Medina v. Arizona Dept. of Transp.

• Decision Date: 05 December 1995
• Docket Number: CA-CV,No. 1,1
• Parties: Daniel MEDINA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent-Appellant. 94-0147.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

Page 1130

916 P.2d 1130

185 Ariz. 414

Daniel MEDINA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 94-0147.

Court of Appeals of Arizona,

Division 1, Department B.

Dec. 5, 1995.

Review Denied May 21, 1996.

[185 Ariz. 416] Law Offices of William C. Porter by Billy K. Sipe, Jr., Kingman, for Petitioner-Appellee.

Grant Woods, Attorney General by Susan E. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, for Respondent-Appellant.

OPINION

THOMPSON, Judge.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the alleged failure of Petitioner-Appellee Daniel Medina ("Medina") to exhaust all available administrative remedies following suspension of his driver's license, pursuant to Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. ("A.R.S.") § 28-694, deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain his appeal. We hold that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, but rather is a procedural prerequisite to judicial review of an agency determination, and that the failure of Respondent-Appellant Arizona Department of Transportation ("ADOT") to timely raise this potential procedural defense resulted in its waiver. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On August 7, 1992, Kingman Police Officer Mattosa stopped Medina for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor ("DUI"). Medina's speech was extremely slurred, he had difficulty with his balance, and he admitted having consumed alcohol earlier that day. Officer Sipe arrived at the scene and performed field sobriety tests on Medina. He performed poorly on these tests and was placed under arrest for DUI.

At the county jail, Medina submitted to several breath tests administered by Officer Sipe. Officer Sipe, a certified intoxilyzer operator, used the Intoxilyzer Model 5000 to collect Medina's breath sample. Initially, Medina refused to blow into the machine. He then blew very lightly into the machine, producing an invalid test due to insufficient air flow. On his second deficient attempt, Medina continued to blow short, light breaths. After the machine was readied again, Medina finally provided an adequate breath sample, which registered .203 percent blood alcohol.

Based on Medina's breath test results, Officer Sipe seized his driver's license and served him with a ninety-day suspension order on behalf of ADOT. Medina timely requested a hearing with ADOT regarding his license suspension pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-694. The ADOT hearing officer affirmed Medina's ninety-day license suspension following the hearing. Medina thereafter filed a petition to review his license suspension in superior court. In his petition, Medina alleged that a motion for rehearing before ADOT was not required and that the superior court had jurisdiction. ADOT admitted these allegations in their answer.

Following oral argument, the superior court reversed the hearing officer's decision because the breathalyzer calibration records had been wrongfully admitted into evidence at the ADOT hearing. After the court reached this decision, but before judgment was entered, ADOT filed a motion to dismiss Medina's appeal, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because Medina had failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review. ADOT maintained that Medina was required to request an administrative rehearing before the superior court could consider his appeal.

The superior court entered a minute order "temporarily declining to exercise jurisdiction" and ordered Medina to file a request for a rehearing with ADOT within forty-five days. The court indicated that it would "pick up th[e] case at its present posture" if the request for rehearing was denied for any reason. Medina filed a motion for rehearing which was denied for untimeliness because almost a year had elapsed since the hearing. Medina then filed a motion for reconsideration in superior court.

On January 14, 1994, the superior court "re-exercised" jurisdiction and affirmed its prior order reversing the hearing officer's decision. ADOT timely appealed to this court.

DISCUSSION

In an appeal from the trial court's review of administrative agency factual findings, we examine whether such findings are supported by substantial evidence. Sigmen v. Arizona Dep't of Real Estate, 169 Ariz. 383, 386, 819 P.2d 969, 972 (App.1991). In so doing, we owe no deference to the agency's conclusions of law and may substitute our own. Gardiner v. Arizona Dep't of Economic Sec., 127 Ariz. 603, 606, 623 P.2d 33, 36 (App.1980). We also independently review the trial court's jurisdiction as an issue of law. R.A.J. v. L.B.V., 169 Ariz. 92, 94, 817 P.2d 37, 39 (App.1991).

ADOT argues that Medina's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction and that therefore the judgment is void. This argument is based on Medina's failure to timely request an administrative rehearing prior to seeking judicial review. ¹ When a statute or regulation provides a hearing and review process to litigants before an administrative agency, the failure to pursue that process generally precludes judicial review. Cochise County v. Kirschner, 171 Ariz. 258, 260, 830 P.2d 470, 472 (App.1992); Sanchez-O'Brien Minerals Corp. v. State, 149 Ariz. 258, 261, 717 P.2d 937, 940 (App.1986). However, ADOT did not raise the failure to exhaust administrative remedies as a possible defense until after the trial court had already reached a decision on the merits of Medina's petition. In fact, ADOT admitted in the answer that the trial court had jurisdiction and that a motion for rehearing was not required. We believe, then, that the dispositive issue presented in this case is not whether Medina exhausted his administrative remedies, but whether ADOT can waive the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Under the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, litigants may not seek "judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." Estate of Bohn v. Waddell, 174 Ariz. 239, 246, 848 P.2d 324, 331 (App.1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 906, 113 S.Ct. 3000, 125 L.Ed.2d 693 (1993), citing Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938); Arizona Law Enforcement Merit Sys. Council v. Dann, 133 Ariz. 429, 431, 652 P.2d 168, 170 (App.1982). The purpose of the doctrine is "to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its special competence--to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial controversies." Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37, 92 S.Ct. 815, 818, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972). The doctrine promotes both judicial economy and administrative agency autonomy by preventing premature judicial intervention in inchoate administrative proceedings.

Arizona has recognized the exhaustion doctrine as a long-settled rule of judicial administration that is usually applied by virtue of express statutory mandate. Original Apartment Movers, Inc. v. Waddell, 179 Ariz. 419, 420, 880 P.2d 639, 640 (App.1993); Campbell v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 120 Ariz. 426, 429, 586 P.2d 987, 990 (App.1978); State ex rel. Church v. Arizona Corporation Comm'n, 94 Ariz. 107, 110, 382 P.2d 222, 224 (1963). In this sense, the doctrine is similar to other judicial gate-keeping devices, such as mootness, ripeness and standing, which courts have established to limit the cases over which they take jurisdiction. Campbell v. Chatwin, 102 Ariz. 251, 257, 428 P.2d 108, 114 (1967). This does not mean, however, that the exhaustion doctrine is simply a matter of judicial discretion. Indeed, our supreme court has held that, when the exhaustion doctrine is properly invoked in timely response to an action seeking judicial review of an administrative determination, the trial court may not exercise jurisdiction of the action. Id. at 258, 428 P.2d at 115; see Mountain View Pioneer Hospital v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 107 Ariz. 81, 85, 482 P.2d 448, 452 (1971).

In the present case, ADOT maintains that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that therefore the court had no authority to review Medina's license suspension, notwithstanding ADOT's failure to raise a potential exhaustion defense. We disagree. Although the question of whether failure to exhaust administrative remedies implicates subject-matter jurisdiction has not been fully addressed in Arizona, ² we conclude that exhaustion of remedies is generally a prerequisite to judicial relief which is based on the needs of judicial administration and not on consideration of the courts' subject-matter jurisdiction. Original Apartment Movers, 179 Ariz. at 420, 880 P.2d at 640; Green v. City of Oceanside, 194 Cal.App.3d 212, 239 Cal.Rptr. 470, 474 (1987); Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. County of Sacramento, 220 Cal.App.3d 280, 269 Cal.Rptr. 6, 10 (1990); but cf. Bohn, 174 Ariz. at 251, 848 P.2d at 336; Oberkirsch v. Director of Revenue, 883 S.W.2d 110, 111 (Mo.Ct.App.1994). It is important to distinguish between a court's inability to act because it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and a court's refusal to act because certain procedural defects, such as failure to exhaust administrative remedies, make its exercise of jurisdiction unwarranted. Jackson v. Centennial School Dist., 509 Pa. 101, 501 A.2d 218, 224 n. 3 (1985) (Larsen, J., dissenting). Here, the trial court exercised jurisdiction without regard to whether Medina had fully exhausted his administrative remedies pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-694 because ADOT did not raise any issue as to a failure to pursue all available administrative remedies. The superior court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of Medina's appeal, although, if Medina had in fact failed to exhaust his remedies by not requesting an administrative rehearing and this failure had been timely...