Melton v. State
Decision Date | 23 May 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 569-84,569-84 |
Parties | Madalyn Sue MELTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Paul N. Buchanan, Charles Carver, Beaumont, for appellant.
James S. McGrath, Dist. Atty., and John R. DeWitt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Beaumont, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., and Cathleen R. Riedel, Asst. State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before the court en banc.
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Appellant was convicted of the offense of murder of her former lover. Punishment was assessed at ten years' confinement and a fine of $5,000.00.
On appeal, the Beaumont Court of Appeals found that appellant's oral statement was properly admitted into evidence in that appellant was not in custody at the time of the making of the statement. The Court of Appeals also found that appellant's oral statement was made after she voluntarily and knowingly waived her privilege against self-incrimination. Melton v. State, (Tex.App.-Beaumont, No. 09-83-057 CR, delivered March 21, 1984). We granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to examine these issues.
The facts were correctly summarized in the Court of Appeals' opinion:
Slip opinion pp. 2-3. [material in brackets added]
Prior to trial the trial court held a hearing on the voluntariness of appellant's statements to the officers and made the following findings of fact, inter alia:
The trial court made the following conclusions of law:
In her petition, appellant argues that the facts show that appellant was in custody from the time she was taken from her place of employment. She argues that this "custody" is demonstrated by several facts:
(1) after the officers requested that she accompany them to the police station, she requested that she be allowed to take a loan payment book to her husband and the officers refused;
(2) she was not given the option of driving her own car to the police station;
(3) she was taken into the police station through a rear door which the detectives had to unlock and which "clicked" when it was closed behind her;
(4) she was escorted into an interrogation room and the door was closed behind her; and
(5) she was never informed that she was free to go.
Findings by a trial court should not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Dancy v. State, 728 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). A review of the record shows that there is ample evidence to support the findings of the trial court.
The record shows that Detective Woods testified that they sought to interview appellant, not as a suspect in the case but because their investigation revealed that appellant was probably the last person to see the victim alive. He further testified that they picked up appellant at her place of employment at approximately 10:30 a.m. When appellant requested that she be allowed to take the credit union payment book to her husband so he could make a payment during the lunch hour, Woods informed her that she would be finished at the police station by noon and could take it to her husband after the interview was completed. Woods testified that appellant did not have to accompany them to the police station. He further testified that although he did not inform appellant that she had the option of driving her own vehicle to the station had she made such a request, he would have allowed her to do so. During the interview, appellant did not request to talk with anyone but if she had made such a request, he also would have allowed her to do so. Woods testified that up until she admitted her culpability in the murder appellant was free to leave.
A person need not be under formal arrest in order to be in custody. In the past this Court has examined these types of cases in light of four factors: whether probable cause to arrest existed; whether the defendant was the focus of the investigation; the subjective intent of the police; and the subjective belief of the defendant. Turner v. State, 685 S.W.2d 38 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Ruth v. State, 645 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
Shiflet v. State, 732 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.Cr.App.1985).
In Shiflet and Dancy, we went so far as to find that:
Dancy v. State, supra, at p. 778. (emphasis added)"
Clearly, there was no custodial...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Fuller v. State
...he had committed an offense. Surprisingly, the State has opted not to join issue on this question. See, e.g., Melton v. State, 790 S.W.2d 322, 323-325 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Dancy v. State, 728 S.W.2d 772, 778 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); Shiflet v. State, 732 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.Crim.App.1985). Accordin......
-
Amores v. State
... ... Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983) (Seizure effected by "a show of official authority such that 'a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave' "); Melton v. State, 790 S.W.2d 322, 329 (Tex.Cr.App.1990); Gilbreath v. State, 412 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1967) ("Whether the accused is or [is] not under arrest is to be determined from the sufficiency of facts to reasonably create the impression on his mind that he is under arrest") ... 11 Dunaway ... ...
-
Alvarado v. State
...findings that the evidence supported beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's confession was voluntary. See Melton v. State, 790 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (noting trial court found State proved beyond a reasonable doubt confession was voluntary); Davis v. State, 499 S.W.2d 3......
-
Rodriguez v. State
... ... CUSTODY AND CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION ... If an investigation is not at an accusatorial or custodial stage, a person's Fifth Amendment rights have not yet come into play and the voluntariness of those rights is not implicated. Melton v. State, 790 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); Garza v. State, 915 S.W.2d 204, 211 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1996, pet. filed). Voluntariness is an issue only if the confession was obtained while the speaker was in custody. See White v. State, 874 S.W.2d 229, 236 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th ... ...