Medley v. State

• Decision Date: 27 October 2000
• Docket Number: No. 07-98-0225-CR,07-98-0225-CR
• Citation: 47 S.W.3d 17
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000) CLIFFORD SCOTT MEDLEY, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 17

47 S.W.3d 17 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000)

CLIFFORD SCOTT MEDLEY, APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

No. 07-98-0225-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Amarillo.

October 27, 2000

Discretionary Review Refused May 23, 2001.

FROM THE 251ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY NO. 35,170-C; HONORABLE PATRICK A. PIRTLE, JUDGE

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before BOYD, C.J., and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ.

ON STATE'S MOTION FOR REHEARING

Johnson, Justice.

On consideration of the State's Motion for Rehearing, we withdraw our opinion of August 31, 2000.

Appellant Clifford Scott Medley appeals his conviction for murder. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to withdraw his waiver of right to counsel just prior to trial. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

In May, 1995, appellant Clifford Scott Medley and Frankie Steinbrecher (Frankie) were living together at the Coach Light Inn in Amarillo, Texas. Frankie and appellant broke up, and Frankie went to the Inn to pack up her effects. She disappeared. Her body was discovered on June 7, 1995, near Amarillo. She had been strangled.

In June, 1995, appellant was indicted for murdering Frankie and counsel was appointed to represent him. In May, 1997, appellant expressed dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel because of alleged lack of communication and lack of activity by counsel. Appellant requested removal of appointed counsel. In June, 1997, appointed counsel was allowed to withdraw from representing appellant, and attorney Warren Clark was appointed as new counsel. In October, 1997, appellant requested that he be allowed to represent himself with Clark as "assistant counsel." Appellant expressed no dissatisfaction with Clark's representation, but believed that "justice [would] be best served if I represent myself." After thoroughly admonishing appellant of the disadvantages of representing himself, and finding that appellant's decision was knowingly and voluntarily made, the trial judge granted appellant's request. At the same time, the court appointed Clark as "standby counsel"¹ to appellant. The court also set a trial date for March, 1998, and advised appellant that if he decided at some later time that he wanted Clark to represent him, that such decision and possible lack of preparation by Clark because of the timing of appellant's decision would not be grounds for a continuance of the trial.

Subsequent to the court's granting his request to proceed pro se, appellant filed numerous motions, attended pretrial hearings, examined witnesses in hearings, and participated in discovery proceedings. Pursuant to his request, the trial court granted appellant access to a law library for a specified number of hours per week. Appellant conferred with standby counsel, was furnished copies of documents by the State's attorneys, and had access to the State's files.

The March trial date was rescheduled to April 7, 1998, due to an extended trial over which the trial judge was presiding. The case was called for trial on the morning of April 7th. The State announced ready, but appellant moved for a continuance based on his allegations that the State had not timely produced certain evidence. His motion for continuance was denied. Appellant then announced that he was not prepared to go forward with the trial and defend himself, and responded to the trial judge's questioning by stating that he was asking the court to withdraw his previous waiver of his right to counsel. The trial judge denied appellant's request to withdraw his waiver of his right to counsel because appellant's request was made to "manipulate the orderly process of the court system." The jury panel was then summoned and jury selection began.

Appellant, assisted by standby counsel Clark, represented himself during voir dire, the jury selection process, and trial of the case until the State rested. After the State rested, appellant renewed his request "to have counsel" and an "expert assistant." The trial judge questioned appellant about his continuing to represent himself. After conferring with Clark, appellant told the judge that he wished to continue to represent himself because he wanted to present "[his] side of the story" that appellant did not feel would be presented if appellant were to be represented by Clark as his appointed attorney in charge of the case. Clark disclosed to the court that appellant indicated a desire to represent himself through the guilt-innocence stage of trial, but that appellant wanted Clark to represent him in the punishment stage of trial if the case reached that point.

Appellant continued to represent himself through presentation of defendant's case, the State's rebuttal witnesses, formulation of the jury charge, jury arguments, and jury deliberations on guilt. The jury found appellant guilty. Following return of the jury's verdict of guilty, appellant requested the court to allow standby counsel Clark to represent him. After determining that the withdrawal of appellant's right to represent himself was voluntarily and knowingly made, the trial judge appointed Clark as trial counsel. The trial then proceeded with both the State and appellant presenting evidence during the punishment phase. The jury assessed punishment at confinement for life.

By his one issue, appellant urges that he was denied counsel during the guilt-innocence phase of trial in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution,² and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 1.051(h).³ Appellant's brief does not include a harm analysis in support of his claim that a violation of Article 1.051(h) requires reversal. See Llamas v. State, 12 S.W.3d 469 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Instead, appellant relies on United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), in asserting that the denial of counsel is not subject to harmless error review, but rather, mandates automatic reversal.

The State responds by delineating the extensive period of time spent by the trial judge in admonishing appellant of the seriousness of his trying to represent himself, and in advising appellant that appellant's asserting of his right to represent himself would not be allowed to disrupt the trial schedule and orderly presentation of the case. The State cites us to United States v. Pollani, 146 F.3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1991); and Culverhouse v. State, 755 S.W.2d 856 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 863, 109 S.Ct. 164, 102 L.Ed.2d 134 (1988), in supporting the trial judge's actions as not violating appellant's right to counsel. By its Motion for Rehearing, the State also urges that Marquez v. State, 921 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996), mandates a presumption against allowing the withdrawal of waiver of counsel, and requires appellant to bear the burden of proving that no delay or disruption of orderly administration of justice would have accrued if the trial court had granted his request to withdraw his waiver. The State then argues that appellant did not offer proof that his request would not have disrupted or manipulated the orderly administration of justice, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's request. Although Marquez deals with the issue of withdrawal of waiver of the right to a jury, we agree with the State that it provides an appropriate framework with which to analyze appellant's issue. We disagree that application of Marquez mandates that we overrule appellant's sole issue.

LAW

When interpreting the federal constitution we follow the guidance of the United States Supreme Court. State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). Issues as to authoritative laws, rules and remedies designed to secure federally-guaranteed rights are federal questions. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21, 87 S.Ct. 824, 826, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). Thus, in addressing appellant's assertion that he was denied his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, we begin by looking to federal court decisions.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that in criminal prosecutions the defendant enjoys the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is extended to defendants in state court non-capital criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 596, 81 S.Ct. 756, 5 L.Ed.2d 783 (1961).

The right to effective assistance of counsel is implicated when the challenged conduct affects the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial, and includes the entitlement of a defendant to be effectively represented by counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, 104 S.Ct. at 2047. Whether a particular part of the trial process is a "critical stage" is determined not by whether the defendant suffered prejudice by the absence of effective assistance of counsel during that part of the proceedings, but rather, whether critical rights of a defendant can be lost at the stage in question. See, e.g., Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975) (final summation); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 83 S.Ct. 1050, 10 L.Ed.2d 193 (1963) (preliminary hearing); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 82 S.Ct. 157, 7 L.Ed.2d 114 (1961) (arraignment); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 81 S.Ct. 756, 5 L.Ed.2d 783 (1961) (defendant entitled to present his testimony by questions from his attorney). If counsel is either totally absent or is prevented from assisting the accused during a...