Medellin v. State
| Decision Date | 26 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | NO. 02-10-00002-CR,NO. 02-10-00003-CR,02-10-00002-CR,02-10-00003-CR |
| Parties | FEDENCIO PENA MEDELLIN APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 1 OF TARRANT COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION1Introduction
Appellant Fedencio Pena Medellin appeals his convictions on three counts of possessing illegal drugs.2 In his sole point, he challenges the trial court'sdenial of his motion to suppress, contending that the search that led to the seizure of the drugs admitted against him at trial was illegal because the police detained him for too long and without reasonable suspicion while awaiting a drug-sniffing dog. Because we hold that Appellant's brief detention was reasonable, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
Around 10:35 p.m. on March 26, 2009, Corporal B.A. Farmer of the Fort Worth Police Department's North Zero Tolerance Team was watching a house on North Commerce Street. Farmer and his team had received complaints of narcotics activity at the house, had on numerous occasions caught people leaving there with drugs, and over the previous two years had executed two warrants seizing large quantities of methamphetamine from the house.
Watching through binoculars from the next street over, Farmer saw Appellant walk from the house, climb into a maroon Chevrolet pickup parked in the driveway, back it out, and drive south to Long Avenue. Farmer pulled his patrol car in behind and followed the truck as it turned west on Long and then south on North Main. At Northwest 28th Street, Appellant failed to signal while turning. Farmer pulled him over. The time was 10:38 p.m. Farmer advised the rest of his team over his shoulder radio that he had made a traffic stop. When he approached Appellant and asked him for his license and proof of insurance, Appellant had neither but gave the officer his name and driver's license number. Farmer walked back to his patrol car and entered the information on the car's computer. The return showed that Appellant's driver's license had expired.
Farmer walked back to Appellant and ushered him to the sidewalk so they could talk out of the way of traffic. Farmer knew that people were often nervous during traffic stops, but Appellant was abnormally so; he was "a little jittery" and—despite the cool weather—he was sweating.
Farmer asked him where he was going. Appellant replied that he was on his way to a biker rally in Boyd, where he was working security. Farmer asked him for consent to search his truck and his person. Appellant denied consent to search the truck but granted a search of his person. Farmer thought it was suspicious that Appellant would give consent to one but not the other, and before searching Appellant's person, he requested a canine unit and a warrant check.
The frisk revealed no contraband. Farmer talked with Appellant some more as he waited for the return on the warrant check. Another member of Farmer's team, Officer A. White, arrived while Farmer and Appellant were on the sidewalk. Canine Officer Marc Macy, who had been nearby with his dog, "Hutch," arrived within "a couple of minutes" of the stop and a minute afterFarmer's call, pulling up just as Farmer was telling Appellant that the canine unit was coming. Farmer briefed Macy and White on the situation.
Macy retrieved Hutch from the back seat of his patrol car after latching the dog to a six-foot leash. Appellant's demeanor visibly deflated as he watched Macy bring out the dog; he took a deep breath and just looked at the ground.
Macy led Hutch to the truck, and starting at the driver's side headlight, he led the dog around the truck counter-clockwise to the passenger side headlight. As Hutch passed the door on the passenger side, he did a "head kick" toward it, indicating that something had caught his attention. Macy and Hutch reversed directions upon reaching the passenger side headlight, and they began retracing their path clockwise around the truck. Within a couple of steps, Hutch alerted aggressively at the passenger side door, scratching with his paws at the seam between the door and the frame. Macy returned Hutch to the back seat of his patrol car and informed the others of the alert.
Farmer and White began searching the truck. White pulled the passenger seat forward and noticed that its seat cover was unzipped five to six inches in the back. He found a black t-shirt wadded around a baggie containing smaller baggies of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine stuffed inside the opening. Farmer found another baggie containing "an extremely large amount" of black tar heroin on the other side under the driver's seat and wedged against the back wall.
The officers arrested Appellant. The total elapsed time from the stop to arrest was approximately ten minutes.
At trial, Appellant moved to suppress the drugs. The trial court carried the motion with the evidence at trial. After the State rested, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The jury convicted Appellant and, after hearing evidence on punishment, assessed sentences of ten years' confinement for possession of one or more but less than four grams of cocaine, ten years' confinement for possession of one gram or more but less than four grams of methamphetamine, and thirty years' confinement for possession with intent to deliver four or more but less than 200 grams of heroin. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly and ordered the sentences to run concurrently.
Issue on Appeal
Appellant concedes that the stop was justified by his committing a traffic violation, and he does not appear to challenge the subsequent search after the dog alerted to his truck. He does assert, however, that his continued detention pending the arrival of the canine unit was unreasonable. We disagree.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In reviewing the trial court's decision, we do not engage in our own factual review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Best v.State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), modified on other grounds by State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court's rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court's determination of those facts was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court's rulings on those questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652-53.
Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the trial court makes explicit fact findings, as it did here, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports those fact findings. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 818-19. We then review the trial court's legal ruling de novo unless itsexplicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Id. at 818.
We must uphold the trial court's ruling if it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the case even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling. State v. Stevens, 235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974 (2004).
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24. To suppress evidence because of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, the defendant bears the initial burden of producing evidence that rebuts the presumption of proper police conduct. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672; see Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). A defendant satisfies this burden by establishing that a search or seizure occurred without a warrant. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672. Once the defendant has made this showing, the burden of proof shifts to the State, which is then required to establish that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a warrant or was reasonable. Id. at 672-73; Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
A detention, as opposed to an arrest, may be justified on less than probable cause if a person is reasonably suspected of criminal activity based on specific, articulable facts. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880(1968); Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). An officer conducts a lawful temporary detention when he or she has reasonable suspicion to believe that an individual is violating the law. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492.
Analysis
In what is known as a Terry stop or an investigative detention, an officer may stop and briefly detain a person suspected of criminal activity on less information than is constitutionally required...
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