Meek v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 20 November 1935
• Citation: 88 S.W.2d 333,337 Mo. 1188
• Parties: Lena C. Meek, Administratrix of the Estate of James C. Meek, v. The New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company, a Corporation, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

88 S.W.2d 333

337 Mo. 1188

Lena C. Meek, Administratrix of the Estate of James C. Meek, v. The New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Company, a Corporation, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri

November 20, 1935

Motion for Rehearing Overruled November 20, 1935.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. H. A Rosskopf, Judge.

Affirmed.

Sullivan Reeder & Finley and Jones, Hocker, Gladney & Jones for appellant;

W J. Stevenson of counsel.

(1) Because this case is governed by the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C. A., secs. 51-59), and the Safety Appliance Act (U.S.C. A., Title 45), the rights of the parties must be determined by the decisions of the Federal rather than the State courts. Ill. State Trust Co. v. Railroad Co., 5 S.W.2d 368; C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472; Gulf, M. & N. Railroad Co. v. Wells, 275 U.S. 255; Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Hughes, 278 U.S. 496; C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Stapleton, 279 U.S. 587; A. Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Davis, 279 U.S. 34; Peters v. Railroad Co., 42 S.W.2d 588; Norton v. Wheelock, 23 S.W.2d 146. (2) The evidence in this record is wholly insufficient to establish why, when or where Meek was killed, but leaves these questions in the realm of speculation and conjecture. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Saxon, 284 U.S. 458; A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Toops, 276 U.S. 303; Patton v. Ry. Co., 179 U.S. 664; C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472; C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209; Southern Ry. Co. v. Walters, 284 U.S. 190; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333; St. L. I. M. & So. Ry. Co. v. McWhirter, 229 U.S. 265. (a) Inference must be built upon inference in order to arrive at the conclusion necessary to warrant a recovery in this case by respondent. As this cannot be done, respondent failed to make a case for the jury. State ex rel. v. Cox, 298 Mo. 433; Nations v. United States, 52 F.2d 105; Looney v. Met. Ry. Co., 200 U.S. 488; Smith v. Railroad Co., 239 F. 103; United States v. Ross, 92 U.S. 284. (b) If several inferences, all equally consistent with the proved facts, may be drawn from the evidence, some of which support respondent's theory and others appellant's, then respondent has failed to make a prima facie case. Because the logical inferences which may be drawn in this case from the evidence in the record are at least as consistent with other theories as with that advanced by respondent, appellant must prevail. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co. v. Holstein, 67 F.2d 782; Patton v. Ry. Co., 179 U.S. 664. (c) There is no evidence in this record even tending to prove that the alleged defective coupler was the proximate cause of Meek's death. Davis v. Wolfe, 263 U.S. 243; Martin v. Ry. Co., 19 S.W.2d 470; Ill. Trust Co. v. Railroad Co., 5 S.W.2d 368; Peters v. Railroad Co., 42 S.W.2d 588; Swearingen v. Railroad Co., 221 Mo. 656; Grant v. Ry. Co., 190 S.W. 586; Hamilton v. Ry. Co., 300 S.W. 787. (3) The Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, had no jurisdiction of this cause, for the reason that Meek was killed in Indiana, all of the witnesses in this cause resided in that state, where it should have been tried, and the trial in St. Louis constituted an undue burden on interstate commerce. Michigan Cent. Railroad Co. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492; D. & R. G. Railroad Co. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284.

Allen, Moser & Marsalek and Charles L. Moore for respondent.

(1) The duty placed by this act upon carriers by railroad engaged in interstate commerce to have their cars equipped with couplers that will couple automatically by impact without the necessity of men going between the cars is an absolute, unqualified, continuing and mandatory duty to maintain the couplers on their cars in such condition at all times. The test of the observance of such duty is the performance of the appliance. The failure of a coupler to operate or function efficiently at any time will sustain a charge that the act was violated and render the carrier liable for an injury resulting therefrom. Didinger v. Railroad Co., 39 F.2d 798; Philadelphia & R. Railroad Co. v. Eisenhart, 280 F. 276; Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. Howell, 6 F.2d 784; Minn. & St. L. Railroad Co. v. Gotscholl, 244 U.S. 66, 61 L.Ed. 95; San Antonio & R. Railroad Co. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 60 L.Ed. 1110; Alcorn v. Railroad Co., 333 Mo. 834; McAllister v. Terminal Railroad Co., 324 Mo. 1014; Henry v. Ry. Co., 332 Mo. 1076. (a) The evidence adduced amply warranted the jury in finding that upon the occasion in question Meek, in the performance of his duty as defendant's employee, went between the rails of defendant's track, the "Nickel Plate Belt," and was there working with a defective coupler on the south end of the tank car that was the southernmost car of defendant's cut of four cars then standing on that track, trying to open the knuckle of that coupler which could not be operated by the lift lever at the corner of the car, and that while so engaged, between that car and the cars that were farther south on that track, he was killed by being run upon by the latter cars and mashed between them and the tank car. The evidence to support such finding is by no means speculative or conjectural, but consists of positive testimony of witnesses, with the natural, reasonable and legitimate inferences arising therefrom; inferences, indeed, that inevitably follow therefrom. McAllister v. Railroad Co., 324 Mo. 1005; Hardin v. Railroad Co., 70 S.W.2d 1075; Grange v. Ry. Co., 69 S.W.2d 961; Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90; Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521, 69 L.Ed. 419; Myers v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 233 U.S. 193, 58 L.Ed. 911; Choctaw, Oklahoma & Gulf Railroad Co. v. McDade, 191 U.S. 64, 48 L.Ed. 96; Henry v. Ry. Co., 332 Mo. 1078; Detroit, T. & I. Railroad Co. v. Hahn, 47 F.2d 59, certiorari denied 283 U.S. 842, 75 L.Ed. 1452; Natl. Biscuit Co. v. Litzky, 22 F.2d 942; Worthington v. Elmer, 207 F. 309; Crucible Steel Forge Co. v. Moir, 219 F. 153; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Sherer, 205 F. 358; Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. Marland, 239 F. 5; C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Cowley, 166 F. 283; Stewart v. Gaslight Co., 241 S.W. 909; Buesching v. Gaslight Co., 73 Mo. 219. (b) It is not disputed that the case is one governed by the law as declared by the Federal courts. But the rules of decision which this court applies, and has constantly applied in determining whether a submissible case has been made, are in nowise in conflict with the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States and the other Federal courts, but thoroughly in keeping therewith. Hardin v. Railroad Co., 70 S.W.2d 1085; Grange v. Ry. Co., 69 S.W.2d 961; McAllister v. Terminal Railroad Co., 324 Mo. 1014; Koonse v. Ry. Co., 322 Mo. 813, certiorari denied 280 U.S. 582, 74 L.Ed. 632. (c) The evidence adduced fully warranted the conclusion that Meek, in undertaking to open the defective coupler and get ready for the coupling, was in the performance of his duty as defendant's employee, and that he continued in the performance thereof until he was struck and killed. Worthington v. Elmer, 207 F. 308; Crucible Steel Forge Co. v. Moir, 219 F. 153; McAllister v. Railroad Co., 324 Mo. 1005; Maguire v. Railroad Co., 146 Mass. 379, 15 N.E. 904. (2) The contention of appellant that the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis had no jurisdiction of this cause, because Meek was killed in Indiana, where, it is claimed, the suit should have been tried, is obviously without merit. Since, as appears from our statement, supra, this record shows that the defendant is actually doing business as a carrier in the State of Missouri; that it runs daily trains between Cleveland, Ohio, and St. Louis, Missouri, and its crews come into St. Louis, and it maintains offices in St. Louis where it was served with process in this case, the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis was fully possessed of jurisdiction to hear and try the case. State ex rel. Foraker v. Hoffman, 309 Mo. 625; Hoffman v. State ex rel. Foraker, 274 U.S. 21, 71 L.Ed. 1025; Denver & R. G. W. Railroad Co. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 286, 76 L.Ed. 295; Doyle v. Ry. Co., 55 F.2d 708.

OPINION

Frank, J.

Action by Lena C. Meek, administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, James C. Meek to recover damages for the death of her said husband. She recovered a judgment for $ 25,000 and defendant appealed.

The action was brought for an alleged violation of the Federal Safety Appliance Act, U.S.C. A., Title 45, Section 2, in that defendant as a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad, was hauling and using on its railroad, cars which were not equipped with couplers that would couple automatically by impact without the necessity of men going between the cars. No contention is made that the petition does not state facts sufficient to charge that Meek's death was caused by a violation of the Federal Act, therefore, it is not necessary to either reproduce or discuss the allegations of the petition. The petition being based upon a violation of the Federal Act, the rights of the parties must be determined by the decisions of the Federal Courts.

Appellant contends that the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, had no jurisdiction of this cause for the reason that Meek was killed in Indiana; that all of the witnesses in the cause reside in that state, and that the trial of said cause in St. Louis was an undue burden on interstate commerce. Michigan Central Railroad Co. v Mix, 278 U.S. 492, and Denver & R. G. Railroad Co. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284, are cited in support of this contention. The cited cases are not in point. An examination of their facts will show that the only business transacted in Missouri by the railroads in question, was the solicitation of traffic by a...