Meeker v. Provenant Health Partners, No. 95CA0904
Docket Nº | No. 95CA0904 |
Citation | 929 P.2d 26 |
Case Date | May 30, 1996 |
Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
Page 26
v.
PROVENANT HEALTH PARTNERS; Sisters of Charity Health Care
Systems, Inc.; Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State
of Colorado; and Director, Department of Labor &
Employment, Division of Workers' Compensation, Respondents.
Div. II.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing
July 5, 1996.
Certiorari Denied Jan. 13, 1997.
Page 27
Dwyer, Huddleson & Ray, P.C., Stephen J. Jouard, Fort Collins, for Petitioner.
Watson, Nathan & Bremer, P.C., Anne S. Myers, Karen R. Wells, Denver, for Respondent Provenant Health Partners and Sisters of Charity Health Care Systems, Inc.
No Appearance for Respondent The Industrial Claim Appeals Office or Director, Department of Labor & Employment, Division of Workers' Compensation.
Opinion by Judge CRISWELL.
The issue in this workers' compensation proceeding is whether the value of leave time credited to the employee, Margaret Meeker, during the course of her employment with Provenant Health Partners, is to be considered as "wages" under the pertinent 1992 statutory provision, Colo.Sess. Laws 1991, ch. 219, § 8-40-201(9) at 1293-1294. Based upon the parties' written stipulation of facts, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that such credit was required to be considered as such. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) disagreed and modified the ALJ's order accordingly. We agree with the ALJ. Hence, we set the Panel's order aside and remand for entry of an order in accordance with this determination.
The stipulation of facts agreed to by the parties makes it apparent that the employer here had not established any program for its employees that specifically provided for any paid holidays, paid sick leave, or paid vacations. Rather, its employees were paid a cash salary, based on an hourly rate, only for the hours actually worked by them.
In lieu of any provision for paid holidays, paid sick leave, or paid vacations, however, the employer had established a benefit plan, which it referred to as "personal employee time," or "PET." Under this plan, each employee was given a credit for leave time for a specific number of hours for each pay period of two weeks. The number of hours credited to each employee was based upon the employee's length of service and ranged from a minimum of 8 to a maximum of 11.08 hours. At the time of her industrial injury, the employee here was being credited with approximately 9.5 hours for each two-week period that she worked. During each such two-week period, therefore, she was paid at the end of that pay period for the hours that she actually worked, and she received a leave credit for an additional 9.5 hours.
The hours thus credited to each employee were "deposited" into the employee's "bank," and the employee could choose to "draw" on those hours (by being paid therefor at the employee's current hourly rate) whenever the employee was absent from work. Thus, so long as the employee had hours in the bank, he or she could elect to receive pay for a holiday, for an absence because of illness, for a vacation period, or for any other work absence, including simply taking a day off.
There was no limit or cap upon the number of hours that an employee could accumulate in his or her bank. Nor does the record indicate that the employee was required to use (by being paid for absences) any of the hours in the bank. At the time of the hearing here, the employee had a credit in her bank of some 248 hours. This represented more than one year's accumulation of credits.
If upon termination of employment, the employee had elected not to use all of the hours credited to that employee's bank, then the employee was paid in full for all remaining hours, at the employee's then current hourly rate. Once the hours were earned and credited to the bank, therefore, the employee never forfeited any of them. Rather, at the employee's election, all of the hours credited were used either to pay the employee
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for work absences or to provide for a lump sum payment at the time of termination.Under the Workers' Compensation Act, if an employee suffers either a temporary or permanent impairment, benefits are payable to that employee in an amount equal to 66 2/3% of the employee's "average weekly wage," up to a statutory maximum. Sections 8-42-102(1); 8-42-105(1); and 8-42-106, C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.).
If, as here, the employee is paid by the hour, a daily wage is determined by multiplying the employee's "hourly rate" by the number of hours during the day that the employee was working at the time of the injury. This daily wage is then multiplied by the number of days in the week that the employee was working (or would have worked)...
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Cockle v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, No. 68539-8.
...dissent with approval); Ragland v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 724 P.2d 519, 521 (Alaska.1986) (same); Meeker v. Provenant Health Partners, 929 P.2d 26, 29 (Colo.App.1996) (same) ("[T]he Morrison-Knudsen conclusion is not binding upon us."); Ashby v. Rust Eng'g Co., 559 A.2d 774 (Me.198......
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VISSER EX REL. EDER v. Mahan, No. 04CA1361.
...against a person under a disability is controlled by the appointment of a `legal representative'"); Rojhani v. Arenson, supra, 929 P.2d at 26 (where child is not capable of appreciating his injury, 180-day period begins to run when guardian or personal representative is appointed on hi......
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HUMANE SOC. OF PIKES PEAK v. INDUS. OFFICE, No. 00CA0968.
...it also decreased the potential AWW by excluding certain fringe benefits from consideration. See Meeker v. Provenant Health Partners, 929 P.2d 26 (Colo.App.1996). Consequently, the potential windfall to the claimant was legislatively offset by the elimination of other fringe benefits includ......
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Gomez v. Children's Hosp. Colo., Civil Action No. 18-cv-00002-MEH
...Court of Appeals has defined benefits which are not capable of being forfeited as vested. See Meeker v. Provenant Health Partners, 929 P.2d 26, 28-29 (Colo. App. 1996) ("Under similar plans for leave pay in which leave time once credited is not forfeitable, i.e., it has "vested&qu......
-
Cockle v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, No. 68539-8.
...dissent with approval); Ragland v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 724 P.2d 519, 521 (Alaska.1986) (same); Meeker v. Provenant Health Partners, 929 P.2d 26, 29 (Colo.App.1996) (same) ("[T]he Morrison-Knudsen conclusion is not binding upon us."); Ashby v. Rust Eng'g Co., 559 A.2d 774 (Me.198......
-
VISSER EX REL. EDER v. Mahan, No. 04CA1361.
...against a person under a disability is controlled by the appointment of a `legal representative'"); Rojhani v. Arenson, supra, 929 P.2d at 26 (where child is not capable of appreciating his injury, 180-day period begins to run when guardian or personal representative is appointed on hi......
-
HUMANE SOC. OF PIKES PEAK v. INDUS. OFFICE, No. 00CA0968.
...it also decreased the potential AWW by excluding certain fringe benefits from consideration. See Meeker v. Provenant Health Partners, 929 P.2d 26 (Colo.App.1996). Consequently, the potential windfall to the claimant was legislatively offset by the elimination of other fringe benefits includ......
-
Gomez v. Children's Hosp. Colo., Civil Action No. 18-cv-00002-MEH
...Court of Appeals has defined benefits which are not capable of being forfeited as vested. See Meeker v. Provenant Health Partners, 929 P.2d 26, 28-29 (Colo. App. 1996) ("Under similar plans for leave pay in which leave time once credited is not forfeitable, i.e., it has "vested&qu......