Mendoza v. Neudorfer Engineers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. 36592-8-II.,36592-8-II.
• Citation: 145 Wn. App. 146,185 P.3d 1204
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Benito J. MENDOZA, an individual, Appellant, v. NEUDORFER ENGINEERS, INC., a Washington corporation, and Matt Charters, an individual, Respondents.

185 P.3d 1204

145 Wn. App. 146

Benito J. MENDOZA, an individual, Appellant, v. NEUDORFER ENGINEERS, INC., a Washington corporation, and Matt Charters, an individual, Respondents.

No. 36592-8-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

June 17, 2008.

Teri L. Rideout, John E. Wallace, Rumbaugh Rideout Barnett & Adkins, Tacoma, WA, for Appellant.

Kenneth Edward Hepworth, Lee Smart PS Inc., Seattle, WA, for Respondents.

BRIDGEWATER, J.

¶ 1 Benito J. Mendoza appeals the trial court's dismissal of a personal injury claim arising from injuries he allegedly sustained while working within the territory of Fort Lewis. The trial court dismissed the claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the injury occurred on a federal enclave. We hold that Washington courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over transitory claims when proper personal jurisdiction over the parties is established. We reverse and remand for trial.

FACTS

¶ 2 Mendoza filed a complaint, alleging negligence against Neudorfer Engineers, Inc., and Matt Charters, personally, in Pierce County Superior Court on February 1, 2007. Mendoza claimed that he was employed as a general laborer for Osborne Construction Company While working for Osborne on a project within the territory of Fort Lewis, Washington, Mendoza claimed that he suffered injuries when Charters, an employee of Neudorfer Engineers, Inc., allegedly dropped a tool on his back. Neudorfer and Osborne are both Washington corporations, and Charters and Mendoza are both Washington residents. Mendoza asserted no other causes of action against any other parties in his claim for damages.

¶ 3 Neudorfer and Charters (collectively referred to as Neudorfer) moved to dismiss Mendoza's complaint under Civil Rule 12(b)(1), claiming that Washington lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over torts committed on federal land. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice.

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

¶ 4 A court's subject-matter jurisdiction over a cause or proceeding is a question of law, we review de novo. Young v. Clark, 149 Wash.2d 130, 132, 65 P.3d 1192 (2003). And a court only has authorization to hear and determine a cause or proceeding if it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. Absent proper jurisdiction, a court may do nothing more than enter an order of dismissal. Deschenes v. King County, 83 Wash.2d 714, 716, 521 P.2d 1181 (1974).

¶ 5 Mendoza contends on appeal that the trial court erred when it dismissed his cause of action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. He argues that contrary to the trial court's decision, state courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate civil causes of action for personal injuries sustained in federal enclaves,¹ so long as proper jurisdiction can be established over the parties. Mendoza is correct.

II. Cession of Fort Lewis

¶ 6 The trial court dismissed Mendoza's claim, presumably based on Neudorfer's assertion that under the terms of its cession, Fort Lewis is subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. But Neudorfer and the trial court misinterpret the Fort Lewis cession language.

¶ 7 Cession is a method whereby a state can relinquish exclusive jurisdiction to the federal government. Ryan v. State, 188 Wash. 115, 126, 61 P.2d 1276 (1936), aff'd sub nom. Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.S. 186, 58 S.Ct. 233, 82 L.Ed. 187 (1937). Where territory is ceded, the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power:

[t]o exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, ... over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards and other needful buildings. ...

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8.

¶ 8 Furthermore, the terms of the cession determine the extent of federal jurisdiction. State v. Lane, 112 Wash.2d 464, 469, 771 P.2d 1150 (1989) (citing Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 23, 59 S.Ct. 442, 83 L.Ed. 455 (1939)); see also Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652, 50 S.Ct. 455, 74 L.Ed. 1091 (1930) (stating that when a cession is accepted, the terms of the cession are determinative of the jurisdiction of both the federal government and the state within the enclave). Here, Washington ceded the land on which Fort Lewis is situated in 1919. Lane, 112 Wash.2d at 469, 771 P.2d 1150. The terms of the cession stated:

[T]he consent of the State of Washington is hereby given to the exercise by the congress of the United States of exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such tracts or parcels of land so conveyed ... provided, That all civil process issued from the courts of this state and such criminal process as may issue under the authority of this state, against any person charged with crime in cases arising outside of said reservation, may be served and executed thereon in the same mode and manner and by the same officers as if the consent herein given had not been made.

Laws of 1917, ch. 3, § 20, p. 14 (emphasis added).

¶ 9 "Exclusive `legislation' has been construed to mean exclusive `jurisdiction' in the sense of exclusive sovereignty." Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 123 (5th Cir.1952) (citing Surplus Trading Co., 281 U.S. at 652, 50 S.Ct. 455). "[W]here a cession of jurisdiction is made by a state to the federal government, it is necessarily one of political power and leaves no authority in the state government thereafter to legislate over the ceded territory." State v. Rainier Nat'l Park Co., 192 Wash. 592, 594, 74 P.2d 464 (1937) (emphasis added). Contrary to Neudorfer's contention, exclusive jurisdiction in the sense of exclusive sovereignty does not divest state courts of jurisdiction over personal injury causes of action. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458, 110 S.Ct. 792, 107 L.Ed.2d 887 (1990) (holding that "state courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the laws of the United States."); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477-78, 101 S.Ct. 2870, 69 L.Ed.2d 784 (1981).

¶ 10 Indeed, in Gulf Offshore, the United States Supreme Court emphasized state courts' inherent concurrent jurisdiction over causes of action arising in federal territories. In Gulf Shore, the issue was whether Texas courts had jurisdiction over a civil personal injury case stemming from the plaintiff's alleged injuries arising under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et. seq. (1976 & Supp. III). Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 475, 101 S.Ct. 2870. The Shelf is federal territory, subject to the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the United States. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 478, 483, 101 S.Ct. 2870. Gulf Offshore argued that because the United States had "exclusive jurisdiction" over the Shelf, state courts had no authority to exercise judicial jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 480, 101 S.Ct. 2870.

¶ 11 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that Gulf Offshore "confus[ed] the political jurisdiction of a State with its judicial jurisdiction." Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 481, 101 S.Ct. 2870. It further stated that "[n]othing inherent in exclusive federal sovereignty over a territory precludes a state court from entertaining a personal injury suit concerning events occurring in the territory and governed by federal law." Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 481, 101 S.Ct. 2870 (citing Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 244 U.S. 68, 37 S.Ct. 599, 61 L.Ed. 997 (1917)). "That the location of the event giving rise to the suit is an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction rather than another State, does not introduce any new limitation on the forum State's subject-matter jurisdiction." Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 481-82, 101 S.Ct. 2870 (citing Ohio River Contract, 244 U.S. at 72, 37 S.Ct. 599). It further reasoned that "[s]tate courts routinely exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over civil cases arising from events in other States and governed by the other States' laws." Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 481, 101 S.Ct. 2870; see, e.g., Rice v. Dow Chem. Co., 124 Wash.2d 205, 875 P.2d 1213 (1994) (product liability cause of action arising in Oregon was properly adjudicated by a Washington court). Thus, exclusive political jurisdiction does not automatically divest state courts of their inherent jurisdiction. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 481-82, 101 S.Ct. 2870.

¶ 12 Similarly, in this case, Neudorfer confuses political jurisdiction with the state's judicial jurisdiction. If Mendoza's injuries occurred in a neighboring state, there would be no question that Washington courts could exercise proper subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim. That the injuries were allegedly inflicted within a federal enclave, Fort Lewis, does not limit Washington's subject-matter jurisdiction. Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 481, 101 S.Ct. 2870. Additionally, the ceding language, "exclusive legislation in all cases," does not limit Washington's subject-matter jurisdiction over civil claims arising on Fort Lewis.² Laws of 1917, ch. 3, § 20, p. 14; see Gulf Offshore, 453 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. 2870; Mater, 200 F.2d at 123. Therefore, the trial court's dismissal of Mendoza's cause of action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was in error.

III. Criminal Actions Versus Personal Injury Actions Arising on Fort Lewis

¶ 13 Neudorfer's misunderstanding of subject-matter jurisdiction is illustrated by its reliance on Lane to support its contention that the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over tortious acts committed on Fort Lewis. Lane was a criminal case, wherein the Washington Supreme Court decided whether Washington courts had jurisdiction under the state criminal jurisdiction statute, RCW 9A.04.030(1),³ to prosecute defendants for a murder that occurred on Fort Lewis. Lane, 112 Wash.2d at 471, 771 P.2d 1150. The Supreme Court held that the State had jurisdiction because the State presented sufficient facts to lead a...