Meyer v. State

• Docket Number: 2022-00121,Claim No. 136748
• Decision Date: 08 February 2023
• Citation: 213 A.D.3d 753,183 N.Y.S.3d 521
• Parties: Claudia MEYER, appellant, v. STATE of New York, respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

213 A.D.3d 753

183 N.Y.S.3d 521

Claudia MEYER, appellant,

v.STATE of New York, respondent.

2022-00121

Claim No. 136748

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—January 12, 2023

February 8, 2023

Phillips & Paolicelli, LLP, New York, NY (Ari L. Taub of counsel), for appellant.

Letitia James, Attorney General, New York, NY (Ester Murdukhayeva and Blair J. Greenwald of counsel), for respondent.

BETSY BARROS, J.P., REINALDO E. RIVERA, LARA J. GENOVESI, HELEN VOUTSINAS, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In a claim, inter alia, to recover damages for negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, the claimant appeals from an order of the Court of Claims (Catherine Leahy–Scott, J.), dated November 23, 2021. The order granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the claim.

ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the matter is remitted to the Court of Claims for a new determination of the defendant's motion to dismiss the claim in accordance herewith.

In August 2021, the claimant commenced this claim against the State of New York pursuant to the Child Victims Act (hereinafter the CVA), which "provides, inter alia, that civil actions brought by any person for physical, psychological, or other injury suffered as a result of conduct that would constitute a sex crime, that was committed against such person when they were less than 18 years of age, may now be commenced against any party ‘whose intentional or negligent acts or omissions are alleged to have resulted in the commission of [such] conduct’ up until the date the plaintiff reaches the age of 55 ( CPLR 208[b] )" ( S.H. v. Diocese of Brooklyn, 205 A.D.3d 180, 184, 167 N.Y.S.3d 171 ). "Prior to enactment of the CVA, the applicable statute of limitations for such actions typically would begin to run when the victim reached the age of 18" ( id. at 184, 167 N.Y.S.3d 171 ; see former CPLR 208 [L 1986, ch 485, § 1]).

The claim alleges that "[s]tarting in approximately 1978," when the claimant was "approximately 13 years old," she was "repeatedly sexually assaulted by Curtis West, an employee of the Ramapo Community Workshop" (hereinafter the Workshop), which was operated by, among others, the State. The purpose of the Workshop was to provide a safe environment and counseling, including drug and alcohol counseling and crisis management, to vulnerable minors such as the claimant. The Workshop took referrals of "troubled and/or at-risk youth" from the Ramapo Justice Court Diversionary Project. The claim alleges that in 1975 the Workshop hired West as a temporary staff member. In 1978, the Workshop hired West as a full-time counselor. The claim alleges that, prior to the sexual misconduct committed by West, West had been dishonorably discharged from the military and had a history of violence and other misconduct. The claim alleges that the State failed to administer a Civil Service Test upon West until 1982, that when it finally administered that test West failed the test, and that he was fired in 1982 for failing the test and for being "too friendly" with minor females at the Workshop. The claim alleges that eight months after terminating West's employment, the Workshop rehired West.

The claim alleges that West, acting in his capacity as a counselor at the Workshop, manipulated and coerced the claimant to submit to sexual contact with him and duped her into believing that it was a form of treatment and therapy. Starting in 1978 and continuing until 1982, West engaged in sexual misconduct, including intercourse and oral sex, with the claimant "multiple times." The claim alleges that, "[i]n or about 1983," the claimant reported West's sexual misconduct to authorities, and West was thereafter arrested and prosecuted. The claim alleges that West pleaded guilty to rape and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 to 5 years. The claim alleges causes of action to recover damages for, inter alia, negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, reckless and willful misconduct, and "breach of statutory duties to report."

The State moved to dismiss the claim on the ground, among others, that the claim failed to comply with Court of Claims Act § 11(b) because it did not specify the exact dates on which the alleged sexual abuse occurred. In an order dated November 23, 2021, the Court of Claims granted the State's motion on that ground. In light of its determination, the court did not address the State's remaining grounds for dismissal of the claim. The claimant appeals.

" ‘[B]ecause suits against the State are allowed only by the State's waiver of sovereign immunity and in derogation of the common law, statutory requirements conditioning suit must be strictly construed’ " ( Lichtenstein v. State of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 911, 913, 690 N.Y.S.2d 851, 712 N.E.2d 1218, quoting Dreger v. New York State Thruway Auth., 81 N.Y.2d 721, 724, 593 N.Y.S.2d 758, 609 N.E.2d 111 ; see Lepkowski v. State of New York, 1 N.Y.3d 201, 206–207, 770 N.Y.S.2d 696, 802 N.E.2d 1094 ). Court of Claims Act § 11(b) "places five specific substantive conditions upon the State's waiver of sovereign immunity by requiring the claim to specify (1) the nature of [the claim]; (2) the time when it arose; (3) the place where it arose; (4) the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained; and (5) the total sum claimed" ( Lepkowski v. State of New York, 1 N.Y.3d at 207, 770 N.Y.S.2d 696, 802 N.E.2d 1094 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

The "guiding principle informing" section 11(b) ’s pleading requirements is that the information be sufficiently definite " ‘to enable the State ... to investigate the claim[s] promptly and to ascertain its liability under the circumstances’ " ( Lepkowski v. State of New York, 1 N.Y.3d at 207, 770 N.Y.S.2d 696, 802 N.E.2d 1094, quoting Heisler v. State of New York, 78 A.D.2d 767, 767, 433 N.Y.S.2d 646 ). "[A]bsolute exactness is not required" ( Kimball Brooklands Corp. v. State of New York, 180 A.D.3d 1031, 121 N.Y.S.3d 129 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Morra v. State of New York, 107 A.D.3d 1115, 1115, 967 N.Y.S.2d 169 ; Heisler v. State of New York, 78 A.D.2d at 767, 433 N.Y.S.2d 646 ), but the "Court of Claims Act does not require the State to ferret out or assemble information that section 11(b) obligates the claimant to allege" ( Lepkowski v. State of New York, 1 N.Y.3d at 208, 770 N.Y.S.2d 696, 802 N.E.2d 1094 ). The determination whether a claimant's statement of the "time when" the claim arose is sufficiently definite to enable the State to investigate and ascertain its liability under the circumstances is a sui generis determination depending upon the nature of the claim and specificity of allegations set forth in the claim.

Here, the claim is brought under the CVA, which revived the time to commence civil actions based upon certain "conduct which would constitute a sexual offense" committed against children less than 18 years of age (see S.H. v. Diocese of Brooklyn, 205 A.D.3d at 186, 167 N.Y.S.3d 171 ; Pisula v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 201 A.D.3d 88, 98–99, 159 N.Y.S.3d 458 ), and created a window period running from the effective date of the CVA to two years and six months for civil actions for which the statute of limitations has already expired (see CPLR 214–g ). As part of the CVA, Court of Claims Act § 10(10) was amended to reflect that the time limitations set forth in section 10 would not apply to "any claim to recover damages for physical, psychological, or other...