Medina v. People

• Citation: 2023 CO 46
• Docket Number: 21SC765
• Decision Date: 11 September 2023
• Parties: Delano Marco Medina, Petitioner v. The People of the State of Colorado. Respondent
• Court: Supreme Court of Colorado

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2023 CO 46

Delano Marco Medina, Petitioner
v.
The People of the State of Colorado. Respondent

No. 21SC765

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc

September 11, 2023

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 19CA1196

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Schelhaas Law LLC

Krista A. Schelhaas

Littleton, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General

Grant R. Fevurly, Assistant Attorney General

Denver, Colorado

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CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which JUSTICE MARQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

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OPINION

BOATRIGHT, CHIEF JUSTICE

¶1 In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970), the United States Supreme Court upheld a defendant's guilty plea even though the defendant maintained his innocence while entering the plea. In so doing, the Court noted that such a scenario (now commonly known as an Alford plea) is functionally identical to a no-contest plea when the defendant "intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt." Id. at 37.

¶2 Similarly, Delano Marco Medina pleaded guilty to felony menacing even though he maintained his innocence of that charge. He did so in exchange for the dismissal of several other criminal cases. The trial court found that Medina's plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. But because Medina agreed to waive the establishment of a factual basis for menacing under Crim. P. 11(b)(6), the trial court did not make a finding as to whether strong evidence of Medina's actual guilt existed. Medina later moved to withdraw his plea as violative of due process, arguing that a defendant cannot waive proof of a factual basis when entering an Alford plea. The postconviction court denied his motion, and a division of the court of appeals affirmed.

¶3 We must now determine whether an Alford plea requires that the trial court make a finding of strong evidence of actual guilt to pass constitutional muster. We

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conclude that there is no such requirement. Rather, we hold that a defendant may enter an Alford plea while nonetheless waiving the establishment of a factual basis for the charge under Crim. P. 11(b)(6), provided that the plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. We therefore affirm the division's judgment, albeit on slightly different grounds.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶4 Medina's wife reported that Medina had threatened her and held a knife to her throat during an argument. The People charged Medina in Lake County with felony menacing (committed with the use of a real or simulated weapon), a class 5 felony. At the time, Medina faced prosecution in five other Lake County cases, as well as one Boulder County case. The court set a $10,000 cash or surety bond in the menacing case; bond amounts were also set in the other cases.

¶5 Medina later agreed to plead guilty to felony menacing in this case. In exchange, the People agreed to dismiss all charges in the five other Lake County cases.^[1] The parties further agreed that after Medina received his Boulder County

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sentence, he would receive a consecutive one-year sentence for menacing. Medina signed a copy of the guilty plea, which stated both: "I acknowledge that there is factual basis for my guilty plea" and "I waive establishment of a factual basis for the charge."

¶6 Before the plea colloquy, Medina's attorney ("plea counsel") told the trial court that Medina "steadfastly maintains that the menacing would not be a provable case." Plea counsel added, however, that Medina "does not have a defense" to "other cases, in particular a bond violation." Accordingly, plea counsel said that Medina was choosing to plead guilty to felony menacing, "even though in his heart of hearts he does not believe he's guilty of that," so Medina could "take advantage of the plea bargain." And "to that extent," plea counsel stated, Medina "would be waiving proof of a factual basis."

¶7 The trial court acknowledged that because Medina maintained his innocence, he was entering an Alford plea. The court asked Medina if he had read the plea agreement, understood everything he read, and signed it. Medina said that he had. The court warned Medina that he would be "giving up some serious rights" by pleading guilty, which the court then described in turn before asking if Medina understood that he would be waiving each right. Medina said that he understood. The trial court explained the elements of felony menacing and asked whether Medina understood that if he went to trial, the People would need to

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prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. Medina said that he understood. The trial court asked if Medina understood that "[o]nce you plead guilty, this is a final decision. You cannot come back at another time, change your mind, plead not guilty and have a trial." Again, Medina said that he understood. At that point, the trial court asked Medina how he chose to plead, and Medina pleaded guilty.

¶8 Accordingly, the trial court found that Medina's plea was "freely, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently given." The court also found that Medina had "waived the factual basis" for the menacing charge and understood that he was waiving his rights by pleading guilty. The trial court therefore accepted Medina's guilty plea and scheduled a sentencing hearing. In accordance with the plea agreement, the court then dismissed the five other Lake County cases. With the other cases dismissed, Medina posted the $10,000 surety bond in this case and was released from custody.

¶9 Medina failed to appear at the sentencing hearing, and the court issued a warrant for his arrest. Almost a year later, Medina appeared in custody once again, represented by a new attorney ("sentencing counsel"). The People asked the court to enter the one-year sentence for felony menacing that Medina had agreed to previously. Sentencing counsel, however, sought to withdraw the plea, arguing that Medina had believed he could withdraw an Alford plea if he

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discovered new evidence and that new evidence had since come to light.^[2] The trial court denied Medina's request to withdraw his plea, stating that "there's no evidence before me that [Medina's] plea was not freely, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently done." And so, the court imposed the one-year sentence that Medina had stipulated to previously, and Medina was given 165 days of presentence confinement credit for a total sentence of 200 days of imprisonment, plus two years of mandatory parole.

¶10 Almost three years later, Medina filed a motion for postconviction relief. As relevant here, Medina argued that there was no factual basis for the plea, rendering his conviction invalid under Alford. At a hearing, plea counsel testified that Medina had "waived the factual basis" for menacing because (1) "he may have been guilty of some of the other charges" and "wanted to take the plea agreement," and (2) he would be able to post bond once the other Lake County cases were dismissed. Medina also testified and acknowledged that he "was guilty of" the other Lake County cases, but he maintained that he was innocent of menacing. Under cross-examination, Medina conceded that pleading guilty to menacing "was my choice" and that "[n]obody forced me."

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¶11 The postconviction court denied Medina's motion. It found that the record "reflect[ed] that [Medina] waived a factual basis for the purpose of availing himself of the plea bargain in the case"; specifically, Medina did so because he wanted to avoid prosecution in the other Lake County cases and post bond. The court found it "[p]articularly persuasive" that Medina had pleaded guilty knowing he would obtain the benefits of an "incredibly favorable" plea bargain, including the dismissal of five other cases and a stipulated one-year sentence. Moreover, the court found that the record provided sufficient grounds "to determine that there was a strong factual basis for the offense." Accordingly, the court ruled that Medina's plea was knowing and voluntary; it also ruled that "[t]here was a factual basis for the plea sufficient to meet the Alford requirements."

¶12 Medina appealed, arguing that under Alford, his plea was invalid because the trial court allowed him to waive proof of a factual basis.^[3] People v. Medina, 2021 COA 124, ¶ 14, 501 P.3d 834, 837. A division of the court of appeals first noted that Crim. P. 11(b)(6) expressly permits a defendant to waive proof of a factual basis when the defendant enters a plea agreement. Id. at ¶ 18, 501 P.3d at 838. Turning to Alford, the division identified "two components to a plea when a

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defendant protests his or her innocence: (1) that the defendant's interests show he or she should enter the plea; and (2) that there is strong evidence of actual guilt" despite that protestation of innocence. Id. at ¶ 23, 501 P.3d at 839. The division determined, however, that Alford didn't resolve whether the defendant may waive a finding that there is strong evidence of actual guilt. Id. at ¶ 24, 501 P.3d at 839. Reviewing case law, the division determined that federal courts disagree as to whether a strong factual basis is an independent constitutional requirement for Alford pleas. Id. at ¶ 29, 501 P.3d at 839-40. The division found similar discord among state courts; some hold that a strong factual basis is constitutionally required under Alford, while others hold that a strong factual basis is required by state procedural rules. Id. at ¶¶ 34-36, 501 P.3d at 840-41.

¶13 Faced with these competing views, the division stated that Colorado "has treated an Alford plea like any other guilty plea" and that Crim. P. 11(b)(6)-which does not distinguish between Alford pleas and other guilty pleas-is consistent with that treatment. Id. at ¶ 41...