Mendez v. San Benito-Cameron County Drainage Dist. No. 3

Decision Date12 April 2001
Docket NumberNo. 13-98-661-CV,13-98-661-CV
Parties(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001) AURELIO IBARRA MENDEZ, TOMAS PADILLA, TERESA PADILLA, AND GUILLERMINA RUIZ, Appellants, v. SAN BENITO/CAMERON COUNTY DRAINAGE DISTRICT NO. 3, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

On appeal from the 103rd District Court of Cameron County, Texas.

Before Justices Hinojosa, Yanez, and Seerden1

OPINION

Opinion by Justice Hinojosa

Appellants, Aurelio Ibarra Mendez, Tomas Padilla, Teresa Padilla, and Guillermina Ruiz, sued appellee, San Benito/Cameron County Drainage District No. 3, for negligence, gross negligence, negligence per se, nuisance, and inverse condemnation. Appellee moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion. By five issues, appellants contend the trial court erred in denying their motion to reconsider the granting of appellee's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.

A. Background and Procedural History

On April 5, 1991, an extremely heavy rain fell in San Benito and flooded the La Palma subdivision.2 The flooding affected approximately 700 individuals with homes and businesses in the area.

1. The Lawsuit

On April 15, 1991, ten plaintiffs filed suit against Missouri Pacific Railroad Company ("MOPAC") and Central Power & Light Company ("CP&L") alleging that they had:

suffered extensive damages to their property by reason of rising water. The occurrence of the rising water was due to the negligent conduct of the Defendants by diminishing the carrying capacity of a drainage ditch by placing it, or causing it to be placed underground, and erecting a barrier in the drainage ditch, which drainage ditch had been constructed and was designed to drain rain water from the areas in question. By negligently obstructing the drainage ditch, the flow of rainwater was impeded, causing it to rise and flood the areas in question, thereby proximately causing extensive and permanent damage to the Plaintiffs.

Appellant, Tomas Padilla, was one of the ten original plaintiffs. Appellants, Aurelio Ibarra Mendez, Teresa Padilla, and Guillermina Ruiz, subsequently intervened in the lawsuit. At one time, there were over 600 plaintiffs and intervenors in the case. We will refer to the plaintiffs/intervenors as the "residents."

In amended pleadings, the residents alleged:

The Railroad built a raised railroad bed and then the Railroad filled in and obstructed the primary drainage ditch which drains the area south of the railroad track near [the residents'] properties in San Benito, Texas. CP&L altered its property near [the residents'] properties so as to divert or impound the natural flow of surface waters and permitted a diversion or impounding to continue in a manner which proximately caused damages to the properties of [the residents]. . . .

The residents further alleged that "MOPAC constructed a raised roadbed which acted as a dam and did not provide the necessary culverts and sluices required to drain the area south of its tract in San Benito, Texas."

In 1993, the Drainage District was added as a defendant. The residents alleged that the Drainage District had constructed and maintained drainage ditches and other permanent structures for drainage purposes near the properties in question, and as a result of the configuration of the drainage ditches and other permanent structures which the Drainage District had constructed, the properties were flooded on April 5, 1991. Pursuant to section 11.086 of the Texas Water Code, the residents claimed that they were "damaged by the conduct of Defendants in altering the natural flow and diverting and impounding surface waters near their homes and properties." The residents further asserted that "the Drainage District was negligent in the maintenance and cleaning of its drainage ditches and other permanent structures [and] negligent in permitting CP&L to alter the flow to the natural drain ditches and other permanent structures, and such negligence was one of the proximate cause[s] of the flooding conditions in question . . . ." The residents contended that the Drainage District's acts constituted a taking, nuisance, negligence, gross negligence, and negligence per se.

The Drainage District generally denied the residents' allegations and asserted as affirmative defenses: (1) sovereign immunity; (2) the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA) did not allow the residents to sue for their claims; (3) the residents' alleged injuries and damages were caused by the negligence of a party over whom the Drainage District did not exercise control; and (4) the alleged injuries and damages were caused by an Act of God or unavoidable accident.

In their amended petition, the residents alleged the following:

(1) Negligence

(a) The Drainage District was negligent by allowing MOPAC to replace a trestle bridge with a raised railroad bed without proper permits and allowed them to fill in and obstruct the primary drainage ditch which drains the area south of the railroad track near [the residents'] properties.

(b) The Drainage District failed to take corrective action against the negligent conduct of the railroad, thus it failed to exercise reasonable care.

(c) The Drainage District failed to properly clean and maintain the drainage ditches.

(d) The Drainage District failed to apply the correct standard of care required for engineers designing or redesigning a bridge crossing, and to require the railroad to adhere to existing engineering standards of care upstream and downstream.

(e) The Drainage District failed to order the railroad to remove struts and to build proper sluices which were causing the retardation and backflow of the natural flow of surface waters.

(f) The Drainage District was negligent in allowing MOPAC and CP&L to build without permits, proper engineering standards, and a proper bridge design.

(g) The Drainage District failed to act when notified by the railroad that they were relying on CP&L's incorrect standard of care downstream.

(2) Negligence Per Se

[The residents] were damaged by the conduct of Defendants in altering the natural flow and diverting and impounding surface waters near their homes and properties in violation of Texas Water Code section 11.086;3 Texas Revised Civil Statutes articles 6320,4 6325,5 6328;6 and Texas Water Code sections 56.115,7 56.116,8 56.117,9 56.119,10 56.121,11 56.133,12 and 56.134.13

The Drainage District failed to control, supervise and maintain all improvements referred to in this petition and failed to keep them in repair.

(3) Gross Negligence

The Drainage District's actions constituted gross negligence in that the same was performed without any appropriate engineering and with knowledge that damage to property owners was highly likely and with apparent absence of concern for the rights and welfare of such property owners.

(4) Strict Liability

Defendants have an absolute duty to prevent the occurrence of flooding.

(5) Nuisance

The design defect at the bridge is a nuisance.

(6) Nuisance per se

The City of San Benito failed to supervise the Drainage District and to keep the city in the proper state for the safety and welfare of the people.

(7) Inverse Condemnation

Defendants, except the Drainage District, have inversely condemned [the residents'] land for use of storage of water due to embankment created in E-drain when the trestle bridge was replaced.

(8) Res Ipsa Loquitur

But for the negligence of defendants, the flood would not have occurred.

(9) Texas Tort Claims Act (in the alternative)

[The residents] contend that the City and Drainage District are performing proprietary functions in draining the surface waters.

2. Drainage District's Motions for Summary Judgment

The Drainage District subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment.14 The Drainage District asserted that: (1) as a matter of law, all of the residents' damages were caused by an act of God; (2) it is not liable for the performance of, or failure to perform, discretionary acts; (3) it is not liable for the residents' property damages because the damages were not caused by a Drainage District employee's operation of a motor vehicle or motor-driven equipment; (4) the residents' property damages did not constitute a taking by inverse condemnation because the flood was a unique occurrence, not an inevitable recurring flood; and (5) there is no nuisance cause of action in this case. The Drainage District relied upon its pleadings, the orders of the trial court, the deposition of John James Lynn, which included records from the National Weather Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the opinion of this Court in Juan Torres, et. al. v. Harlingen Irrigation District, No. 13-93-193-CV (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi Dec. 29, 1994, no writ) (not designated for publication).15 The National Weather Service recorded 18.05 inches of rainfall in a 12-hour period on April 5, 1991. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration recorded 13.96 inches of rainfall in San Benito on that date. This represented the heaviest rainfall recorded in San Benito in one day since before 1953.

On January 16, 1997, the trial court granted a partial summary judgment on the issues of nuisance and inverse condemnation. The court refused to grant summary judgment on the issue of negligence of the Drainage District in "maintaining its drain free of debris and allowing the railroad to alter the drainage design under the railroad without allowing for proper drainage," because the court concluded that the TTCA waived immunity "for the use of property, [and] the issue here is the manner in which the water district used or maintained its property."

On June 27, 1997, the Drainage District filed a "Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment." We will refer to this motion as the district's second motion for summary judgment. In the motion, the district urged the trial court to reconsider the arguments it had presented in its original motion for...

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    • United States
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    ...of immunity under section 101.021 in order for jurisdiction to be established. Mendez v. San Benito/Cameron County Drainage Dist. No. 3, 45 S.W.3d 746, 755 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied). Hence a waiver of immunity as to the claimed negligence per se would have to have been ple......
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