Metheny v. State

• Decision Date: 04 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. A90A2293,A90A2293
• Citation: 400 S.E.2d 25,197 Ga.App. 882
• Parties: METHENY v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 25

400 S.E.2d 25

197 Ga.App. 882

METHENY v. The STATE.

No. A90A2293.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Dec. 4, 1990.

Walter J. Clarke, for appellant.

Thomas C. Lawler, III, Dist. Atty. and Debra K. Turner, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.

DEEN, Presiding Judge.

After a jury trial, Robert Lee Metheny was convicted of the offense of habitual violator for operating a motor vehicle after having received notice that his driver's license had been revoked pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-58. He appeals from the judgment entered on the conviction. Held:

1. Metheny contends that after a hearing pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), the trial court erred by failing to exclude statements, admitted in the prosecution's case-in-chief, that he made to police officers before he was given warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The record at the Jackson-Denno hearing shows that, while on routine patrol at night, a Gwinnett County police officer observed a pickup truck off the road and stuck in the mud at the bottom of a ten foot embankment. The vehicle was facing up the embankment with the lights on, the motor running and the wheels spinning. The driver's door was open. The officer observed Metheny sitting behind the wheel of the truck attempting to move the vehicle. After calling for assistance, the officer walked down the embankment to investigate the situation. He asked Metheny to step out of the vehicle and tell him what had happened. Metheny said another vehicle had run off the road, and while helping the other vehicle, his vehicle became stuck. When asked where the other vehicle was located, Metheny responded that it had left the scene. The officer asked Metheny to walk over to his patrol car, where a second officer had arrived in response to the call for assistance. At that point the first officer briefed the arriving officer on his findings and told him that, because there was no sign of another vehicle, he suspected the truck had accidentally run off the road, and also that Metheny appeared to have been drinking. Then pursuant to department custom, the ranking officer, who arrived first on the scene, turned the investigation over to the junior officer. The junior officer, who also observed signs that appellant had consumed alcohol, again asked Metheny what happened, and appellant gave the same explanation previously given. The officer then asked Metheny to produce his driver's license and proof of insurance. After appellant could produce neither, the officer ran a computer check from his patrol car and discovered that Metheny's license had been revoked. He then informed appellant that he was placing him under arrest for the offense of habitual violator. Metheny responded that the officer "didn't have anything on him; that he wasn't driving." The officer said, "You just told me you pulled up to help someone out of the ditch." And Metheny replied, "No, I wasn't driving."

It is undisputed that Metheny was not advised of his Miranda rights. Appellant objected to the admission of all statements made by appellant to the officers at the scene of the investigation and arrest. On these facts the trial court ruled that all of the statements were voluntary and admissible because: (1) they occurred in a non-custodial investigation prior to arrest to which Miranda has no application, and (2) the statements made after arrest were spontaneous and not in response to any police questioning. At trial, witnesses for the state testified as to the statements as part of the state's case-in-chief.

Our review of the trial court's ruling requires that we analyze four interrelated issues: (a) whether the statements were made while appellant was in police custody; (b) whether the statements were inadmissible in the state's case-in-chief because of the failure to give Miranda warnings; (c) whether the statements were voluntary under traditional due process analysis; (d) if the statements should have been excluded, whether their admission could constitute harmless error.

(a) Only in-custody statements by the accused give rise to the issues of voluntariness and the Miranda warnings. "The test for determining whether a person is 'in custody' at a traffic stop is if a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have thought the detention would not be temporary." Hughes v. State, 259 Ga. 227, 228, 378 S.E.2d 853 (1989); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). Police officers at the scene of a traffic stop may conduct a general on-the-scene investigation, which may even require that persons be temporarily detained, without such being classified as custodial interrogation. Mason v. State, 177 Ga.App. 184, 185, 338 S.E.2d 706 (1985); Webb v. State, 179 Ga.App. 101, 102-103, 345 S.E.2d 648 (1986). Nothing the officers did prior to placing Metheny under arrest would have reasonably communicated to him that he was in custody. Testimony by the officers that Metheny would not have been allowed to leave the scene did not establish he was in custody, especially since this decision was never communicated to Metheny, and therefore could have no bearing on appellant's perception under the Berkemer rule. Mason v. State, supra at 177 Ga.App. 184-185, 338 S.E.2d 706. There was ample evidence to support the trial court's determination that appellant was not in custody until he was formally arrested. Since the trial court's factual determination was not clearly erroneous we must accept it. State v. Louis, 185 Ga.App. 529, 530, 364 S.E.2d 896 (1988). Having determined that Metheny was not in custody until his actual arrest, the remaining issues are addressed only to the statements he made to the police after he was informed of his arrest.

(b) It is undisputed that Metheny was not given the Miranda warnings prior to the in-custody statements at issue. The prosecution is barred from using any statements in its case-in-chief, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, obtained from a suspect during custodial interrogation, unless it first demonstrates that the suspect was afforded the procedural safeguards against self-incrimination known as the Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, supra at 384 U.S. 444, at 86 S.Ct. 1612. We have no difficulty with the first statement in which Metheny responded to being placed under arrest by stating that the officer "didn't have anything on him; that he wasn't driving." Since this statement was not given in response to a question posed by police, it does not come within the definition of custodial interrogation in Miranda, and therefore it was admissible. Miranda v. Arizona, supra at 384 U.S. 444-445, 478, at 86 S.Ct. 1612, 1629-1630; Delay v. State, 258 Ga. 229, 231, 367 S.E.2d 806 (1988). With respect to the second statement, we find that the officer's comment directed to Metheny, "You just told me you pulled up to help someone out of the ditch," was the functional equivalent of express questioning, which he "should know ... [was] reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Compare Zubiadul v. State, 193 Ga.App. 235, 237, 387 S.E.2d 431 (1989); Davis v. State, 191 Ga.App. 566, 568, 382 S.E.2d 396 (1989); Lowe v. State, 179 Ga.App. 377, 379, 346 S.E.2d 845 (1986); Williams v. State, 178 Ga.App. 581, 590-591, 344 S.E.2d 247 (1986) (illustrating factual circumstances falling short of custodial interrogation). In fact, the officer's comment did elicit the response, "No, I wasn't driving." For purposes of Miranda analysis, it makes no difference that the thrust of the statement itself was exculpatory since the state seeks to benefit from the incriminating impact on the defendant's credibility by contrasting this statement with other conflicting statements. The trial court committed clear error by failing to exclude this statement from the state's case-in-chief under the principles enunciated in Miranda.

(c) We next address the issue of whether the in-custody statement admitted in violation of Miranda was, nevertheless, voluntary under traditional due process standards. Statements obtained in violation of the procedural requirements of Miranda may be found otherwise voluntary under due process standards. Green v. State, 154 Ga.App. 295, 297-298, 267 S.E.2d 898 (1980); See Platt v. State, 163 Ga.App. 776, 296 S.E.2d 113 (1982). At a Jackson-Denno hearing the due process clause requires that "the state must prove voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence [cits.], and in order to make this determination, the judge must consider the 'totality of the circumstances' surrounding the statement [Cits.] It is not merely an inquiry based solely on Miranda, although the presence of these warnings is significant in deciding the voluntariness question." Pierce v. State, 238 Ga. 126, 129, 231 S.E.2d 744 (1977). "Prior to Miranda the admissibility of an accused's in-custody statements was judged solely by whether they were 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. [Cits.] If a suspect's statements had been obtained by 'techniques and methods offensive to due process' [cits.], or under circumstances in which the suspect clearly had no opportunity to exercise 'a free and unconstrained will' [cits.], the statements would not be admitted." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1290, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985); see Jackson v. Denno, supra. "Indeed, even after holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies in the context of custodial interrogation, [cit.] and is binding on the States, [cit.] the Court has continued to measure confessions against the requirements of due process." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110, 106 S.Ct. 445, 449, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985). "The failure of police to administer Miranda warnings does not mean that the...