Melvin v. Troy Univ.
| Decision Date | 29 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:21cv475-MHT (WO) |
| Parties | NICK MELVIN, Plaintiff, v. TROY UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
NICK MELVIN, Plaintiff,
v.
TROY UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants.
Civil Action No. 2:21cv475-MHT (WO)
United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division
June 29, 2022
OPINION
MYRON H. THOMPSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff Nick Melvin brought this lawsuit against defendants Troy University and three of its current or former employees--Luke Ritter, Scout Blum, and Jack Hawkins, Jr.--in their individual capacities,[1] asserting the federal claims that they deprived him of the rights
of due process, equal protection, and free speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and conspired to deprive him of the same rights due to his political and religious views in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Melvin also asserts state claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, promissory fraud, and fraudulent misrepresentation.[2]
This cause is now before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.
I. Standard on Motion to Dismiss
The defendants move to dismiss Melvin's complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “[T]he court need not accept a plaintiff's conclusory allegations or ‘formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action.'” Hammonds v. Montgomery Children's Specialty Ctr., LLC, No. 2:21CV448-MHT, 2022 WL 949830, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 29, 2022) (Thompson, J.) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).
The defendants also move to dismiss Melvin's claims against Troy University as barred by sovereign immunity, in what is equivalent to a facial attack on the court's
subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Bennett v. United States, 102 F.3d 486, 488 n.1 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that a dismissal on a sovereign-immunity ground should be under Rule 12(b)(1) because no subject-matter jurisdiction exists). “A facial attack [under Rule 12(b)(1)] questions the sufficiency of the pleading and the plaintiff enjoys similar safeguards to those provided when opposing a motion to dismiss under ... Rule ... 12(b)(6).” Whitson v. Staff Acquisition, Inc., 41 F.Supp.2d 1294, 1296 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (Thompson, J.).
When deciding either type of motion, “[t]he court accepts the plaintiff's allegations as true, construes them most favorably to the plaintiff, and will not look beyond the face of the complaint.” Id. (citations omitted); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993).
II. Factual Background
In 2015, Melvin enrolled in a master's program at Troy University. As part of his required coursework, he took a history class taught by defendant Ritter. After Melvin submitted work for the class evincing a Christian and politically conservative viewpoint, and requested to write his final paper on a book written by a conservative Christian, Ritter accused him of plagiarism. Ritter contacted defendant Blum, who also worked at Troy University, although in what capacity it is unclear, and together they investigated Melvin's work for plagiarism.
The university proceeded to hold a hearing on the matter at which Melvin was not allowed to be present. He was also not allowed to appeal its findings. Melvin does not allege what the outcome of the hearing was, except to say that he went on to complete his remaining coursework as a “transient student” at the University of North Alabama. Complaint (Doc. 1) at ¶ 31.
After completing his coursework at the University of North Alabama, Melvin needed to pass a “Comprehensive Exam” in order to receive his degree from Troy University. Id. at ¶ 33. According to university policy, the exam was to be graded independently by multiple graders, and was not to bear the examinee's name, so as to allow for anonymous grading.
Melvin took the exam in March 2018, under the supervision of a proctor, and was notified later that month that he had failed. He then requested a copy of his exam. The copy that he received bore his name. Melvin took the exam again in July 2018, under the supervision of a proctor, and was notified later that month that he had failed a second time. Again, he requested a copy of his exam, and again, when he received it, the exam bore his name. Whoever graded Melvin's exams had accused him of cheating, noted his “unsupported belief in God,” id. at ¶ 47, and criticized his skill as a writer.
Melvin later commissioned a forensic test that revealed that his exams had both been graded by Blum and Blum alone.
Melvin filed the instant complaint in July 2021.
III. Discussion
A. Claims Against Defendant Hawkins
Melvin appears to bring all of his claims against each of the defendants, including defendant Hawkins.[3] The court has jurisdiction over Melvin's claims against Hawkins pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1343 (civil rights), and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (supplemental jurisdiction).
However, Melvin has alleged no facts to support his claims against Hawkins. Indeed, the complaint contains
no factual allegations about Hawkins, except that he resides in the Middle District of Alabama. See Complaint (Doc. 1) at ¶ 9. In setting forth his causes of action, Melvin states that Hawkins, along with the rest of the defendants, “deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional right to due process and equal protection under the color of law.” Id. at ¶ 54. This assertion is a conclusory allegation, and as such, it cannot protect Melvin's claims from dismissal. See Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004). Melvin goes on to make additional conclusory allegations about “Defendants”--which the court assumes include Hawkins--throughout the remainder of the complaint, but nowhere does the complaint set forth any specific actions taken by Hawkins. Accordingly, all claims against Hawkins are due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim, albeit with leave to amend.
B. Claims Against Defendant Troy University
As with Hawkins, Melvin names Troy University as a defendant as to all of his federal and state claims. Troy University argues, and the court agrees, that the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution deprives the court of subject-matter jurisdiction over Melvin's claims against it.[4]
“The Eleventh Amendment ... bars suits against states in federal court unless a state has waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has abrogated it.” Cassady v. Hall, 892 F.3d 1150, 1152 (11th Cir. 2018). This bar applies to suits against “state agencies and other arms of the state.” Id. at 1153. Troy University is an arm of the State of Alabama and therefore enjoys Eleventh Amendment protection. See Harden v. Adams, 760 F.2d 1158, 1163-64 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding that Troy University has sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment). Moreover, Alabama has not consented to suit in federal court,[5] nor has Congress abrogated Eleventh Amendment
immunity for Melvin's claims. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 674-77 (1974) (holding that § 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity); Fincher v. State of Fla. Dept. of Labor, 798 F.2d 1371, 1372 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that § 1985 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity); see also Flood v. State of Ala. Dept. of Indus. Relations, 948 F.Supp. 1535, 1542 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (Thompson, J.) (noting that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies “regardless of whether the claim is based on state law or federal law”). Accordingly, the court will dismiss all of Melvin's claims against Troy University, albeit with leave to reassert them in state court.
C. Claims Against Defendants Ritter and Blum
i. Claims Under §§ 1983 and 1985
Melvin brings claims against defendants Ritter and Blum pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights to equal protection, due process, and free speech, and for retaliation against him for his speech; and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for conspiracy to violate the above-mentioned constitutional rights. The court has jurisdiction over these claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1343 (civil rights).
Ritter and Blum argue, and the court agrees, that Melvin's §§ 1983 and 1985 claims against them are due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim because they are barred by the statute of limitations.[6] “[A] Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is ‘apparent from the face of the
complaint' that the claim is time-barred.” La Grasta v. First Union Securities, Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Omar ex rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2003)). “[C]laims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 ... are measured by the personal injury limitations period of the state,” Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir. 1996), which, in Alabama, is two years, see Jones v. Allen, 483 F.Supp.2d 1142, 1146 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (Thompson, J.); Trawinski v. United Technologies, 313 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 2002). Melvin was therefore required to have brought his §§ 1983 and 1985 claims within two years of the events giving rise to those claims. From the face of his complaint, it appears that he did not; all of the events giving rise to those claims took place in 2018 at the latest, and he filed this...
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