Memishian v. Phipps

Decision Date26 May 1942
PartiesSOPHIE MEMISHIAN v. WILLIAM R. PHIPPS.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

April 13, 1942.

Present: FIELD, C.

J., DONAHUE, DOLAN COX, & RONAN, JJ.

Practice, Civil Requests, rulings and instructions; Findings by judge.

A requested ruling that a finding in favor of the party having the burden of proof was required on all the evidence was properly refused since there was no evidence binding on the other party which required such a finding.

A judge hearing an action at law in a District Court is required to deal with proper requests for rulings of law and to decide the case by making an ultimate finding of fact; but he is not required to make special findings of fact except in circumstances described in the last paragraph of Rule 27 of the District Courts (1940), nor rulings of law not called for by proper requests.

A request at a trial in a District Court for a ruling upon all the evidence with a specification of the grounds upon which it is based in accordance with Rule 27 of the District Courts (1940) may be dealt with as a unit; the trial judge is not required to rule separately on each of the specified grounds.

The last paragraph of Rule 27 of the District Courts (1940) was inapplicable where a request for a ruling that as matter of law a certain finding was required on all the evidence was refused.

The refusal of a request for a ruling that as matter of law a certain finding was required on all the evidence was not inconsistent with the granting of requests stating general principles applicable to the case and requests for rulings that certain findings were warranted on the evidence.

TORT. Writ in the District Court of Chelsea dated July 5, 1940. The action was heard by Crowley, J.

S. R. Remar, for the plaintiff. L. Haley, for the defendant.

FIELD, C.J. This action of tort was brought in a District Court to recover compensation for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff as a result of a collision between the automobile in which she was riding as a passenger and an automobile operated by the defendant. There was a finding for the defendant. No special findings were made. The plaintiff made fifteen requests for rulings, of which thirteen, numbered 3 to 15 were granted, and two, numbered 1 and 2, were refused. A report to the Appellate Division was dismissed and the plaintiff appealed to this court.

The two requests for rulings that were refused raised in somewhat different form the question whether, upon all the evidence, a finding for the plaintiff was required as matter of law. The request numbered 2 specified the grounds upon which the request was based. See Rule 27 of the District Courts (1940). Neither of these requests was a request for a ruling that the evidence warranted a finding for the plaintiff. See Howard v Malden Savings Bank, 300 Mass. 208 , 211. There was no error in the refusal of these requests. The evidence need not be recited. To some extent, at least, it was contradictory. But, whether contradictory or not, its credibility and weight and the permissible inferences to be drawn therefrom were questions of fact for the trial judge. There was no evidence binding upon the defendant that required a finding for the plaintiff. And the plaintiff was not aggrieved by the granting of her other thirteen requests. Baker v. Davis, 299 Mass. 345 , 348. No other question of law is reported.

The plaintiff, however, contends that the trial judge did not deal properly with the case because he made no special findings and did not indicate by his rulings the ground upon which the case was decided. There is no merit in this contention. It is the duty of a trial judge sitting without a jury in an action at law to make rulings of law in response to proper requests therefor, that the right of review of questions of law may be preserved, and to decide the case by making an ultimate finding of fact. Wrobel v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. Ltd. 288 Mass. 206 , 209. Adamaitis v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. 295 Mass. 215 , 219. But a trial judge is not required to make special findings of fact even though requested to do so. Castano v. Leone, 278 Mass. 429 , 431. Gosselin v. Silver, 301 Mass. 481 , 482. Nor is a trial judge required to make rulings of law not called for by proper requests. Though it often may be desirable for the trial judge voluntarily to make special findings of fact or rulings of law for the information of the parties and the presentation of the real question of law for review (see Castano v. Leone, 278 Mass. 429 , 431), failure to do so is not error.

The specification of the grounds upon which the requested ruling numbered 2 was based did not call for a separate ruling of law upon each of the specified grounds. This requested ruling upon all the evidence was a single ruling with the reasons therefor specified, and the trial judge did all that was required of him when he dealt with it as a unit. As already stated, he dealt with it correctly by refusing it. Furthermore, even if each of the grounds specified were to be considered as calling for a separate ruling of law, the evidence did not require a finding for the plaintiff upon any specified ground decisive of the case. Halnan v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. 296 Mass. 219 , 223.

The trial judge moreover, was not required to make special findings of fact with respect to the grounds...

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  • Memishian v. Phipps
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 26 Mayo 1942
    ...311 Mass. 52142 N.E.2d 277MEMISHIANv.PHIPPS.Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.May 26, Action of tort by Sophie Memishian against William R. Phipps for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff in an automobile collision, wherein there was a finding for defendant. A report to t......

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