Mejia v. Erwin
| Decision Date | 17 October 1986 |
| Docket Number | A-B,No. 7992-5-II,7992-5-II |
| Parties | Stella MEJIA (f/k/n/a Yakovac), Appellant, v. Felix R. ERWIN, Jane Doe Erwin and the Estate of Phillip E. Erwin, and Rent-ug and Gary Jacobsen and Jane Doe Jacobsen, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Hugh M. Robinson, Puyallup, for appellant.
Robert A. Keolker, Keolker & Swerk, Seattle, for respondents.
Stella Mejia appeals an order of the Pierce County Superior Court, which granted a summary judgment in favor of Felix Erwin and Lucille Erwin and dismissed Mejia's cause of action against the Erwins.
Mejia argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, contending there were genuine issues of material fact concerning the negligence of Felix Erwin to be resolved by a jury. We affirm the trial court.
At the summary judgment hearing, the court was presented with the following undisputed evidence. On October 30, 1980, Phillip Erwin, age 29, called his father, Felix, and asked him if he could borrow Felix's credit card in order to rent an automobile from Rent-A-Bug while Phillip's car was being repaired. Felix agreed and went with his son to Rent-A-Bug to arrange for the rental. The car was rented in Felix's name, but according to Felix, the Rent-A-Bug agent knew that Phillip was to be the only user of the automobile. The rental agreement indicated that the driver would be Felix's "son."
Approximately one week later, Phillip was involved in an accident while driving the rented car. As a result, Phillip was killed and his passenger, Stella Mejia, was injured. Mejia brought an action against Felix and Lucille Erwin, claiming that they were liable for her injuries on a theory of negligent entrustment of the automobile. Felix and Lucille Erwin moved for summary judgment, arguing that Mejia's complaint should be dismissed because they were not negligent as a matter of law. The motion was granted.
In 1969, when Phillip was a teenager, Phillip had been insured under his parents' PEMCO automobile insurance policy. In July of that same year, PEMCO terminated Phillip from the Erwin's policy. PEMCO's underwriting department advised the Erwins that Phillip was terminated because he had received three speeding violations within a period of four months in 1968. Felix Erwin signed an authorization to exclude Phillip from the policy coverage.
A PEMCO committee report regarding the termination indicated that Phillip had been involved in two accidents before the 1969 termination. There was no evidence that Felix knew or should have known of this report. Felix Erwin did admit in a deposition, however, that he was aware that his son had an accident in 1968 or 1969 when, according to Felix, Phillip swerved to avoid hitting a dog and collided with a mailbox. When asked in the same deposition whether he thought Phillip's driving record had improved as Phillip became older, Felix responded:
Phillip became insured with PEMCO again in 1975 under his own policy and remained insured with that company until 1980. During that period of time Phillip was not living with his parents and was entirely self-supporting. PEMCO paid several claims in 1975 and 1976 for Phillip's accidents. An abstract of Phillip's driving record with the Washington State Department of Licensing revealed that Phillip received five traffic citations for speeding and one for disobeying a roadsign between 1971 and 1978. The Department record also disclosed that Phillip was involved in four accidents from 1976 to 1980. No evidence was presented that Phillip's father knew of any of Phillip's infractions or accidents after 1969. Felix claimed that he had no knowledge "of any facts" about his son from which it could be claimed that he negligently entrusted a car to Phillip.
The issue in the case is whether, in light of these facts, the Superior Court erred in granting summary judgment. A summary judgment may be granted only when there is no genuine issue of material fact before the court and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Olympic Fish Prods. Inc. v. Lloyd, 93 Wash.2d 596, 602, 611 P.2d 737 (1980). "[A]n appellate court is required, as [is] the trial court, to review material submitted for and against a motion for summary judgment in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made." Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wash.2d 491, 495, 519 P.2d 7 (1974).
After viewing the undisputed evidence presented to the Superior Court, we are left with the opinion that it was correct in concluding, as a matter of law, that summary judgment should be granted. We reach that conclusion because the undisputed facts show that (1) Felix did not entrust a vehicle to Phillip in 1980, and (2) Felix was not negligent in any way.
Although no Washington case is directly on point, reason would suggest that a person renting or leasing a car could negligently entrust it to another. A person may be in control of a vehicle, for purposes of negligent entrustment, even though the person does not own a vehicle. Cameron v. Downs, 32 Wash.App. 875, 877, 650 P.2d 260 (1982). In Cameron, the court held that it improperly dismissed an action against a woman who had entrusted her father's vehicle to her intoxicated brother. Cameron, 32 Wash.App. at 879, 650 P.2d 260.
However, even viewing the evidence here most favorably to Mejia, there are no facts showing that Felix entrusted a vehicle to Phillip. The facts reveal, rather, that Felix was simply lending his credit to Phillip to assist him in renting a replacement automobile. The fact that the automobile was rented in Felix's name does not alter the true nature of this transaction--a mere accommodation.
Even if the transaction here could have been considered entrustment of an automobile, we...
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