Meinecke v. State
| Decision Date | 30 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2D21-2880 |
| Parties | MATTHEW TYLER MEINECKE, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Appeal from the County Court for Lee County; Josephine M. Gagliardi Judge.
Alexander Bumbu, Pacific Justice Institute - Florida Office Miami, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Kiersten E. Jensen Assistant Attorney General, Tampa; and Jonathan S. Tannen, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellee.
Matthew Tyler Meinecke challenges his convictions and sentences for trespass within a school safety zone and disruption of school function. We affirm and write only to address his arguments challenging the constitutionality of the statutes under which he was convicted.[1]
On February 1, 2019, during the time that students were being released for dismissal, Meinecke was standing on a sidewalk that directly abuts the campus property of Fort Myers High School. While there, Meinecke played loud music and shouted religious messages through a bullhorn at students as they exited the school. His actions caused a delay in the orderly dismissal of the students because many students stopped to record him with their phones and/or altered their path of exit to go around him and some parents in the carline stopped to watch him.
Multiple school administration employees radioed the school resource officer to investigate. The officer approached Meinecke, advised him that he was "disrupting a school function," and indicated that he had to leave. Meinecke responded that he did not have to leave and that he had "done it before," and he continued to shout religious messages at the students. The officer arrested Meinecke for trespass within a school safety zone and disruption of school function.
Prior to trial, Meinecke filed three motions to dismiss the charges, challenging the constitutionality of sections 810.0975(2)(b) and 877.13(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2019), on vagueness and overbreadth grounds. The trial court denied the motions, and Meinecke was subsequently convicted by a jury.
"A trial court's decision regarding the constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo as it presents a pure question of law." Montgomery v. State, 69 So.3d 1023, 1026 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (citing Caribbean Conservation Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm'n, 838 So.2d 492, 500 (Fla. 2003)). "There is a strong presumption that a statute is constitutionally valid, and all reasonable doubts about the statute's validity must be resolved in favor of constitutionality." Id. (citing DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272, 274 (Fla. 2002)).
In order for a criminal statute to withstand a void-for-vagueness challenge, the language of the statute must provide adequate notice of the conduct it prohibits when measured by common understanding and practice. "The language of a statute must 'provide a definite warning of what conduct' is required or prohibited, 'measured by common understanding and practice.' "
State v. Brake, 796 So.2d 522, 527 (Fla. 2001) (citations omitted) (quoting Warren v. State, 572 So.2d 1376, 1377 (Fla. 1991)). "A statute which does not give people of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct is vague." Warren, 572 So.2d at 1377. "[A]ny doubt as to a statute's validity that is raised in a vagueness challenge should be resolved 'in favor of the citizen and against the state.'" Brake, 796 So.2d at 527 (quoting Brown v. State, 629 So.2d 841, 843 (Fla. 1994)).
Section 810.0975 is titled "School safety zones; definition trespass prohibited; penalty," and subsection (2)(b)1 of the statute provides as follows:
During the period from 1 hour prior to the start of a school session until 1 hour after the conclusion of a school session, it is unlawful for any person to enter the premises or trespass within a school safety zone or to remain on such premises or within such school safety zone when that person does not have legitimate business in the school safety zone or any other authorization, license, or invitation to enter or remain in the school safety zone.
(Emphasis added.) "[T]he term 'school safety zone' means in, on, or within 500 feet of any real property owned by or leased to any public or private elementary, middle, or high school or school board and used for elementary, middle, or high school education." § 810.0975(1).
Meinecke maintains that section 810.0975(2)(b) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not define the term "legitimate business." He argues that the phrase "legitimate business" could result in enforcement of the statute against purely innocent, inadvertent, and constitutionally protected conduct in public and quasi-public areas within school safety zones.
The Third District rejected a similar argument in A.C. v. State, 538 So.2d 136, 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). At issue in that case was section 228.091, Florida Statutes (1987), which has been renumbered as section 810.097. The version of section 228.091 that was at issue in A.C. was titled "Trespass upon grounds or facilities of a school; penalties; and arrest" and provided that "[a]ny person who . . . [d]oes not have legitimate business on the campus . . . and who enters or remains upon the campus or other facility of such school" after being told not to enter or to leave by an employee as set forth in the statute commits a trespass. Id. at 137 n.1 (quoting § 228.091(2)).
The Third District held that the phrase "legitimate business on the campus," "when read in context, has an ordinary meaning which is reasonably understandable to a person of ordinary intelligence, to wit: that one entering or remaining on a school campus must lack any purpose for being there which is connected with the operation of the school." Id.; see also E.W. v. State, 873 So.2d 485, 487 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (); A.S.P. v. State, 964 So.2d 211, 212 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ().
We agree with the Third District's reasoning in A.C. and apply it here to conclude that the term "legitimate business in the school safety zone" that appears in section 810.0975(2)(b)-like the term "legitimate business on the campus" that appeared in section 228.091 and now appears in section 810.097-"is sufficiently definite for constitutional purposes to describe, albeit in general terms, the type of activity which a person must lack in order to expose oneself to possible criminal liability under the statute." A.C., 538 So.2d at 137. When read in context, the term "legitimate business in a school safety zone" as used in section 810.0975(2)(b) can be understood by a person of ordinary intelligence to mean "that one entering or remaining [in a school safety zone] must lack any purpose for being there which is connected with the operation of" any of the areas included within the school safety zone. Id.; see also State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980) ("[W]here a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.").
Meinecke relies on Gray v. Kohl, 568 F.Supp.2d 1378, 1388 (S.D. Fla. 2008), wherein the United States District Court distinguished the term "legitimate business" in section 810.0975(2)(b) from use of the term in section 810.097 because the latter is modified by the words "on the campus." The Gray court concluded that "[section] 810.0975(2)(b) has no language, such as 'on [the] campus,' that limits the scope of 'legitimate business.'" Id. The Gray court went on to state:
Therefore, no inference limiting the scope of "legitimate business" to any purpose connected to the purpose of the school is warranted. Even if such an inference could be extrapolated from the text of the statute, to do so would increase the sweep of the statute by criminalizing the presence of any non-exempt [sic] person within 500 feet of school property who enters or remains in the area with no reason connected to the purpose of the school.
Id. (emphasis added).
This reading of section 810.0975(2)(b) is far too narrow and completely ignores the plain wording of the statute. Just like section 810.097 addresses trespasses on a school campus and thus requires an individual to have "legitimate business on the campus" to avoid criminal liability, section 810.0975(2)(b) addresses trespasses in a statutorily-defined school safety zone and thus requires an individual to have "legitimate business in the school safety zone" to avoid criminal liability. The Gray court improperly excises the words "in the school safety zone" from the statute. See State v. Bodden, 877 So.2d 680, 686 (Fla. 2004) (). As such, we decline Meinecke's invitation to adopt Gray's vagueness analysis.[2]
Meinecke also argues that section 810.0975(2)(b) is vague because it does not define from whom "other authorization, license or invitation" must be obtained. Again, we point out that "where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense." Hagan, 387 So.2d at 945. We conclude that when read in...
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