Medynski v. Margolis, Civ. A. No. 1570-73.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1570-73.
• Citation: 389 F. Supp. 743
• Parties: Elsie MEDYNSKI, Plaintiff, v. Lawrence S. MARGOLIS, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

389 F. Supp. 743

Elsie MEDYNSKI, Plaintiff, v. Lawrence S. MARGOLIS, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 1570-73.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

January 8, 1975.

Harry I. Fulton, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., Arnold T. Aikens, John R. Dugan, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., for defendant.

Before ROBINSON, Circuit Judge, and SMITH and GREEN, District Judges.

OPINION

This matter is before the Court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss¹ and plaintiff's opposition thereto. Pursuant to this Court's Order of February 21, 1974, the parties also submitted supplemental memoranda which the Court has considered. Oral argument by counsel was presented on May 8, 1974.

Plaintiff Elsie Medynski alleges, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated², that the procedure for involuntary detention and commitment of mentally ill persons, pursuant to 21 D.C.Code § 901 et seq. (Mentally Ill Persons Found in Certain Federal Reservations) is violative of due process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiff Medynski was detained on a federal reservation, the Washington National Airport in Virginia, pursuant to 21 D.C.Code § 901 et seq., supra. She was thereafter admitted to Saint Elizabeths Hospital in conformity with the statutory provisions of § 901 et seq. The plaintiff has since been released from the Hospital and has presumably returned to Canada, her place of residence.

The first issue before the Court is that of mootness because of plaintiff Medynski's discharge from the Hospital during the pendency of this litigation. The Court concludes that this case is not moot. Inherent in mental health proceedings is the occurrence of short-term detention and/or confinement. In the Case of John Ballay, Judge Tamm concluded, as we must, that mental health proceedings often fall outside the customary definition of mootness. In re Ballay, 157 U.S.App.D.C. 59, 482 F.2d 648, 651-653 (1973). The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this narrow "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 94 S.Ct. 1704, 40 L.Ed.2d 164 (decided April 23, 1974), citing Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S.Ct. 279, 55 L.Ed. 310 (1911); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). Plaintiff Medynski may, in the future, attempt to travel by air in the United States and Canada and be forced to stop at the National Airport. She may again be detained pursuant to § 901, supra, and advance the same alleged violations of the Constitution. Plaintiff should not therefore be deprived of an opportunity to be heard simply because she is discharged from the Hospital before her legal remedies have been perfected.

An additional, independent reason for deciding that this case is not moot exists—"the collateral consequences of being adjudged mentally ill remain to plague appellant". In re Ballay, supra, 482 F.2d at 651-653. A case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequence will be imposed on the basis of a challenged conviction. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). Our Court of Appeals has subsequently extended this holding to cases involving contested civil commitment adjudications. Justin v. Jacobs, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 355, 449 F. 2d 1017, 1018-1020 (1970). In the case at bar, plaintiff may suffer the collateral consequences of rehospitalization based on this "past record" of hospitalization. Further, her non-citizen status may be affected in that her right to travel, work or reside in the United States may be restricted by virtue of having been found mentally ill. Plaintiff therefore needs to be advised by a court of law whether her complaint has any on-going validity.

Turning now to the substance of plaintiff's claim³, the Court concludes that 21 D.C. § 901 et seq. and the application thereof does not present a substantial question of deprivation of the plaintiff's right to due process and equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiff bases her complaint on a comparison between the detention provisions of 21 D.C.Code § 901 et seq. (Mentally Ill Persons Found in Certain Federal Reservations) and the detention provisions of 21 D.C.Code § 501 et seq. (Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill). Plaintiff alleges that the two statutes do not contain the same provisions and that therefore those mentally ill persons detained on federal reservations adjacent to the District of Columbia (§ 901) are treated differently from those detained within the District of Columbia (§ 501).

The Court does not find that the differences between 21 D.C.Code § 901 and 21 D.C.Code § 501 rise to the level of presenting a substantial constitutional question. A reading of the two statutes reveals some minor procedural differences⁴, but none which can be construed by this Court as significant. In fact, this Court is guided by the Supreme Court's warning "that a statute should be interpreted, if fairly possible, in such a way as to free it from not insubstantial constitutional doubts". Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 711, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962) and cases cited therein. The comparison which plaintiff finds so damaging, in reality reveals that the two statutes are to be read together in a parallel and consistent fashion. For example, 21 D.C. Code § 906 specifically provides that the laws of the District of Columbia — that is, 21 D.C.Code § 501 et seq. — apply to the adjudications of those found mentally ill under § 901 et seq. That this was Congress' intent is clear since § 901 et seq. has been changed twice since the passage of § 501 et seq. Therefore, the two statutes, when read together, do not present any major constitutional inconsistencies.

The Court further notes that simply because Congress has legislated two statutes for detaining mentally ill persons, one applicable to the Metropolitan District of Columbia area containing federal reservations and one applicable to the District of Columbia does not present a constitutionally suspect situation. Because the District of Columbia is neither a state nor territory, but a federal enclave, housing the federal government, Congress may legislate a detention statute applicable only within the District. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 93 S.Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed. 2d 613 (1972). The District's statute need not contain the same provisions as those embodied in surrounding jurisdictions to pass constitutional muster.

The Court therefore concludes that the claim raised by the plaintiff does not present a substantial constitutional question which would justify further consideration by us.

In accordance with this Opinion, this Court would dismiss this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Circuit Judge Spottswood W. Robinson, III, would dismiss the action for failure of plaintiff's complaint to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, as more fully set forth in his concurring opinion.

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Circuit Judge (concurring):

I am in full agreement with the result the court reaches. My reasons differ significantly, however. Consequently, I set forth my views separately, addressing first the mootness issue¹ and then the constitutional questions.²

I. MOOTNESS

My colleagues hold that the case is not moot because the precipating incident is "capable of repetition, yet evading review,"³ and because collateral consequences of an adjudication of mental illness will continue to plague Ms. Medynski.⁴ I cannot accept either of these claims as a basis for holding, as the court does, that the case, as an action simply on Ms. Medynski's behalf, survived her release from Saint Elizabeths Hospital. If the case could not be deemed class action — a question the court declines to consider — I would conclude that it is now moot. Since I believe Ms. Medynski's suit does qualify as a class action, I think the controversy before us remains very much alive.

The continuing-controversy exception to the mootness doctrine, which my colleagues undertake to apply, has two elements: a likelihood of repetition of the same or similar events,⁵ and a time period too short to enable judicial resolution of the controversy before its current phase passes off the scene.⁶ Since Ms. Medynski was admitted to Saint Elizabeths Hospital on August 1, 1973 and released only 30 days later, I have no difficulty in concluding that this litigation meets the latter criterion. To keep the suit viable, however, the circumstances must indicate more than a mere speculative possibility of revival of the conflict; they must establish "that renewal of the controversy `is a prospect of immediacy and reality.'"⁷ The exception is wholly "dependent on a prediction of a recurrence or continuation of what is perceived to be essentially the same legal dispute,"⁸ and such a prediction for Ms. Medynski individually is not possible. The controversy before us can reappear, as one personal to her, only if she returns to the United States from her home in Canada, and happens to again become the subject of a belief of mental illness while on federal property in one of a very few Northern Virginia or Southern Maryland localities.⁹ The record discloses nothing to suggest that recurrence of that combination of events at any time in the near future is a realistic probability.

Nor am I persuaded that the collateral-consequences exception to the doctrine of mootness keeps the constitutional issues alive.¹⁰ The court relies on In re Ballay,¹¹ wherein a mootness claim was rejected because of the damaging by-products of an adjudication of mental illness.¹² To be sure, Ms. Medynski, like Ballay, was detained for emergency observation and diagnosis,¹³ but any relevant similarity between...