Methene v. State
| Decision Date | 30 November 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 34A02-9901-CR-44.,34A02-9901-CR-44. |
| Citation | 720 N.E.2d 384 |
| Parties | Mark METHENE, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Matthew J. Elkin, Deputy Public Defender, Kokomo, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, Sarah E. Scherrer, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee.
Mark Methene appeals his conviction of Dealing in Cocaine, a Class A felony, following a jury trial. The trial court sentenced Methene to thirty years imprisonment. The dispositive issue for our review is whether the trial court erred when it denied Methene's motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his residence.1
We reverse.
On September 18, 1996, Kokomo Police Officer Douglas Mason sought a warrant to search Methene's residence. The probable cause affidavit submitted to the judge provided in relevant part:
The Affiant is a four year veteran with the Kokomo Police Department currently assigned to narcotics and illegal drug investigations. During the past 52 hours the Affiant met with a confidential and reliable informant regarding the above location (1317 North Purdum Street, Kokomo, IN). Under controlled circumstances and under the direction of the Affiant, this informant visited 1317 North Purdum Street. During that visit the informant purchased a quantity of white rock-like substance which was reported by Mr. Methene to be crack cocaine. The informant gave Mr. Methene one hundred dollars ($100.00) in U.S. currency during this transaction. The informant has purchased crack cocaine in the past and is familiar with the appearance and packaging of crack cocaine.
Record at 111-12. Based entirely on the foregoing affidavit, a search warrant was issued for Methene's residence and police officers of the Howard County Drug Task Force executed the warrant. During the search, the officers found cash, weighing devices, three handguns, and approximately thirty-four grams of cocaine. The State subsequently charged Methene with dealing in cocaine, as a class A felony.
A jury trial commenced on May 19, 1998. During trial, Methene moved to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search of his residence. The trial court denied his motion. That jury trial ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The trial court then set a new trial date.
Prior to his second jury trial, Methene filed a written motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his residence. Following a hearing, the trial court again denied Methene's motion. During the second jury trial held on December 15, 1998, Methene asserted a continuing objection to the admission of all evidence obtained as a result of the search of his residence. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Methene guilty as charged. This appeal ensued.
The sole dispositive issue for our review is whether the trial court erred when it denied Methene's motion to suppress. We review the denial of a motion to suppress in a manner similar to other sufficiency matters. Taylor v. State, 689 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind.1997). We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. However, unlike the typical sufficiency of the evidence case where only the evidence favorable to the verdict is considered, we must also consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant. Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 434 (Ind.1993).
The task of the magistrate in deciding whether to issue a search warrant "is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The duty of the reviewing court is to determine whether the magistrate had a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable cause existed. Figert v. State, 686 N.E.2d 827, 830 (Ind.1997). "[S]ubstantial basis requires the reviewing court, with significant deference to the magistrate's determination, to focus on whether reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence support the determination" of probable cause. Houser v. State, 678 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ind.1997). "Reviewing court" includes both the trial court in ruling on a motion to suppress and the appellate court reviewing that decision. Id. at 98. "In this review, we consider only the evidence presented to the issuing magistrate and not post hoc justifications for the search." Jaggers v. State, 687 N.E.2d 180, 182 (Ind.1997). Although we accord great deference to the magistrate's probable cause determination, we review the trial court's ruling on a motion to exclude seized evidence de novo. Houser, 678 N.E.2d at 98.
Methene first contends that the affidavit for probable cause was supported, in part, by the hearsay statements of a confidential informant ("CI") and that the affidavit did not establish the credibility of the CI.2 Both the United States Supreme Court and the Indiana legislature have set forth requirements to ensure that hearsay used to support a probable cause finding is reliable. Lloyd v. State, 677 N.E.2d 71, 73 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), trans. denied. The Supreme Court in Gates was unequivocal in concluding that uncorroborated hearsay from a source whose credibility is itself unknown cannot support the finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant. Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 182 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 227, 103 S.Ct. 2317). The hearsay must exhibit some hallmarks of reliability. Id. The Gates court indicated that the trustworthiness of hearsay for purposes of proving probable cause can be established in a number of ways, including where (1) the informant has given correct information in the past; (2) independent police investigation corroborates the informant's statements; (3) some basis for the informant's knowledge is shown; or (4) the informant predicts conduct or activities by the suspect that are not ordinarily easily predicted. Id. "Depending on the facts, other considerations may come into play in establishing the reliability of the informant or the hearsay." Id.
Likewise, Indiana Code Section 35-33-5-2(b) has codified changes in Fourth Amendment doctrine on the use of informants to establish probable cause. Jaggers, 687 N.E.2d at 183. That statute provides that an affidavit based on hearsay must either:
IND.CODE § 35-33-5-2. "When seeking either a search or an arrest warrant, the police must follow the warrant statute, which specifies the minimum information necessary to establish probable cause." Esquerdo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1023, 1029 (Ind.1994) (citation and footnote omitted).
In the present case, Officer Mason did not offer any information to the issuing magistrate to establish the CI's reliability under the federal standard or subsection (b)(1) of our warrant statute. There is no factual basis to support a finding that the CI had given correct information to police in the past or the CI's hearsay that Methene "does keep crack cocaine inside the house." The CI did not predict conduct or activities by Methene that would have corroborated her hearsay statement. Neither the judicial officer who issues the warrant nor the reviewing court can rely on the affiant's representation that an informant is "reliable" without an independent factual basis to support that representation. The affiant's judgment cannot be substituted for that of a neutral and detached magistrate.
Subsection (b)(2) of the warrant statute was also not satisfied because the totality of the circumstances did not corroborate the hearsay. The State argues that the CI's hearsay information...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Frasier v. State
...probable cause determination, we review de novo the trial court's decision on a motion to suppress seized evidence. Methene v. State, 720 N.E.2d 384, 388 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). A. Thermal Our review of probable cause in the present case is somewhat complicated by the use of thermal imaging by ......
-
Whaley v. State
...residence and returns directly, and they closely watch all entrances to the residence throughout the transaction. Methene v. State, 720 N.E.2d 384, 389-390 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (quoting Flaherty v. State, 443 N.E.2d 340, 341 (Ind.Ct.App. 1982)). The record indicates that this is the procedure ......
-
Heyen v. State
...the affiant's personal observation of a controlled buy may be sufficient as grounds for finding probable cause." Methene v. State, 720 N.E.2d 384, 390 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). Under such circumstances, even where the informant is not reliable, a court may accept the personal observations of the a......
-
State v. Fridy
...cause determination, but we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence de novo. Id. at 1016; Methene v. State, 720 N.E.2d 384, 388 (Ind.Ct.App.1999); Hensley v. State, 778 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). On review, we determine whether the trial court had a "substanti......