circumstances and actualities as enacted by the parties in the evidence leading up to and culminating in appellant's acquirement of the mother's holdings. Immediately after the father's death, Martha A. McNeer seems to have lived more or less alone until 1916, when, at about 75 years of age, she fell receiving an injury from which she never fully recovered. Thereafter, the appellee, Edward, lived with and cared for his mother continuously...